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1. Introduction
The McKell Institute is an independent, 
not-for-profit public policy institute 
dedicated to developing practical 
policy ideas and contributing  
to public debate.
The McKell Institute’s key areas of activity include producing policy research papers,  
hosting policy roundtable discussions and organising public lectures and debates.
The McKell Institute takes its name from New South Wales’ wartime Premier and  
Governor–General of Australia, William McKell. 
William McKell made a powerful contribution to both New South Wales and Australian 
society through progressive social, economic and environmental reforms.
For more information phone (02) 9113 0944 or visit www.mckellinstitute.org.au
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The opinions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily  
represent the views of the McKell Institute’s members, affiliates,  
individual board members or research committee members.  
Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
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8The origins of Long Service Leave can 
be traced back to the 19th century as an 
entitlement referred to as a furlough given 
to civil servants which enabled those who 
had served for a long period of time to 
travel ‘home’ to Britain, confident that they 
could return to Australia and return to their 
previous job. 
The entitlement was transformed from leave 
provided to visit Britain, to leave provided after a 
long period of employment for workers to have a 
break and return to work fresh and renewed. 
During the post-war years, Long Service Leave 
spread from the public sector to the private sector, 
and soon was legislated as a basic entitlement in 
State and Territory Parliaments. While the length 
of leave and qualification periods vary from State 
to State, the general entitlement a worker receives 
is two months leave after ten continuous years of 
service with the same employer.  
However, due to the changing nature of 
employment, Australian workers are more 
frequently changing jobs and careers. This has 
meant Long Service Leave in its current form 
has become inaccessible to the overwhelming 
majority of Australian workers.  
Only one in four Australian workers stay with  
the same employer for 10 years. 
This is not due to a change in the ‘loyalty’ of 
workers to one employer, but a simple reality of 
the changing dynamic of the Australian labour 
market. 
Now more than ever before, Australian workers 
are struggling to balance their work commitments 
with their family and other life commitments.  
This is in no small part due to the changing 
nature of our labour market and the fact that 
Australians work some of the longest hours in the 
world. They also stay in the workforce for longer 
than previously. 
Recent surveys have shown well over 50% of 
Australian workers would rather have an extra 
two weeks annual leave then take the equivalent 
annual pay rise.  
In this context, the McKell Institute believes the 
time has come to again restructure Long Service 
Leave and create a 21st century entitlement by 
making Long Service Leave fully portable. 
If Long Service Leave were to follow  
a worker as they change jobs and  
long servIce leave Is unIque to australIa 
and new Zealand.
Foreword
9careers (as our superannuation does), 
the majority of Australian workers would  
again be able to take a well earned  
break after a long period of time in  
the workforce. 
The McKell Institute is proud to present  
this report by Professor Raymond Markey  
and his colleagues at the Macquarie  
University Centre for Workforce Futures. 
The report provides the most comprehensive 
framework for the establishment of  
a National Portable Long Service Leave  
Scheme ever produced in Australia. 
The report will provide a basis for deliberation, 
consideration and discussion around this 
significant and timely proposal. 
An entitlement that began as a furlough  
to visit Britain was transformed into  
Long Service Leave to provide a decent  
break for workers partway through  
their working life. 
That objective is as relevant today as ever, but 
the changing nature of the way we work requires 
us to again re-invent this entitlement so that it 
achieves its intended ends. 
Such a change will ensure that the majority  
of Australian workers receive a well earned  
break partway through their increasingly  
longer working lives. 
The Hon John Watkins
chaIr,  
McKell InstItute 
Peter Bentley 
executIve dIrector,  
McKell InstItute
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This report examines the feasibility of 
a nationally consistent portable long 
service leave (PLSL) scheme for Australia. 
Traditionally, three reasons have been 
cited for providing long service leave (LSL) 
benefits:  
 to reduce labour turnover;
 to provide a reward for long and faithful 
service; and
 to enable employees halfway through their 
working life to recover their energies and return 
to work renewed, refreshed, and reinvigorated.
The third objective, in particular, is becoming 
increasingly important to Australian workers. 
Australians are spending larger proportions of their 
lifetimes in employment and growing numbers of 
workers are remaining in the workforce at older 
ages. As the length of time in work increases, the 
importance of LSL entitlements – particularly for 
those who work in physically or mentally exhausting 
jobs – becomes increasingly evident. 
Despite this, high mobility trends in the profile 
of Australia’s workforce have resulted in a low 
proportion of workers being able to access LSL 
benefits  – some due to employment choices 
and others for structural reasons. Recognising 
this, a small number of industries with high 
structural job mobility, such as construction and 
contract cleaning, have introduced portable 
long service schemes (PLSLs). These schemes 
have successfully improved access for a small 
percentage of workers. This report examines the 
feasibility of introducing a nationally consistent PLSL 
scheme that would cover all workers, including 
those who are casual, permanent full-time and 
permanent part-time.
Methodology
This report assesses trends in the Australian 
labour force based on data from the census, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and from 
the survey of Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA). We also prepared 
projections of future labour force patterns and 
reviewed the development of LSL in Australia. 
The full report summarises key features of 
minimum LSL entitlements and industry-based 
PLSL arrangements. We analysed annual and 
actuarial reports and reviews of these schemes 
and conducted interviews with key stakeholders, 
including fund administrators and the employer 
and worker representatives of their boards, to gain 
further insights into how effectively these schemes 
operate, their financial stability, and their costs and 
benefits.
We consider three approaches for extending 
PLSL to a broader range of workers. Employers 
will naturally be concerned about the additional 
cost of PLSL benefits, therefore we have provided 
cost calculations for typical LSL benefits. These 
illustrate the factors which are likely to affect 
the overall cost, including benefit accrual rates, 
investment returns, wage increases, benefit 
design, workforce mobility, leave taking patterns, 
and administrative arrangements. This illustration 
should not be used as an estimate of the costs of 
any particular scheme. Further, the cost analyses 
do not address savings and potential tax benefits 
that employers may gain as a result of introducing 
a PLSL scheme, nor the financial benefits to 
government and the community. 
the case for a natIonal Portable  
long servIce leave scheMe In australIa
Executive summary
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Section 2. 
Labour force trends  
and their implications  
for access to LSL  
Labour force participation  
and time spent in employment  
are both increasing
Australians are spending more of their lifetimes 
in employment. For new-born males in 2011 the 
expected lifetime number of years in employment is 
36.8 years, and 31.9 years for females. There are also 
increases in the numbers of males and females in the 
later working and post standard retirement ages. The 
number of females aged 60 to 69 in employment rose 
by 169.7% between 2001 and 2011, whilst for males 
aged 65 to 69 the number in employment also more 
than doubled (an increase of 124.1%).
The median age of employed males is projected 
to increase to 41.9 years in 2021 and that for 
employed females to 41.6 years. The percentage of 
the employed who are aged 45 or over is projected 
to increase for males from 39.6% in 2011 to 43.1% 
in 2021, and for females from 38.8% to 42.8%. 
Australian workers are highly  
mobile, but mobility rates  
differ across the workforce
Mobility is high with almost 1 in 5 workers employed 
by their current employer for less than one year 
(ABS 2012b). 
Labour mobility differs across sectors and is highest 
among those employed in industries such as: 
mining; wholesale trade; transport and logistics; 
rental, hiring and real estate; business and personal 
services; and healthcare. 
Implications for access to LSL
There is a low prevalence of long-term employment 
relationships, with around three in four workers 
working with their employer for less than 10 years 
(including many that have worked in the labour 
force for a longer period). Given that 10 years is the 
usual qualifying period for LSL, the structural trend 
away from long-term employment is limiting access 
to LSL entitlement for a significant share of the 
Australian workforce. 
Benefits from LSL portability are more likely among 
workers aged 35 to 54, female workers and workers 
engaged in particular (generally lower-skilled) non-
managerial service and blue-collar occupations. 
Notably, the highest mobility rates are reflected in 
occupations that tend to be characterised by high 
rates of contract and casual labour. It is a highly 
gendered issue because of the predominance of 
women in the casual and part-time workforce.
Section 3. 
Long Service Leave  
in Australia 
As a statutory right to a sustained period of leave 
after an extended period of employment, LSL is a 
distinctively Australian provision, with origins going 
back to the 19th century. Most States currently 
provide 8.67 weeks LSL after 10 years of service. 
Workers are entitled to LSL again after every 
additional 5 year period in most jurisdictions.  
These schemes are typically State-wide and provide 
an entitlement to LSL for workers who complete 
continuous service with the one employer. This 
entitlement is not portable within an industry or 
across employers.
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PLSL entitlements are widely available to public 
sector workers in the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory public sectors.  They are most prevalent in 
building and construction, mining, contract cleaning 
and community services.
Feedback from stakeholders about 
PLSL schemes
Representatives of employers, employees, and 
administrators involved in the management of 
established PLSL schemes generally present 
a positive view of these schemes and see the 
advantages of PLSL as outweighing its costs. 
A number of interviewees (including employer 
representatives) said that PLSL allows workers 
to receive their LSL entitlements, and that the 
levy system is an effective way of collecting funds 
without imposing an administrative burden on 
employers. However, some interviewees said that 
the obligation to make LSL payments into industry 
funds effectively imposes an additional cost burden 
on employers operating in industries where the 
profit margins are typically very small. Stakeholders’ 
detailed comments are summarised as follows.
Potential advantages  
of PLSL schemes
 Retention of workers – PLSL schemes 
address challenges in retaining employees in 
industries with high levels of labour mobility. 
 Equity – Workers in highly casualised or contract 
roles otherwise have no practical access.
 Mobility and flexibility – Workers have more 
capacity to move between employers or to 
take short periods out of employment to meet 
commitments such as carer responsibilities.
 Productivity and work environment – 
The capacity to take a sustained period of 
leave to rejuvenate after a lengthy period of 
continued work has advantages for boosting 
productivity and morale.
 Employee attraction – A benefit for “good 
employers” as employees feel less compelled 
to stay in poorly managed workplaces in order 
to meet LSL eligibility requirements.
 Non-compliance problems reduced – 
Employers pay for entitlements as they accrue.
 Free-riding problems reduced – Industry-
based LSL schemes mean that all employers 
are obliged to fund LSL entitlements, 
regardless of whether they retain employees 
who reach the vesting period for taking leave.
 Administrative benefits for employers – 
Industry funds effectively remove from employers 
the responsibility for administering LSL 
arrangements and payment for employees. 
 Cost certainty – Greater cost stability is 
provided to employers because the pay-as-you-
go operation limits the potential for employers 
to accumulate liabilities and not being able to 
pay employees their entitlements if they become 
insolvent or have trading difficulties.
 Tax benefits – Employers can claim a tax 
deduction for payment of the levies, and the 
portable industry funds are not required to pay 
tax on their investment income. 
Potential disadvantages  
of LSL portability
 Administration costs for employers – 
This factor is pronounced during 
transitional periods of newly established 
schemes. However, recent improvements 
in administrative software and systems 
were cited by administrators and employer 
representatives as significantly reducing the 
administrative burden and cost.
 Financial costs of providing benefits for 
employees who leave after a short period 
of service – In industries where many workers 
do not achieve the qualifying period under non-
portable schemes, PLSL has effectively imposed 
an additional financial cost for employers. 
 Prefunding impact on business cash flows – 
Smaller employers may fail to provide for LSL 
benefits in their accounting systems and simply 
pay LSL payments from consolidated revenues 
as required. The PLSL schemes require 
employers to prefund these benefit payments, 
which impacts the employers’ cash flows.
13
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Additional benefits of LSL
Although there is limited research into the benefits 
of LSL specifically, research into annual leave 
sheds light on the need for LSL. In general the 
importance of leave from work for employee health, 
well-being and work/life balance has been widely 
acknowledged. Long hours of work with a lack of 
adequate leave have been associated with stress-
related illness, including heart disease and stroke. 
This can represent a cost to employers. Leave also 
provides an important period of rest for workers 
in occupations particularly susceptible to long-
term fatigue and associated stress. Studies have 
found that people who take leave are generally 
more productive and exhibit fewer symptoms 
of workplace stress, which may help to reduce 
employers’ occupational health and safety costs. 
Wider benefits include
 the tourism and hospitality sector may benefit 
from extended leave provisions;
 the Commonwealth government would 
save a substantial and growing financial 
outlay for the LSL component of the Fair 
Entitlements Guarantee in the case of business 
insolvencies; and
 PLSL funds would benefit the economy 
generally by contributing substantially to 
national saving and investment.
14
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Section 4. 
Designing PLSL schemes
Under the Fair Work Act 2009, the Commonwealth 
government has the power to establish National 
Employment Standards, including standards for 
LSL entitlements. There are three key aspects: the 
Constitutional issue associated with establishing 
PLSL funds, vesting of entitlements and transfer of 
entitlements. 
Firstly, the Commonwealth may have the 
Constitutional power to establish PLSL funds with 
compulsory employer levies, but this may also be 
challenged by the States. An alternative approach 
would be to develop cooperative arrangements 
with the States whilst the Commonwealth institutes 
model legislation; this approach was used for 
occupational health and safety.
Secondly, portability requires full vesting of each 
worker’s LSL entitlements to a pro rata benefit 
whenever they leave service, even after a short 
period of service, for whatever reason. Over time, 
effectively the “vesting period” would be reduced to 
zero. Each employer would have a liability to pay a 
specified amount in respect of the LSL entitlements 
accruing for each worker during each worker’s 
period of employment.
Thirdly, it would be necessary to develop rules 
for the payment of LSL benefits and the transfer 
of leave entitlements. At present, pro rata LSL 
benefits are paid in cash when an employee leaves 
service, and the employee cannot transfer their 
leave entitlements to their next employer. However, 
under a PLSL scheme, a worker might not take 
cash payment when they leave their job. Instead, 
the money set aside to pay their accrued benefits 
would be held in reserve. Of course, some workers 
might prefer to take the cash payment, although 
this would mean that they will not be eligible to take 
leave for another 10 years and would forgo many 
of the benefits identified here. Questions then arise 
as to whether portability should allow the worker to 
choose either alternative, or whether there should 
be restrictions in the payment of cash pro rata 
benefits.
LSL entitlements are usually determined on a 
defined benefit basis. When an employee takes 
leave, they receive a benefit which is equal to the 
number of weeks of LSL taken multiplied by their 
weekly wages at the date the benefit is taken. 
Alternatively, employers might fund LSL payments 
on an accumulation basis. The employer would 
periodically pay contributions, equal to a fixed 
percentage of salary, into an employee’s LSL 
account. The contributions would accumulate 
with interest, less administration fees. When the 
employee takes leave, they would be entitled to 
withdraw money from their account. Under an 
accumulation arrangement, the contribution would 
presumably be set at a level which would be 
expected to provide an adequate LSL benefit.
Comparison of 3 alternative models
Each of these models has a different mixture of 
advantages and disadvantages for employers and 
employees.
OptiOn A 
The ADF Model (paying a mixture of defined 
and accumulation benefits)
 
The ADF model is based on the system of 
Approved Deposit Funds (ADFs) established in 
the superannuation industry during the 1980s 
(also known as Rollover Funds). Employers make 
their own internal provisions for LSL until an 
employee leaves or is eligible for LSL. Employees 
who leave service can roll over a lump sum PLSL 
benefit into any ADF they nominate. The accrued 
benefit payable at exit from an employer would 
be calculated using a defined benefit formula, 
based on the employee’s wages at the date of 
exit, in line with existing legislation, awards and/
or workplace agreements. The lump sum benefit 
would not normally be payable in cash (unless the 
employee met a LSL condition of release). The ADF 
invests the money on behalf of the employee, in an 
accumulation-style account, until the employee is 
eligible to receive LSL.
15
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Each worker would have just one ADF account 
for LSL benefits. If a worker worked in a series of 
different jobs, or worked in two or more part-time 
jobs, the LSL payments would be made into the 
same ADF account. This would help to prevent 
the proliferation of multiple small accounts. Each 
employer would provide the ADF with information 
about the period of service applicable to each 
lump sum payment. The ADF would be required to 
maintain records sufficient to determine a worker’s 
eligibility for LSL cash payments in the future. 
The ADF would invest the money on behalf of the 
account-holder, and credit investment earnings 
to the account. The ADF would also deduct 
administration fees from the account.
The LSL ADF provider would be required to meet 
registration, reporting, and corporate governance 
requirements, similar to those imposed on the ADFs 
that hold superannuation savings. Financial institutions 
would be required to apply for permission to manage 
LSL ADF accounts. The Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (APRA) would set standards 
for authorisation and would monitor ADF providers. 
Banks, life insurers, and superannuation funds would 
be eligible to offer LSL ADFs, as long as they met the 
authorisation standards.
This model has many advantages: 
 It could be phased in gradually over time.
 It is relatively simple to understand.
 It does not create a great deal of extra 
administrative work for employers.
 It does not require pre-funding, therefore the 
employers’ cash flows would not be affected 
until their employees left service or took LSL.
 It is flexible.
 It does not create cross-subsidies between 
different employers or industries.
 It reduces (but does not eliminate) the risk of 
loss of entitlements due to employer insolvency.
 It could make use of existing infrastructure, 
i.e. it would not be necessary to create new 
organisations to provide ADF LSL accounts.
However this model does have 
significant weaknesses: 
 The administrative costs are likely to be high 
relative to the size of the account balances, and 
this will erode workers’ LSL benefits.
 Financial institutions may be reluctant to offer 
products which are likely to have low balances 
and hence limited profitability.
 Workers who hold money in ADF accounts 
are exposed to investment and inflation risks, 
meaning that the account balance might not 
always be sufficient to provide a replacement of 
income when the worker takes leave.
 This model does not incorporate any additional 
mechanisms for ensuring that employers will 
comply with their LSL obligations (other than the 
existing compliance checks performed by Fair 
Work Australia).
 Unless regulated to restrict payments to one 
ADF, this model could mean that workers 
end up with multiple LSL accounts in different 
ADF’s. Multiple accounts would create 
problems in assessing eligibility for entitlements, 
and risk many workers losing track of their 
accounts and becoming “lost members” leading 
to lost monies, as occurs in the superannuation 
system.
OptiOn B 
The Industry-based Defined Benefit  
Fund Model 
An alternative model involves the creation of a range 
of industry-based defined benefit funds. There are 
already more than a dozen established industry-
based PLSL arrangements, however, each of these 
provides only limited portability. Workers only accrue 
LSL benefits while working within the industry, and 
may forfeit their entitlements if they cease working in 
the industry prior to completing the vesting period of 
service. Workers who complete the vesting period, 
and then leave the industry are usually entitled to 
claim a cash payout.
16
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Employers in the industries covered by existing 
schemes are required to be registered with the 
relevant fund. The employers periodically provide 
information about each employee and periodically 
pay levies to the fund administrators. Each fund is 
invested in line with a strategy determined by the 
Board and/or approved by the Minister or Trustee. 
When an employee becomes eligible for an LSL 
payment, a benefit may be payable directly from 
the LSL fund; or may be payable by the employer, 
who then claims reimbursement from the fund. The 
benefits payable are calculated in accordance with 
the relevant legislation and/or award. This currently 
means that LSL benefits are defined benefits.
Each fund is periodically reviewed by an actuary, who 
assesses the adequacy of the fund’s assets, relative 
to the fund’s liabilities, using reasonable assumptions 
about the future experience of the fund. The actuary 
might recommend an increase or a decrease in 
the levy rate, in order to maintain an acceptable 
level of solvency. The fund administrators play a 
role in ensuring that employers comply with their 
obligations, for example, educating new employers, 
inspecting records of registered employers and 
imposing financial penalties for late payments.
If these schemes are extended to provide full 
portability, then presumably the LSL benefit 
entitlements would be transferred to a different 
industry fund if a worker shifted employment to a 
different industry. For example, if a person working 
in the retail industry transferred to the hotel industry, 
LSL funds would be transferred from the retail industry 
fund to the hotel industry fund. This would allow more 
workers to claim their LSL benefits, but the complexity 
of the administration would be increased.
Industry-based PLSL funds have the 
following advantages:
 The defined benefit structure provides benefits 
which provide a replacement of normal income 
while the employee is on long service leave.
 The established industry-based funds have 
been successful in developing administration 
systems which minimise the administrative 
burden for employers.
 The larger industry-based funds have 
apparently been able to keep administration 
costs at about 1.5% to 2% of assets or less.
 The established funds have devoted resources 
towards improving compliance, i.e. ensuring 
that workers receive their entitlements.
 Improved compliance also provides a level 
playing field for employers, i.e. by limiting the 
risk that irresponsible employers will be able to 
undercut responsible employers.
However this option also has 
disadvantages:
 Defined benefit funds are more difficult to 
manage when there are multiple employers 
with a diverse group of employees who 
frequently switch between funds.
 If new schemes are created for each industry, 
this will create administrative difficulties, e.g. if 
workers accrue benefits in multiple industries 
across multiple jurisdictions.
 If new schemes are created for each industry, 
it is likely that many of these schemes 
will be too small to operate efficiently. If 
they are unable to attain economies of 
scale, employers will have to pay higher 
contributions in order to cover higher 
administration fees.
 The defined benefit structure might create 
cross-subsidies between different employers 
and different generations of employers.
 Based on the experience of the established 
PLSL schemes, the levy rate is likely to vary 
over time, creating difficulties for employers. 
This problem is likely to be more severe in 
cyclical industries and/or in funds which adopt 
more volatile investment strategies.
 Defined benefit funds may develop large 
deficits (especially if there is pressure to keep 
levy rates low); it would be desirable to have 
clear-cut rules for the management of fund 
surpluses and deficits (which might entail 
benefit reductions).
 Defined benefit schemes are less flexible than 
accumulation schemes, i.e. less able to cope 
with variations in entitlements across different 
categories or workers, and less able to cope 
with changes in entitlements over time. 
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OptiOn C
The Accumulation Model 
Employers would be required to make regular 
contributions for all eligible employees into 
designated LSL accounts administered by 
superannuation funds and/or authorised financial 
institutions. (The minimum contribution would be 
determined by the National Employment Standards.) 
Account funds would be invested on behalf of the 
account holder and investment earnings would be 
credited. Administration fees would be deducted. 
The account-provider would be required to maintain 
records sufficient to determine the worker’s eligibility 
for LSL cash payments in the future.
The LSL benefit would not become payable in cash 
until the worker met an “LSL condition of release”, 
similar to the preservation requirements applicable 
to superannuation benefits. The LSL account-
provider would be required to meet registration, 
reporting, and corporate governance requirements, 
similar to those imposed on the financial institutions 
that hold superannuation savings. APRA would set 
standards for authorisation and monitor account-
providers. Banks, life insurers, and superannuation 
funds would be eligible to offer LSL accounts, as 
long as they met the authorisation standards.
The employee would be entitled to choose their 
LSL account-provider and to transfer their LSL 
account from one provider to another. This would 
enable an employee to combine LSL payments 
from two or more employers into one account. 
This would improve the efficiency of the system, 
i.e. minimising administration fees. If an employee 
did not exercise their right to choose, then the 
employer would make payments to an LSL account 
administered by a default account-provider. In 
practice, the employer’s administrative burden 
would be reduced if there was consistency between 
the superannuation system and the LSL system.  
It would be necessary to carefully consider the 
tax treatment of these LSL accounts. Established 
industry-based PLSL schemes are not required 
to pay tax on levies received or on the investment 
income earned. However, LSL benefits are taxed 
in the hands of recipients when the benefits are 
ultimately paid. The tax treatment of these accounts 
will, of course, affect the costing of LSL benefits. If 
LSL accounts are taxed, then employers will have 
to pay a higher rate of contributions in order to fund 
the same level of benefits. If LSL accounts are given 
favourable tax treatment, the annual contributions 
should not exceed the amount needed to fund the 
accruing LSL entitlements (e.g. fixed as a percentage 
of wages or salary).
The advantages of this model are:
 It is simple to understand.
 Assuming that the administrative arrangements 
can be integrated with the superannuation 
system, the administrative burdens for the 
employer should be acceptable.
 Assuming that: (1) the LSL savings account is 
designed to be a low cost, no-frills product; 
(2) the industry can achieve economies of 
scale in providing these products; and (3) there 
are synergies with the superannuation; then 
administration costs should be lower than 
Option B.
 The employers’ cost is stable and predictable.
 It avoids cross subsidies between employers 
and industries.
 It is flexible.
On the other hand, this model also 
has some disadvantages:
 The legal framework for creating this system 
has not been specified and it might be 
difficult to achieve consensus between 
Commonwealth and State governments.
 It would require some additional resources to 
monitor and enforce compliance.
 Accumulation benefits may not provide a 
replacement of income during leave – the risks 
are passed to the employee.
 As with Options A and B, the system is 
vulnerable to the “small accounts problem”, 
i.e. relatively high administration costs for 
accounts with small balances. 
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Section 5. 
Costing of LSL obligations
As a basic principle, over the long term the income 
received by any fund must cover the payments made 
from the fund according to the following formula:
Employer levies PluS investment 
income on assets must be sufficient  
to cover Benefit Payments PluS 
Administration Expenses PluS Tax.
The cost of LSL benefits will depend on the level 
of benefits provided, the fund’s investment returns 
relative to wages growth, the timing of benefit 
payments, the amount of withdrawal surplus,  
and the administration costs. We have estimated  
the long term average levy rate based on the  
following assumptions:
 The fund can earn investment returns which 
exceed the rate of wages growth by 2% p.a.;
 Benefits are paid to an employee after 
every 10 years of service, on average;
 There is no significant amount of withdrawal 
surplus;
 Ongoing administration costs are between 
0.1% and 0.3% of workers’ wages;
 Establishment expenses are not included;
 Funds do not have to pay tax.
Under these assumptions:
 A fund which provides 2 months LSL after 
10 years of service would require a levy rate 
between 1.6% and 1.9% of worker’s wages;
 A fund which provides 3 months LSL after 10 
years of service would require a levy rate between 
2.4% and 2.7% of workers’ wages.
These figures are purely indicative. In order to 
estimate the costs for any specific fund, a full 
actuarial review should be conducted, taking account 
of the rules of the fund and the demographics of the 
fund membership. 
Defined Benefit Funds:  
Risks to employers 
We have estimated the long term average levy 
rate which would be needed to fund LSL benefits. 
However, in a defined benefit fund, levy rates might 
vary widely over time. Volatility in the levy rate is also 
more difficult to manage when a fund’s revenue base 
is cyclical or declining. For example, suppose that a 
particular industry is booming, and a large number 
of workers accumulate LSL benefits. Suppose 
that the fund then suffers large investment losses, 
creating a large deficit. If the industry is stable, 
these losses can be spread across a large number 
of employers, i.e. the levy rate would increase by a 
relatively small amount. But if the industry is facing 
profitability problems and the number of employers in 
the industry declines, a smaller number of employers 
must pay higher levies to cover the fund’s deficit.
Clearly, in a defined benefit system employers bear 
the risk of volatility in levy rates. Many employers are 
unwilling to accept such risks. In the superannuation 
industry, employers have demonstrated a strong 
preference for accumulation benefits. The number of 
defined benefit superannuation funds has declined 
steadily over the last 20 years. The trend towards 
accumulation benefits has been particularly strong 
amongst smaller employers.
Accumulation Funds:  
Risks to employees
In an accumulation fund, the workers will bear the 
investment risk. If there are poor investment returns, 
then the workers’ accounts may not provide enough 
money to provide a replacement income during 
periods of LSL. As a result, it might be preferable to 
adopt a low-risk investment strategy. If we assume 
that the long term investment returns are roughly 
equal to long term increases in remuneration (i.e. 
a 0% gap), then the required contribution rates 
would increase slightly. For example, under these 
assumptions:
 A fund which provides 2 months LSL after 
10 years of service would require a levy rate 
between 1.8% and 2.1% of worker’s wages;
 A fund which provides 3 months LSL after 
10 years of service would require a levy rate 
between 2.6% and 2.9% of workers’ wages.
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Section 6. 
Tax implications
Currently employers required to prepare accounts 
recognise a liability to pay LSL to employees over 
an employee’s period of service and then claim 
that liability as an expense in the accounts each 
reporting period. However, for income tax purposes 
no deduction is available until the LSL benefit is 
actually paid out or until the employer makes a 
leave transfer payment. As a result there is often 
a mismatch between the liability recognised by 
the employer in the accounts and the amount 
actually claimed as an income tax deduction in any 
particular reporting period.
A nationally consistent PLSL scheme would 
ensure that the amount provided for LSL in a 
particular year is tax deductible in that year. 
An income tax deduction for a levy paid to the 
scheme is supported by the ATO’s approach to 
worker entitlement funds as it is envisaged that the 
scheme would have similar characteristics. The 
Commonwealth Government could legislate to 
make the position clear in this respect. In addition, 
because the LSL is paid directly to the member of 
the scheme, employers would not have to include 
these payments in their workers compensation 
calculations.
Another tax issue relates to the question of whether 
a levy paid by an employer would constitute the 
provision of a fringe benefit and be subject to fringe 
benefits tax (FBT) at a flat 46.5%. It could be argued 
that exemption from FBT should apply on the 
same basis as the current exemption for approved 
worker entitlement funds. If an employer levy paid 
to a scheme is treated as an exempt benefit for 
FBT purposes then it would also be excluded from 
liability to State payroll tax. 
The treatment of existing worker entitlement funds 
in relation to the Superannuation Guarantee Charge 
could also be applied: that neither the worker 
entitlement fund or the employer have an obligation 
to make superannuation contributions on LSL 
payments made to an individual from the fund.
ATO class rulings have confirmed that a payment of 
LSL from a worker entitlement fund to an employee 
will receive the same tax treatment as if it had 
been paid directly by the employer. In addition, 
contributions by the employer to the worker 
entitlement fund are not assessable as income to 
the fund.  A nationally consistent PLSL scheme, if 
structured appropriately, would provide an upfront 
income tax deduction in respect of an employer’s 
liability to pay LSL as well as payroll tax and 
workers compensation payment savings.
Further tax incentives could be explored to minimise 
any increased costs for small employers. These 
could include company tax reductions linked with 
the cost of a levy.
Section 7. 
Conclusion and 
Recommendations
We conclude that a national uniform system 
of PLSL accessible to all workers would be of 
great benefit: not only to employees, but also for 
employers, government and the community and 
economy generally. This system could build on 
extensive experience from existing PLSL schemes 
and the superannuation system, which provide 
strong viable models. PLSL should be introduced 
as part of a collaborative process between 
stakeholders and all levels of government, with 
supportive tax measures to minimise cost to 
employers and ensure the full value of entitlements 
to employees.
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Recommendations
1 That the Commonwealth government legislate for a uniform minimum Long Service Leave standard as part of the National Employment Standards. 
2	 That the Commonwealth government find ways to extend coverage of Long Service Leave through a portable scheme to include the large proportions of the workforce who are mobile 
between employers as a result of changing career patterns, rapidly shifting sectoral labour 
demand, and the growth of workplace flexibility through casual and part-time employment.
3	 That the name for this employee benefit be changed to Accrued Employment Leave in recognition that it would no longer be tied to service with one employer.
4	 That the Commonwealth government initiate a consultative process involving State and Territory governments and employer and employee representative groups to determine 
the most effective mechanisms for implementing portable long service leave and to broaden 
the level of community support.
5	 That the Commonwealth government adopt a model for Accrued Leave Funds based on one, or a combination of, models successfully employed in the superannuation industry, namely 
Approved Deposit Funds, industry-based Defined Benefit Funds, or Accumulation Funds. 
6	 That the Commonwealth government consider the ways of minimising extra business costs, especially for small and medium sized enterprises, through favourable tax treatment  
of portable long service leave accounts in specified funds, tax offsets linked with  
the cost of a levy in the form of reduced company tax.
7	 That the stakeholders consider an agreement for a one-off wage offset for the first year of an employer levy, to the extent of 1-2% of anticipated wage increases,  
to assist with the transition.
8	 That existing portable long service leave arrangements in some sectors, whether established by State legislation or industrial instruments, be allowed to persist within the new system,  
at least for a transitional period.
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Introduction
1.1 Purpose of report 
The Fair Work Act 2009 established a framework 
for uniform minimum National Employment 
Standards (NES) across all States and Territories 
of Australia. The NES cover various types of leave, 
including annual leave, parental leave, carer’s leave, 
and community service leave. In relation to long 
service leave the National Employment Standard 
preserved employees’ existing rights in a transitional 
entitlement, pending the development of a uniform 
national long service leave standard. 
The Fair Work Review proposed a national 
streamlining of the long service leave standard  
by 2015:
“The Panel recommends that the Commonwealth, 
State and Territory governments should expedite 
the development of a national long service leave 
standard with a view to introducing it by 1 January 
2015.”1 The government’s intention was to provide 
an opportunity for a community discussion on all 
aspects of long service leave entitlements. Before 
developing a uniform national standard, policy 
makers needed to establish what type of long 
service leave benefits should be provided, and what 
is the best way of providing these benefits for the 
greatest benefit of employees and employers.
This report aims to examine the feasibility of a 
nationally consistent portable long service leave 
(PLSL) scheme for Australia that would cover 
all workers, including those who are casual, 
permanent full-time and permanent part-time. The 
name of the entitlement would more appropriately 
become Accrued Service Leave.
Long service leave (LSL) is a benefit unique to 
Australia and New Zealand. It had its origins in the 
19th century benefits to civil servants which enabled 
long serving workers to travel ‘home’ to Britain, 
confident that they would be able to return to their 
positions when they arrived back in Australia.  
The post-war decades saw LSL become a 
widespread entitlement for workers in Australia as 
employers strove to be more comparable with the 
public service. Over time, each State and Territory 
passed long service leave legislation which set  
out the minimum entitlements in each jurisdiction 
(the current provisions are described in Section 3  
of this report).
LSL has evolved over time as a result of trends to 
extend LSL benefits to a wider range of employees, 
reduce the qualifying and vesting periods for 
LSL benefits, and increase the amount of leave 
granted. These changes demonstrate recognition 
by State legislatures of the value of providing LSL 
benefits. Indeed, proponents of long service leave 
cite important benefits for both employees and 
employers (see Section 3), although its critics argue 
it is an obsolete entitlement.2 Traditionally, three 
reasons have been cited for providing long service 
leave benefits:
 to reduce labour turnover;
 to provide a reward for long and faithful 
service;
 to enable employees halfway through their 
working life to recover their energies and 
return to work renewed, refreshed, and 
reinvigorated.3
The third objective, in particular, is becoming 
increasingly important to Australian workers. 
Demographic changes in the labour force are 
seeing Australians spend increasing proportions 
of their lifetimes in employment (see Section 2) 
and increasing numbers of workers are remaining 
in the workforce at older ages, consistent with 
government policy. As the length of time in 
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work increases, to 30 or 40 years or more, the 
importance of LSL entitlements – particularly 
for those who work in physically or mentally 
exhausting jobs – becomes increasingly evident. 
Despite this, however, changes in the profile of 
Australia’s workforce have resulted in a declining 
proportion of workers being able to access LSL 
benefits. LSL was originally designed to reward 
full-time employees for long and faithful service 
with one employer. However, Australia’s workforce 
is increasingly mobile, driven by structural changes 
in the labour market, which have substantially 
increased the proportion of contract, casualised 
and part-time labour as employers seek labour 
flexibility. As a result, many workers are failing 
to qualify for long service leave – some due to 
employment choices and others for structural 
reasons. If labour mobility continues to increase 
in the future even fewer workers will be eligible to 
access these benefits.
Recognising this problem, a small number of 
industries with high structural job mobility, such 
as construction and contract cleaning, have 
introduced portable long service schemes (PLSLs). 
This broke the traditional nexus between the 
employee and a single employer by enabling 
workers to retain their LSL entitlements as they 
move from one employer to another, as long as 
they remain within the same industry. A review 
of existing industry-based PLSL schemes is 
described in Section 3 of this report.
While the introduction of PLSLs has improved 
access for a small percentage of workers, 
many remain unable to access LSL benefits. 
This has prompted questions over whether LSL 
entitlements should be strengthened and adapted 
more broadly to meet the changing needs of the 
Australian workforce. In particular, the potential to 
extend PLSL to cover more workers is one such 
consideration. The ACTU’s Independent Inquiry into 
Insecure Work, for example, recommended that: 
“	 The	Federal	Government		
support	the	expansion		
of	portable	long	service	leave	
schemes	for	insecure	workers,	
particularly	in	contracting	
industries	where	workers		
are	most	exposed		
to	poor	job	security.”4
This report examines the feasibility of introducing 
a nationally consistent PLSL scheme. Section 4 
explores three alternative models for the design 
of such a scheme. Each model is assessed 
against various criteria such as simplicity, flexibility, 
efficiency and cost. In Section 5, a simplified 
actuarial approach is presented to estimate the cost 
of providing these PLSL benefits. 
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1.2 Methodology
We assessed trends in the Australian Labour 
Force based on data from the census, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics and from the survey 
of Household Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA). We also prepared projections  
of future labour force patterns.
We reviewed the historical development of LSL 
arrangements in Australia. This report includes 
a summary of the key features of the minimum 
LSL entitlements provided under current 
Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation; 
and a description of the industry-based PLSL  
arrangements which cover workers in a small 
number of industries, including coal mining, 
building and construction, contract cleaning, 
security and community services. We reviewed 
annual and actuarial reports of these schemes, 
and conducted interviews regarding the features 
of the existing schemes with key stakeholders 
including fund administrators and the employer 
and worker representatives of their boards. This 
allowed us to gain further insights into how well 
these schemes operate, their financial stability, and 
the costs and benefits. 
We considered different approaches that might 
be used to extend PLSL to a broader range of 
workers. We looked at the problem from the 
perspective of the stakeholders – employees, 
employers, and government – in order to identify 
the criteria that might be used to assess these 
alternatives.  Our analysis is informed by our 
knowledge of the issues which have arisen in the 
superannuation industry and the superannuation 
system as it has progressively evolved since the 
1980s, to provide better portability of benefits as 
workers move from one job to another.
Each of the alternatives has advantages and 
disadvantages, costs and benefits. However, we need 
to be clear about the limitations of our approach. For 
instance, we do not provide an analysis of the risk for 
the alternative schemes proposed.
Employers will naturally be concerned about 
the additional cost of PLSL benefits. We have 
provided illustrations of the calculation of costs for 
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typical LSL benefits. This is designed to illustrate 
the factors which are likely to affect the cost, 
including (inter alia) benefit accrual rates, investment 
returns, wage increases, benefit design, workforce 
mobility, leave taking patterns, and administrative 
arrangements. We should stress that this illustration 
should not be used as an estimate of the costs of 
any particular scheme. Notably, the cost analyses 
do not address the cost savings that may be gained 
as a result of introducing a PLSL scheme. It is 
impossible to provide an accurate estimate of these 
costs and savings at this stage, since so many 
scheme details are as yet undefined and there is 
little data available on many of the key demographic 
and financial variables. The Actuaries Institute is 
sponsoring further research into some of these 
aspects.
The report is structured as follows:
 Section 2 presents an analysis of recent 
and projected trends in the Australian labour 
force and the implications of these trends for 
workers’ capacity to access LSL entitlements;
 Section 3 outlines the history and rationale for 
LSL before examining the legislation governing 
existing standard and PLSL provisions across 
the various jurisdictions;
 Section 4 considers various factors that 
policymakers will have to consider when 
designing a nationally-consistent system 
of PLSL and then outlines three alternative 
models that could form the basis for the 
design of such a system;
 Section 5 examines the cost of funding PLSL 
benefits, illustrating the impact of variables 
such as investment returns, salary growth 
rates, administration costs, tax, staff turnover, 
and patterns of leave-taking; and
 Section 6 examines the tax implications and 
advantages for employers of a nationally 
consistent LSL scheme.
We hope that this report will provide a useful basis 
for further discussion on the provision of PLSL.
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Labour force trends  
and their implications  
for access to LSL
This section describes recent and prospective 
changes in the composition of Australia’s labour 
force, trends in variables related to access to 
LSL, and differences in these patterns between 
demographic subgroups of the population 
and between industries. Particular attention is 
paid to the number of years Australians spend 
in employment over their lifetimes and to the 
numbers of years they have been employed by 
their current employer. The data in this section 
is drawn from the five-yearly population census, 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), the 
Household Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia (HILDA) survey and labour force 
projections prepared by the authors.
Demographic data shows that in Australia: labour 
force participation is growing, especially amongst 
women; the number of years spent in paid 
employment is growing; the workforce is ageing; the 
proportion of the part-time workforce is increasing; 
and labour mobility is increasing. This means that 
access to LSL is restricted and potentially declining 
even as the need for it is increasing.
2.1  Length of time  
in employment
The increase in years spent in the paid workforce 
is not surprising. Life expectancy is increasing, 
and workers can look forward to a longer period 
of retirement. As a result, workers may need to 
remain in the workforce longer, in order to build 
up sufficient superannuation savings to provide an 
income for many years in retirement. In response to 
the ageing of Australia’s population, the government 
has taken steps to encourage older workers to 
remain in the workforce. The eligibility age for 
accessing lump sum superannuation benefits is 
increasing from age 55 to age 60; the eligibility age 
for the old age pension is increasing from 65 to 
67; and further increases have been mooted.5 The 
government has also taken steps to prevent age 
discrimination in employment, and has a policy of 
encourageing employers to recognise the benefits 
of employing mature, experienced workers. Indeed, 
many older workers now remain healthy and fit 
enough to continue working well past traditional 
retirement ages – particularly in occupations which 
do not require manual labour.
Between 2001 and 2011 the number of Australians 
counted as being in the labour force increased by 
19.0%.6 The growth rate for the number of females 
in the labour force (23.7%) was greater than that 
for males (17.1%), resulting in a modest increase in 
the female share of the labour force (from 44.9% to 
46.6%). With a generally falling unemployment rate, 
the increases in the numbers of employed (18.0% for 
males and 25.1% for females) have been slightly more 
rapid than those for the labour force. These increases 
are the product of population growth in the working 
ages and increases in labour force participation.
Between 2001 and 2011 the employment-to- 
population ratio for males increased for all ages 
over 30 years,7 with the largest increases occurring 
in the later working ages (Figure 2.1).8 For females 
there were increases for all ages over 25 years,9 
with the increases generally being greater than 
those for males (Figure 2.2). The increases were 
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especially large in the later working ages for females. 
For example, for females aged 60 to 64 years the 
percentage in employment almost doubled from 
22.9% in 2001 to 40.1% in 2011. Figures 2.1 and 
2.2 show that, in addition to a general increase in 
employment to population ratios, there has also 
been a trend towards a later pattern of labour force 
participation, reflecting the marked trend towards 
later retirement and, of secondary importance, 
lower employment to population ratios near the 
labour force entry ages. The trends for full-time 
employment-to-population ratios are broadly 
similar to those for all employment, except that the 
decreases below age 25 are more marked due to 
increases in the percentage of the employed who 
work part-time.
Australians are spending more of their lifetimes in 
employment. For new-born males the expected 
lifetime number of years in employment increased 
from 35.1 in 2001 to 36.8 in 2011.10 The increase 
for female new-borns, from 28.7 years in 2001 
to 31.9 years in 2011,11 has been even more 
rapid. Whilst there were significant increases in 
the percentage of the employed who worked 
part-time as opposed to full-time (from 16.5% of 
employed males and 43.0% of employed females 
Figure 2.1 
eMPloyMent to PoPulation RatioS by age FoR auStRalian MaleS, 2001, 2006, 2011
Figure 2.2 
eMPloyMent to PoPulation RatioS by age FoR auStRalian FeMaleS, 2001, 2006, 2011
Source: ABS Census Data
Source: ABS Census Data
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in 2001 to 18.3 of employed males and 44.3% 
of employed females in 2011) (ABS 2012a), there 
was nonetheless a significant increase in the 
expected lifetime numbers of years in full-time 
employment (from 26.6 to 27.6 for males and from 
14.2 to 15.4 for females). The increases in lifetime 
years in employment are driven by a combination 
of increased life expectancy and increasing 
participation in the labour force.
The shift towards a later pattern of workforce 
participation, combined with underlying ageing of 
the population, has resulted in a significant ageing 
of Australia’s labour force. Between 2001 and 2011 
the median age of males in employment increased 
from 39.3 to 40.9 and the median age of females in 
employment from 38.4 to 40.5. The median ages 
for males and females who are employed full-time 
also increased (from 39.9 to 41.3 for males and 
from 38.1 to 40.5 for females). The percentages of 
the employed who were 50 years or over increased 
from 23.9% in 2001 to 29.3% in 2011 for males 
and from 20.3% to 27.4% for females. There were 
also increases in the numbers of males and females 
in the later working and post standard retirement 
ages. For example the number of females aged 60 
to 69 who were in employment rose by 169.7% 
between 2001 and 2011, whilst for males aged 65 
to 69 the number in employment also more than 
doubled (an increase of 124.1%).
2.2  Labour force 
projections 
Labour force projections for the period 2011 to 2021 
were calculated by applying projections of future 
labour force participation rates and of employment 
to population ratios, which were calculated through 
a linear extrapolation of the 2001-2011 trends, to 
projections of the population. The projections of 
the population were prepared assuming that life 
expectancy at birth for males and females increases 
to 82.4 years for males (an increase of 2.2 years from 
2011) and to 86.5 years for females (1.8 years) by 
2021, using the projections of Li (2013), and assuming 
that net international migration remains constant at 
around its recent level of 180,000 per annum. 
Under these assumptions the expected lifetime 
number of years in employment is projected to 
increase further to 39.0 for males and 35.4 for 
females by 2021, and the expected lifetime numbers 
of years in full-time employment to 29.0 for males 
and 16.8 for females. The median age of employed 
males is projected to increase further to 41.9 and 
that for employed females to 41.6 in 2021. The 
percentage of the employed who are aged 45 or 
over is projected to increase for males from 39.6% in 
2011 to 43.1% in 2021, and for females from 38.8% 
to 42.8% over the same period.
2.3  Labour mobility 
patterns
High rates of labour mobility have been evident 
in recent years. In February 2012 nearly one-fifth 
(19.5%) of employed Australians had been with 
their current employer for less than one year, with 
the percentage for females (20.3%) being slightly 
higher than that for males (19.5%) (ABS 2012b). 
Younger adults are more likely than older adults to 
have been with their current employer for less than 
12 months. Employed people in managerial and 
professional occupations have the lowest rates 
of mobility, whilst sales workers (27%), labourers 
(27%), machine operators and drivers (26%), and 
community and personal service workers (25%) 
have the highest rates.
Between 2000 and 2008 the percentages of males 
and females who had been with their current 
employer for less than a year remained fairly steady. 
However a marked drop was evident between 2008 
and 2010, followed by a small and partial recovery 
between 2010 and 2012. 
Changes in employment may be either voluntary 
or involuntary. The ABS data shows that 37% of 
the people who left their jobs left involuntarily; 16% 
because their employer went out of business or 
downsized the workforce; and 17% because their 
job was seasonal or temporary.12 If an employer 
goes out of business, then the employees will 
involuntarily forfeit their accrued (but unvested) LSL 
entitlements.
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There also have been some significant changes in 
the distribution of employment between industries 
over the 2001 to 2011 period. The largest increases 
in the share of total employment were recorded by 
health care and social assistance, construction, 
public administration and safety, and mining, whilst 
the largest decreases were for manufacturing, 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, and wholesale 
trade (Table 2.1). The distribution of the employed 
between types of occupation also has changed, with 
increasing percentages in professional occupations 
and personal and community service workers and 
decreases in all the other 1-digit (i.e. broadly defined) 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ANZSCO) categories.
These workforce changes reflect changes in 
Australia’s economy. For example, the ageing 
population leads to an increase in demand for 
health care; the mining boom leads to an increase 
in employment in the mining industry; the decline 
induStRy
PeR cent oF total 
eMPloyed in induStRy % 
change 
2001-20112001 2006 2011
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 3.99 3.09 2.48 -38
Mining 0.91 1.17 1.76 +93
Manufacturing 11.82 10.46 8.98 -24
Electricity, gas, water & waste services 0.93 0.98 1.15 +24
Construction 6.55 7.80 8.24 +26
Wholesale trade 5.04 4.35 4.01 -20
Retail trade 11.12 11.35 10.51 -5
Accommodation & food services 6.52 6.32 6.47 -1
Transport, postal & warehousing 4.64 4.70 4.76 +3
Information media & telecommunications 2.46 1.94 1.77 -28
Financial & insurance services 3.76 3.83 3.75 0
Rental, hiring & real estate services 1.70 1.69 1.58 -7
Professional, scientific & technical services 6.61 6.61 7.26 +10
Administrative & support services 3.33 3.15 3.22 -3
Public administration & safety 5.83 6.68 6.86 +18
Education & training 7.56 7.66 8.00 +6
Health care & social assistance 9.56 10.50 11.61 +21
Arts & recreation services 1.39 1.40 1.51 +9
Other services 3.98 3.71 3.76 -6
tABLe 2.1  
PeRcentageS oF eMPloyed PeoPle by induStRy, 2001, 2006, 2011
Source: ABS Census Data
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in manufacturing industries leads to a decline in 
employment in this sector. The workforce must 
be adaptable in order to cope with changes in 
demand for labour. However, under the current 
arrangements, workers who change their 
occupation are likely to miss out on LSL benefits.
2.4 Access to LSL
Our projections suggest that in the future, workers 
are likely to remain in the workforce for 35 to 40 
years on average.  Under these circumstances, the 
opportunity to take breaks from work from time to 
time is likely to be valuable. But how many workers 
will be able to take LSL? 
According to ABS data, approximately 33% of 
workers report not having any entitlement to LSL.13 
As shown in Figure 2.3, those who are earning the 
least are most likely to report that they have no 
LSL entitlements. 
The ABS data indicates that the majority of workers 
(about 67%) are entitled to LSL benefits. But under 
current arrangements, most workers will only be 
eligible to take leave if they remain with the same 
employer for 10 years. Therefore, the numbers who 
actually qualify to take LSL will depend on labour 
mobility patterns.
In order to gauge the extent of eligibility to LSL among 
employed Australians, and the extent to which this 
would have been different had a portable scheme 
been in operation, we have analysed employment 
data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and  
from the 2009 survey of Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA Survey).14
Workers are generally entitled to take LSL after 
completing 7 or 10 years of service; they may be 
entitled to pro rata cash payments after 5 or 7 years 
on leaving the service of the employer and subject 
to certain conditions (depending on the jurisdiction, 
award, or workplace agreement). Therefore, the 
percentages of employed people who have been 
employed by their current employer for more than 5 
or 10 years provides a crude indication of the extent 
to which employed Australians are eligible for LSL 
from their current employer. 
The most recent data from the Australian Bureau of 
statistics survey shows that about 44% of workers 
had been employed by the same employer for 
at least 5 years. Only about 25% of workers had 
remained with the same employer for 10 years 
or more, even though as Figure 2.4 shows, the 
proportion of people working 10 years or more has 
increased slightly over the past 20 years. 
This is consistent with data from the HILDA Survey. 
In 2009, 24.5% of all employed people15 and 26.9% 
of all full-time employed people in Australia had 
been with their current employer for at least 10 
years. These figures have been fairly stable over the 
last 20 years for males, while increasing for females. 
There were significant increases in these figures 
between 2004 and 2009. 
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Figure 2.3  
eMPloyeeS who State that they do not have any lSl entitleMentS (%), 2011 
Source: ABS (2011) Cat 6310.1
Figure 2.4  
PeoPle woRking MoRe than 10 yeaRS
Source: ABS Labour Mobility Data
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Different subgroups have different job mobility 
patterns. The second column in Table 2.2 shows 
the percentage of workers who have been with the 
same employer for at least 10 years, subdivided 
between demographic subgroups of the 
population and between industries. Not surprisingly 
the percentage who have been with their current 
employer for at least 10 years increases rapidly 
with age. However even for the 55 to 64 age group 
only slightly more than half (51.7%) have been 
employed by their current employer for at least 10 
years. In addition:
 Males are more likely than females to have 
been employed by their current employer 
for at least 10 years; 
 The percentage of Indigenous Australians 
(12.1%) who have been with their employer 
for at least 10 years is well below average; 
 Migrants are slightly more likely than the 
Australia-born to have been employed for 
at least 10 years. 
Some of these differences would be due to 
differences in age composition: there is a general 
pattern of younger subpopulations tending to 
have higher percentages who have been with 
their current employer for fewer than 10 years.
The percentage of those who have been 
employed with their current employer for at 
least 10 years varies widely by industry, ranging 
from 52.9% for Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing and 38.4% for Education and Training 
down to 13.3% for Retail Trade and 8.0% for 
Accommodation and Food Services. 
There is a general pattern of industries with 
younger workforces (for example, Retail Trade, 
and Accommodation and Food Services) tending 
to have higher percentages who have been 
with their employer for shorter periods of time 
and those with older workforces (for example, 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, and Education 
and Training) tending to have higher percentages 
who have been employed for at least 10 years 
with the same employer.
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 (a) Percentage of all 
currently employed 
workers who have 
been with the 
current employer for 
at least 10 years 
(b) Percentage of all currently 
employed workers who have 
been in the workforce for at 
least 10 years but have less 
than 10 years service with 
current employer
All 24.5 45.9
age
15 to 24 0.1 0.0
25 to 34 7.9 39.7
35 to 44 25.3 69.8
45 to 54 39.1 57.6
55 to 64 51.7 46.6
65 and above 65.6 32.4
Sex
Males 26.8 45.4
Females 22.1 46.5
biRthPlace
Australia 24.0 43.9
Main English-Speaking Overseas 28.5 58.7
Other Overseas 26.0 51.3
indigenouS
Indigenous 24.2 39.6
Not Indigenous 12.1 44.0
induStRy
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 52.9 30.2
Mining 16.9 61.2
Manufacturing 28.5 46.2
Electricity, Gas, Water & Waste Services 25.3 48.0
Construction 22.6 44.2
Wholesale Trade 21.7 54.9
Retail Trade 13.3 40.1
Accommodation & Food Services 8.0 35.0
Transport, Postal & Warehousing 28.7 54.6
Information Media & Telecommunications 25.7 41.3
Financial & Insurance Services 21.5 51.5
Rental, Hiring & Real Estate Services 14.2 56.1
Professional, Scientific & Technical Services 23.9 48.6
Administrative & Support Services 21.1 51.2
Public Administration & Safety 33.9 45.5
Education & Training 38.4 39.1
Health Care & Social Assistance 24.7 50.9
Arts & Recreation Services 18.7 42.8
Other Services 21.8 47.7
tABLe 2.2  
PeRcentageS oF eMPloyed 
PeoPle by duRation oF SeRvice
Source: HILDA Wave 9 Data
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2.5  People with more than 
10 years’ lifetime work 
experience and less 
than 10 years with 
current employer
In order to assess the impact of improved 
portability of LSL benefits, it is preferable to divide 
the workforce into two groups: those whose 
combined lifetime duration of employment across 
all employers is less than 10 years (for example, 
recent labour force entrants) and those whose 
lifetime duration of employment exceeds 10 
years (for example, experienced workers who 
have changed jobs). The latter group includes the 
people who generally would have qualified for LSL 
under a portable scheme but who would usually 
not be eligible on the basis of their length of 
service with their current employer.16  
The third column of Table 2.2 shows the 
percentage of workers who have more than 10 
years lifetime work experience but have less 
than 10 years of service with one employer.  In 
2009, 45.9% of employed Australians were in 
this category.17 This figure is significantly higher 
than the equivalent figure for 2004 (36.5%).18 The 
increase would reflect a combination of increased 
rates of workforce participation, the ageing of the 
workforce, and the high rates of labour mobility 
over the preceding 10 years, discussed in Sections 
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. Employees aged between 35 
and 55 are most likely to fall in this category, 
which provides a crude indication of the potential 
beneficiaries from portability. The percentages of 
males and females in this category are similar. 
Migrants, both those from the main English-
speaking countries and those from other countries, 
are more likely than the average to have more 
than 10 years of lifetime work experience but have 
less than 10 years’ service with one employer, 
while Indigenous Australians are less likely than 
average to be in this category. These patterns 
reflect that whilst the percentages of Indigenous 
Australians and the Australia-born with less than 
10 years’ service with their current employer are 
above average, there are also higher percentages 
of these younger than average subpopulations 
with less than 10 years’ work lifetime work 
experience. The differences between migrants 
and the Australia-born should be interpreted with 
caution in view of likely differences in the extent 
to which previous migrant work experience was 
overseas. This experience presumably would not 
be considered as counting towards PLSL. 
The percentages of employees with more than 10 
years of lifetime work experience and less than 10 
years with their current employer varies between 
industries. Over three-fifths (61.1%) of employees 
in the mining industry and 56.1% of employees 
in Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services are in 
this category. These are industries in which high 
percentages have been recruited relatively recently 
and additionally in which high percentages of the 
more recent recruits have extensive previous work 
experience. In contrast only 30% of employees in 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 34.9% of those 
in Accommodation and Food Services, and 38.9% 
of those in Education and Training fall into this 
category. As noted previously, Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing and Education and Training have 
relatively mature workforces in which relatively high 
percentages have been with their current employer 
for more than 10 years (Section 2.4). In contrast, 
in Accommodation and Food Services the small 
percentage of employees is primarily due to the 
low percentage who have more than 10 years’ 
lifetime work experience.
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2.6  Implications for  
access to LSL
In summarising the main findings above, a number 
of trends are evident.
 Labour force participation and time spent 
in employment are both increasing;
 The significant rise of labour force participation 
among older workers reflects the increasing 
length of time workers are remaining in 
employment. This trend is expected to 
continue. 
 Australian workers are highly mobile 
between employers;
 Mobility is high with almost 1 in 5 workers 
employed by their current employer for less 
than one year. 
 Differences in mobility across industries 
suggests structural drivers;
 Labour mobility differs across sectors and is 
highest among those employed in industries 
such as: mining; wholesale trade; transport 
and logistics; rental, hiring and real estate; 
services; and healthcare.
 Labour force mobility is greater for certain 
categories of workers;
 The benefit from LSL portability is more likely 
among workers aged 35 to 54, female workers 
and workers engaged in particular (generally 
lower-skilled) non-managerial service and 
blue-collar occupations. In particular, the 
highest mobility rates were seen among: sales, 
labourers, machine operators and drivers, 
and community and personal service workers. 
Notably, the highest mobility rates are reflected 
in occupations that tend to be characterised 
by high rates of contract and casual labour.
Overall, these trends reflect the low prevalence of 
long-term employment relationships, with around 
three in four workers working with their employer for 
less than 10 years (including many that have worked 
in the labour force for a longer period). Given that 10 
years is the qualifying period for LSL in most States 
and Territories, these findings indicate the structural 
trend in the labour market away from long-term 
employment relationships is serving to limit access 
to the statutory LSL entitlement for a significant and 
growing share of the Australian workforce. 
It is notable that those occupations which tend to be 
characterised by work that is highly physically and/or 
emotionally demanding are not only occupations that 
reflect a disproportionately high rate of work-related 
injury and illness,19 but also, given the above analysis, 
are occupations that have the highest rates of labour 
mobility and therefore offer the least access to the 
potential benefits of LSL.
Taken together, this raises the question of how 
best to manage increased length of time spent in 
employment in the light of other major patterns of 
labour market experience. The following sections 
examine how the extension of PLSL schemes 
allowing workers to transfer their entitlements 
between jobs may help to address this problem.
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3.1 Brief history of LSL
Long service leave is an entitlement that is unique 
to Australia. In Britain, Greece and some parts of 
Canada, there is provision for extended annual 
leave according to length of service. Some 
New Zealand employment contracts provide for 
LSL (Labour Ministers Council, 1999). But as a 
statutory right to a sustained period of leave after 
an extended period of employment, LSL is a 
distinctively Australian provision.
The entitlement to LSL has its origins in  
the 19th century colonial public services.  
The Victorian and South Australian Civil Service 
Acts in the 1860s provided an entitlement for 
civil service officers who had completed at least 
10 years of service to paid leave of absence for 
between 3 and 12 months. LSL was intended to 
provide public servants with an opportunity to sail 
to the United Kingdom or Europe and back. All 
State and Commonwealth public servants were 
subsequently granted the entitlement. It was then 
gradually but unevenly extended to other public 
sector employees. 
Commonwealth awards began to include LSL 
provisions by consent in the late 1940s. However, 
LSL did not become a standard employment 
condition for all employees until the passage of the 
Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW), which other 
States then followed by enacting similar legislation. 
In 1964, the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission arbitrated its first LSL 
award to provide what has become the standard 
provision for non-public service employees. The 
entitlement was 13 weeks leave after 15 years of 
service with an employer, with pro rata payment in 
lieu on termination of employment after 10 years 
of service (Labour Ministers Council, 1999). State 
legislation and existing awards were amended 
to provide the same entitlement. In the ensuing 
years, most jurisdictions have provided for the 
entitlement to be available on a pro rata basis after 
10 years of continuous employment. While LSL 
entitlements are predominately provided for under 
State laws, the Commonwealth makes legislative 
provision for entitlements for those employed in the 
Commonwealth public sector.
Table 3.1 details existing statutory LSL schemes 
in Australia and the primary piece of legislation 
which establishes them. In each jurisdiction, 
supplementary legislation and regulations provide 
specific and further details on operational matters 
of the schemes. The length of entitlement and 
qualifying period for LSL under each of the 
standard and portable schemes are also outlined 
in Table 3.1. Several patterns are clear. Most 
States provide for 8.67 weeks after 10 years of 
service. South Australia and the Northern Territory 
provide the more generous entitlement of 13 
weeks leave after 10 of years of service. In the 
ACT, workers are entitled to take leave after only 
7 years of service. Workers are entitled to LSL 
again after every additional 5 year period in most 
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jurisdictions. Workers in the NSW Metalliferous 
Mining sector have a more generous entitlement 
than the norm, with 3 months leave for every 10 
years of service. 
These schemes are typically State-wide and 
provide an entitlement to LSL for workers who 
complete continuous service with the one employer. 
This entitlement is not portable within an industry or 
across employers.
JuRiSdiction key legiSlation entitleMent
NSW Long Service Leave Act 1955
2 months after 10 years’ service. 
Then 1 month leave for each subsequent 5 years’ service 
NSW
Long Service Leave 
(Metalliferous Mining 
Industry) Act 1963 No 48
3 months after each 10 years’ service.
VIC Long Service Leave Act 1992
8.67 weeks after 10 years’ service. 
Then 4.33 weeks after each additional 5 years’ service
QLD Industrial Relations Act 1999
8.67 weeks leave after 10 years’ service. 
Then further leave after each additional 5 years’ service.
SA Long Service Leave Act 1987
13 weeks leave after 10 years’ service. 
Then 1.3 weeks leave for each subsequent year.
WA Long Service Leave Act 1958
8.67 weeks leave after 10 years’ service. 
Then 4.33 weeks leave after additional 5 years’ service
TAS Long Service Leave Act 1976
8.67 weeks leave after 10 years’ service. Then 4.33 
weeks leave for each additional 5 years employment
NT Long Service Leave Act 1981
13 weeks leave after 10 years’ service. 
Then 6.5 weeks after each additional 5 years’ service.
ACT Long Service Leave Act 1976
0.2 months leave for each year of service, with leave 
available to be taken after 7 years’ service.
tABLe 3.1
StandaRd lSl entitleMentS
Note: ‘Service’ refers to continuous service with one employer
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3.2 Portable LSL schemes
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of LSL 
schemes to both employers and employees, many 
workers have found it increasingly difficult to qualify 
for a LSL entitlement in the context of increasingly 
short-term employment arrangements (as discussed 
in Section 2). Although these patterns have become 
much more prevalent since the 1980s, the use of 
short-term contract-based commercial arrangements 
have characterised industries such as construction, 
mining and property services, for much longer periods. 
One solution used increasingly in those industries, 
and established throughout the public sector, enables 
workers to receive their statutory entitlements to LSL 
by allowing them to gain credit for their long service 
in the industry, rather than to an individual employer, 
through the use of Portable LSL (PLSL) schemes. 
PLSL entitlements are widely available to public 
sector workers in the State and Territory public 
sectors and the Australian Public Service. The 
source of public sector entitlements varies between 
jurisdictions, arising from legislation in some places 
and a combination of legislation and modern 
awards in others.  What is significant for our 
purposes is that the LSL entitlement is essentially 
uniform across the country, with the exception of 
NSW which has a lesser entitlement. Public sector 
worker entitlements are as follows:
 NSW public sector workers are entitled to 
2 months ‘extended leave’ after 10 years’ 
continuous service in the public sector.
 In all other jurisdictions, public sector workers 
are entitled to 3 months long service leave 
following 10 years of continuous employment 
in the public sector – although in some cases 
the entitlement is drafted as 90 days (South 
Australia) or 13 weeks (Queensland, Tasmania 
and Western Australia) instead of 3 months.
 Portability is ensured through provisions 
concerning recognised service of a 
continuous nature, which, in all essential 
respects, are replicated in each set of LSL 
regulations (see example in Box 3.1).
Given the widespread access to PLSL by public 
sector workers, this report focuses on access to 
LSL available to workers employed in the private 
sector. PLSL emerged first in awards in the coal 
mining industry in 1949 on a national basis. Other 
instances have occurred on a State basis, as 
a result of legislation at that level. PLSL began 
extending into the building and construction 
industry in the 1970s, albeit with some variation 
between States (see Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4). Portability 
arrangements exist between the building and 
Clause 49.8.2 the following will be recognised as service in the Victorian Public Service for the 
purposes of long service leave (“Recognised Service”):
 49.8.2(a) any Service with a State, Commonwealth or Territory of Australia Government 
Department or Public Service Authority; or
 49.8.2(b) any service with a public entity under the Public Administration Act 2004 (Vic); or
 49.8.2(c) an service with a local governing body that is established by or under a law of 
Victoria.
Notwithstanding the above, the Employer may recognise any service with a public service authority 
or local governing body of the Commonwealth, a State other than Victoria or a Territory of Australia.
box 3.1 
PlSl PRoviSionS in the victoRian Public SeRvice agReeMent 2006 eva 2009
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construction industry State schemes; i.e. service 
under one of the schemes is counted for eligibility 
for entitlements under the other schemes. However, 
this relies on workers advising the schemes of 
their service periods, which leads to “leakage” of 
entitlements. To meet this issue the State building 
and construction industry schemes are currently 
working towards a national database.  
In 1999 the ACT legislated for PLSL in the 
contract cleaning industry, a lead which 
Queensland and NSW followed in 2005 and 
2011 respectively. The ACT has continued to be 
a pacesetter, subsequently introducing PLSL into 
highly casualised and contracted sectors of the 
community services and security industries. 
Table 3.2 summarises the PLSL schemes currently 
operating in Australia’s private and not-for-
profit sectors and the primary piece of enabling 
legislation. Arrangements that enable a limited 
portability of LSL entitlements between clearly 
defined circles of employers through awards and/or 
collective agreements20 are not addressed.
tABLe 3.2
PlSl ScheMeS in the PRivate and coMMunity SectoRS in auStRalia 
State PlSl ScheMe StaRt key legiSlation
NSW Building and 
Construction
1986 Building and Construction Industry Long Service Payments Act 1986, 
Building and Construction Industry Long Service Payments Regulation 2011
Contract Cleaning 2011 Contract Cleaning Industry (PLSL Scheme)  Act 2010
ACT Building and 
Construction
1981 Long Service Leave (Portable Schemes) Act 2009
Contract Cleaning 1999 “
Community 
Services
2010 “
Security 2012 “
QLD Building and 
Construction
1992 Construction Industry Long Service Leave Act 1987 
Building and Construction Industry (PLSL) Act 1991, 
Building and Construction Industry (PLSL) Regulation 2002
Contract Cleaning 2005 Contract Cleaning Industry (PLSL) Act 2005
VIC Building and 
Construction
1976 Construction Industry Long Service Leave Act 1997
Rules of the Construction Industry LSL Fund as at 7 April 2009
SA Building and 
Construction
1987 Construction Industry Long Service Leave Regulations 2003.
WA Building and 
Construction
1986 Construction Industry Portable Paid Long Service Leave Act 1985
Construction Industry Portable Paid LSL Regulations 1986
TAS Building and 
Construction
1971 Construction Industry (Long Service Leave) Act 1997
NT Building and 
Construction
2005 Construction Industry Long Service Leave and Benefits Act 2005 
Construction Industry LSL and Benefits Regulations as in force at 3 August 
2012
Common 
-wealth
Coal Mining 1949 Coal Mining Industry (LSL) Administration Act 1991
- Amended by Coal Mining Industry (LSL) Legislation Amendment Act 2011. 
- Two related  Coal Mining Industry Payroll Levy Acts also apply  
(both 1992 Acts)
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3.3  Major points of 
difference in existing 
statutory PLSL 
schemes 
For the purposes of comparing PLSL schemes, 
there are eight key aspects of PLSL schemes 
which need to be considered:
1. Administrative arrangements for management 
of the fund;
2. Length of employees’ LSL entitlement and 
qualifying period;
3. Length of service required for pro rata leave 
entitlements under specified conditions;
4. Rate of pay;
5. Rate of employer levy;
6. When the levy is payable;
7. Frequency of employer reporting on 
workforce and deadline for returns;
8. Type of employment arrangement covered 
e.g. ‘employee’, sub-contractor, contractor, 
labour hire.
We examine each of these aspects of PLSL 
schemes below in order to draw out similarities 
and differences between systems.
3.3.1.  Administrative arrangements 
for the management of the fund
Each of the PLSL schemes currently in operation 
is established by statute, which specifies the 
procedures for the creation, constitution and 
functions of the administrative body manageing 
each fund. Table 3.3 provides details on the 
organisational arrangements for administering each 
PLSL scheme. In most cases, members of the 
governing body of the organisation are appointed 
either by the relevant Minister, the Government 
or the Governor. The Victorian fund, Coinvest, is 
a public company in which directors are elected 
at an annual general meeting from employer and 
employee constituencies. Tasbuild, the Tasmanian 
construction industry fund, is a private trustee 
company whose directors are representatives of 
employers and employees through their relevant 
union bodies. The powers of all of these bodies 
may vary according to their legal personality, which 
is based on the legal form in which they have been 
constructed.
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oRganiSation tyPe oF oRganiSation
building and conStRuction
NSW Long Service Payments 
Corporation
NSW Government agency, under Ministerial control 
with day-to-day management by CEO. The Corporation 
administers the Building and Construction Industry Long 
Service Payment Fund
Victoria Coinvest Limited Public company acting as trustee for the Construction 
Industry Long Service Leave Fund
Queensland QLeave (Trading Name of 
Building & Construction 
Industry (Portable Long 
Service Leave) Authority)
Board consisting of 8 members appointed by Governor 
for terms of 3 years
South 
Australia
Construction Benefit 
Services
Board is a body corporate consisting of 7 members 
appointed by the Governor to administer the scheme
Western 
Australia
Construction Industry Long 
Service Leave Payments 
Board
Board of a statutory authority acting as a body 
corporate, which has 7 members appointed by State 
Government. Chair is appointed by the Minister
Tasmania TasBuild Limited Private trustee company acting as the trustee for the 
Construction Industry Long Service Fund, which has 6 
directors and an independent chairperson. The Fund is 
administered as a trust fund
Northern 
Territory
NT Build Statutory board appointed by the Government
ACT ACT Long Service Leave 
Authority
Statutory authority reporting to ACT Government and 
Legislative Assembly
contRact cleaning 
NSW Long Service Payments 
Corporation
NSW Government agency, under Ministerial control with 
day-to-day management by CEO, which administers the 
Contract Cleaning Long Service Leave Fund
Queensland QLeave (Trading Name of 
Contract Cleaning Industry 
(Portable Long Service 
Leave) Authority)
Board consisting of 6 members appointed by the 
Governor for terms of 3 years
ACT ACT Long Service Leave 
Authority
Statutory authority reporting to ACT Government and 
Legislative Assembly
coal Mining
Coal Mining Industry (Long Service Leave 
Funding) Corporation
Corporation acting as a body corporate established by the 
Act, with a board consisting of six directors appointed by 
the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations. The 
Corporation administers the Coal Mining Industry Long 
Service Leave Fund
tABLe 3.3
oRganiSational aRRangeMentS FoR adMiniStRation oF PlSl ScheMeS
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3.3.2. Employees’ LSL entitlements
Table 3.4 summarises employees’ PLSL 
entitlements in existing schemes. Each PLSL 
scheme provides for workers to accrue a LSL 
entitlement after a specified period of service. 
They also permit workers to retain accrued service 
towards their LSL entitlement for a specified period 
of absence from the industry (see Section 3.3.3) 
and a break in service of 4 years is permitted 
without any loss of accrued service entitlement. For 
instance, under the Victorian construction industry 
scheme, workers retain their accrued service 
entitlement for a service break of up to 4 years, 
where that break is due to illness or incapacity to 
work in the industry. 
Note, the coal mining scheme also has a unique 
provision under s.39C of the relevant Act that all 
service contributes to the LSL entitlement provided 
there has not been a break of more than 8 years 
from the industry. No conditions are attached to the 
reasons for the service break from the industry.
State PlSl ScheMe key legiSlation
NSW Building and 
Construction
8.67 weeks for each 10 years’ service; 4.33 weeks for each 
subsequent 5 years’ service
Contract Cleaning Cleaning -  8.67 weeks after 10 years’ service (3650 days);  
4.33 weeks for each 5 years’ service thereafter (1825 days)
ACT Building and 
Construction
13 weeks after 10 years’ service
Contract Cleaning 6.067 weeks after 7 years’ service
Community Services 4.333 weeks after 5 years’ service
Security 8.667 weeks leave after 7 years’ service
QLD Building and 
Construction
8.67 weeks after 10 years’ service (2,200 days); pro rata entitlement 
after 7 years’ service
Contract Cleaning 8.67 weeks after 10 years’ service; pro rata after 7 years’ service
VIC Building and 
Construction
42.4 days after each 7 years’ service
SA Building and 
Construction
13 weeks after 2600 days (260 days p.a.)
WA Building and 
Construction
8.67 weeks after 10 years’ service (2200 working days);  
4.33 weeks for each 5 years’ service thereafter (1100 days)
TAS Building and 
Construction
13 weeks after 10 years’ service (2,600 days); pro rata for each 5 
years’ service thereafter
NT Building and 
Construction
65 days after 10 years’ service (2600 days) (i.e. 13 weeks),  
32.5 days for each 5 years’ service thereafter
Common 
-wealth
Coal Mining 13 weeks for each 8 years’ service
tABLe 3.4 
PlSl entitleMent
Note: ‘Service’ refers to service with one or multiple employers in the industry
Where number of days is given in brackets (e.g. WA – 2200 working days), this refers to the number of days of service which provide an entitlement. State laws often 
specify the number of days of service which will be regarded as 1 year of service. This is qualified by a specification that no more than a certain number of days will be 
credited to an employee in a 12 month period.  Thus if 220 days is regarded as one year service, and no more than 220 days may be credited in a 12 month period, then 
2200 days constitutes 10 years of service. 
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3.3.3. Length of service for  
pro rata leave entitlements  
under certain conditions
Almost all the schemes provide for payment of PLSL 
entitlements on a pro rata basis where employment 
ceases prior to the basic qualifying period.  
Circumstances enabling pro rata payments generally 
include the following:
 When the employee dies;
 When the employee retires on reaching 
retirement age;
 When the employer terminates the 
engagement for any reason other than for 
serious misconduct;
 When the employee terminates the 
engagement due to:
 intention to permanently leave the industry;
 domestic or other pressing necessities; or
 illness or incapacity of such a nature as to 
prevent further engagement;
 The coal mining scheme only provides for pro 
rata payments for eligible employees, which 
ordinarily means employees who have accrued 
the 8 years of service for entitlement to normal 
PLSL.
The various portable schemes also provide different 
rules regarding the amount of service required for 
entitlement to take pro rata LSL:
 Most of the building and construction 
industry schemes specify within the legislation 
circumstances under which workers are entitled 
to take pro rata leave after 7 years of eligible 
service.
 The ACT scheme contains slightly 
different provisions:
 workers with 7 years’ service are entitled 
to payment of accrued leave upon 
permanently leaving the industry, but 20 
weeks must have passed since they left 
the industry;
 workers are entitled to pro rata payment 
after 5 years of service where workers 
have left the industry due to permanent 
incapacity, retirement or death;
 For the other PLSL schemes, the pro rata 
entitlement generally comes into effect  
after 5 years:
 In the contract cleaning industry, the 
NSW and ACT schemes provide for pro 
rata leave after 5 years, whereas the 
Queensland scheme has a 7 year service 
requirement;
 The ACT community sector scheme 
provides for pro rata leave after 5 years;
 The coal mining industry scheme does not 
appear to provide any service requirements 
for entitlement to payment in lieu of leave in 
circumstances where the leave entitlement 
is sought for one of the prescribed reasons 
(death, illness or incapacity, retirement). Only in 
the case of redundancy is a time requirement 
specified, which is that the employee has 
completed 6 years of service.
 
3.3.4. Rate of pay during LSL
Appendix 1 provides examples of the wage  
payment on which LSL is based. Each statute 
specifies what ‘ordinary pay’ or ‘remuneration’ is, 
for the purposes of calculating LSL entitlements. 
Because the meaning of these terms varies 
somewhat between schemes, we have provided 
representative examples of the statutory provisions 
for the building and construction industry and the 
contract cleaning industry schemes (see Appendix 
1). Some building and construction schemes, 
including the NSW scheme, do not require the 
worker to take leave in order to receive the 
entitlement; i.e. once eligible for an entitlement, the 
worker can apply for and receive a payment from the 
scheme while still continuing to work.
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3.3.5. Rate of employer levy
 
Employer levies vary considerably 
between schemes (see Table 3.5). 
Even within the one jurisdiction  
there can be considerable variations. 
There are two methods of levying 
employers:
 Levy is a proportion of total 
costs for construction/project: 
This method applies to the 
construction schemes in NSW, 
Queensland and Northern 
Territory. The prescribed levy 
currently varies from 0.3% to 
0.35% of total costs.
 Levy is a proportion of ordinary 
or eligible wages paid. This 
method applies to all other PLSL 
schemes reported below. These 
levies vary between 1.25% 
(ACT building and construction 
industry) and 2.7% (for the coal 
mining industry and Victoria’s 
construction industry). The 
average for these 11 schemes 
is a 1.81% levy and the most 
common is a 2% levy  
of wages paid. 
As explained in Section 4, the levy 
rates have varied substantially over 
time. 
At present, levies in many  
schemes are higher than usual. This 
reflects the impact of the Global 
Financial Crisis. Funds which suffered 
investment losses have increased 
levies in order to recoup their losses.
tABLe 3.5 
Rate oF eMPloyeR levy PReScRibed  
in PlSl ScheMeS
Note: ‘B & C’ refers to Building and Construction Industry
coMMonwealth coal
2.7% of eligible wages paid
nSw b & c
Up to 0.6% of cost of erecting 
building; Current Regulation (2011) 
prescribes levy of 0.35% of cost
cleaning 
1.7% of total remuneration
vic b & c
2.7% of every workers’ ordinary 
rate of pay
qld b & c
0.3% of total of all costs  
relating to construction work  
(if over $80,000)
cleaning 
2% of ordinary wages paid
Sa b & c
2.25% of total remuneration paid
wa b & c
2% of ordinary rate of pay for  
all workers (except apprentices) for 
all days engaged on site
taS b & c
2% of ordinary pay
nt b & c
0.3% of cost of project for work 
started on or after 1 April 2012 
(0.4% for work started  prior) 
act b & c
1.25% of ordinary wages  
(no levy on apprentices)
cleaning
2% of ordinary wages paid
SecuRity
1.47% of ordinary wages 
coMMunity SeRviceS
1.67% of ordinary wages
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3.3.6. When the levy is payable
Requirements as to when employers must pay 
the levy are likely to affect perceptions of the cost 
burden and also employers’ flexibility in relation 
to transferring the funds. With some schemes, 
employers must pay up-front and with others, 
payment occurs on a regular basis, with payment 
intervals varying also. Thus in many cases, employers 
must pay the levy on a quarterly basis, but in other 
cases it is monthly, two-monthly or half-yearly.
Construction industry LSL schemes in NSW, 
Queensland and NT, which require employers to 
pay levies calculated as a percentage of the cost 
of the project, provide that the levies must be paid 
before the work commences. These schemes 
also allow for employers to pay by instalments in 
certain circumstances. For instance, in NT, where 
the amount owed exceeds $10,000 or the work is 
scheduled to last for one year or more, employers 
can pay in instalments. In NSW, employers can pay 
by instalment where the amount exceeds $100,000 
or where work will continue for more than one year.
PLSL schemes that calculate the levy as a 
percentage of wages paid generally provide for 
payment following the reporting of workforce 
statistics. Thus employers must report at regular 
intervals on the number of workers, hours worked 
and so forth by a certain date, and are then given a 
legislated period to pay the total levy to the fund.
3.3.7. Frequency of employer 
reporting on workforce 
and deadline for returns 
Reporting requirements are as follows:
 For the Victorian and WA construction industry 
schemes and for each of the contract cleaning 
LSL schemes (NSW, Queensland, ACT) 
employers must report quarterly;
 The Queensland and NSW building and 
construction schemes have annual reporting;
 In SA (construction industry), there is a two-
monthly reporting schedule;
 In Tasmania (construction industry), reports are 
required at the end of each month, or quarterly 
if the levy payable is less than $100 or if the 
organisation employs three or fewer workers;
 In NT (construction industry), a half-yearly 
reporting cycle applies to employers who 
choose to pay by instalment (rather than up-
front);
 With the coal mining industry scheme, 
employers must report workforce data at the 
end of every month. 
A number of schemes have introduced or are 
introducing online reporting to make reporting 
easier for employers.
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The flexibility for employers regarding transfer 
of funds owed to the Administering Body also 
depends on the actual deadline for returns on 
workforce data. In some cases, this buys them 
considerable time. Deadlines vary as follows – 
returns must be provided:
 Within 14 days of end of reporting period – 
Victoria (Construction), Queensland (Cleaning, 
Construction) and NSW (Cleaning);
 Within 15 days of end of reporting period – in 
WA;
 Within 21 days of prescribed period – in SA 
(construction);
 Within 28 days of end of quarter – for the coal 
mining industry scheme;
 Within one month of end of reporting period 
– in NT (construction), and for all the ACT 
schemes.
In the Queensland building and construction 
scheme, for which levies are based on project 
costs of $80,000 or more, employers must notify 
the fund prior to the issue of a development permit 
or, if no permit is given, before the work starts. 
In the NSW building and construction scheme, 
levies are based on project costs of $25,000 or 
more and the employer must pay the levy, or begin 
instalments, prior to a construction certificate 
being issued.
In each jurisdiction, the enabling statute provides 
for civil penalties for late returns. The severity of 
fines varies according to the quantum of penalty 
units prescribed and the value of each penalty unit 
in particular jurisdictions. Penalties are imposed 
by courts, as the funds in almost all cases do 
not impose penalties directly. In the Queensland 
building and construction scheme failure to pay 
the levies before the work starts could result in 
a compound interest rate of 2% per month, or 
part thereof, applying to unpaid amounts. The 
Tasmanian building and construction fund applies 
a higher rate of levy where an employer is found to 
have under-reported or failed to report.
3.3.8. Type of employment 
arrangements covered
Schemes also vary in terms of the type  
of workers who are entitled to receive  
PLSL. The industries which currently  
have PLSL schemes provided by  
legislation are those which have experienced  
long-standing but also growing proportions 
of workers in short-term and non-traditional 
employment arrangements. 
The traditional distinction in Australian  
employment law between contract of service  
and contract for service is applied in a number  
of these schemes, with some making  
PLSL available only to those engaged  
on a contract of service. However, some  
quite clearly ‘rope in’ workers engaged  
through other arrangements, including  
sub-contractors, contractors and labour  
hire arrangements.
This is an important distinction and one which 
dramatically affects the coverage and cost of a 
PLSL scheme. It is also an issue that is likely  
to be politically controversial, particularly at the 
present time. 
The exclusion of workers on contracts for service 
from regulation by employment law, and hence 
various industrial entitlements, is something which 
currently is attracting considerable attention in 
Australia. In 2012, employer groups engaged in 
significant litigation to try to stem encroachments 
by trade unions through enterprise bargaining to 
regulate employment conditions for these workers. 
The following patterns can be identified:
 Coal mining industry – PLSL is restricted 
to ‘employees’ as defined in s.13 of the Fair 
Work Act 2009 (Cth);
 Contract cleaning industry – PLSL 
available to workers and contractors, 
therefore including workers engaged both in a 
contract of service and contract for service;
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 Construction industry – In WA only 
workers on a contract of service are covered. 
The remaining schemes generally provide 
the entitlement also to those engaged in a 
contract for service, including sub-contractors, 
other contracts for labour, and workers 
engaged in group training schemes and 
apprenticeships.
Various PLSL statutes provide for the inclusion of 
subcontractors and/or workers on contracts for 
service. The clauses in the statutes take different 
forms.
In NSW, the construction industry scheme provides 
a PLSL entitlement to workers and subcontractors.  
Employers are required to register employees 
and report on their length of employment. 
Subcontractors must register themselves and 
provide returns on their own working arrangements 
with respect to the hours and days worked. Box 3.2 
contains the definitions of each type of work and 
then the rule in relation to subcontract workers and 
their responsibilities in relation to registering for LSL.
 The definition of ‘worker’ under the 
Queensland law is slightly different –  
see Box 3.3.
 The SA Scheme covers working directors 
and self-employed contractors on a voluntary 
(opt-in) basis; entitlements are based on the 
accumulation of fixed dollar contributions with 
interest.
 The ACT Scheme provides an entitlement 
to workers, which include employees and 
contractors (as defined in s.10 – see Box 
3.4. For each group of workers (building 
and construction, contract cleaning, security 
and community service workers) there 
are provisions for how LSL payments are 
calculated for contractors in each of those 
sectors. Box 3.4 presents an extract from the 
Act regarding contractors in the construction 
sector scheme (s.1.13). 
Section 3: subcontract worker means 
a worker who performs work otherwise 
than under a contract of employment.
worker means any person who, under 
a contract, whether or not a contract 
of employment, performs building 
and construction work, however 
remunerated, but does not include 
a person of a class prescribed as 
exempt by the regulations or a person 
who performs, or supervises the 
performance of, any such work under a 
contract of employment.
Section 21 Subcontract workers—
claims for service credits
(1) A registered worker may furnish to 
the Corporation a claim for service 
credits in respect of building and 
construction work performed by 
the registered worker under a 
contract other than a contract of 
employment.
(2)  A claim for service credits under 
subsection (1) may be furnished:
(a)  within 12 months after 30 June 
in any year, in respect of 
building and construction work 
performed by the registered 
worker in the year immediately 
preceding that 30 June,
(b)  within 12 months after the 
registered worker permanently 
ceases work in the building 
and construction industry, 
in respect of building and 
construction work performed 
by the registered worker in the 
period commencing on 1 July 
immediately preceding that 
cessation of work and ending on 
that cessation of work.
BOx 3.2 
building  conStRuction induStRy long 
SeRvice PayMentS act 1986 (nSw) no 19
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s. 3A Who is an eligible worker
(1)  An eligible worker is an individual who—
(a)  under a contract of service is engaged to perform work in the building and construction 
industry for the majority of the person’s ordinary hours of work; or
(b)  under a contract, whether or not the contract is a contract of service, or at piecework rates, 
is engaged to perform work in the building and construction industry, for labour only or 
substantially for labour only, for the majority of the person’s ordinary hours of work; or
(c)  under a contract, whether or not the contract is a contract of service, performs work in the 
building and construction industry for the majority of the person’s ordinary hours of work, 
unless—
(i)  the individual—
(A)  is paid to achieve a stated result or outcome; and
(B)  has to supply all, or substantially all, of the plant and equipment or tools of trade 
needed to perform the work; and
(C)  is, or would be, liable for the cost of fixing a fault with the work performed; or
(ii)  a personal services business determination is in effect for the individual performing the 
work under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), section 87-60.
BOx 3.3
queenSland building and  
conStRuction induStRy (PlSl) act 1991
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s 8 Who is a worker?
Each of the following is a worker for a 
covered industry:
 (a) an employee for the industry;
 (b) a contractor for the industry.
Note An individual may be declared by the 
Minister to be an employee or a contractor 
for a covered industry (see s 11).
s 9 Who is an employee?
(1) An individual is an employee for a 
covered industry if the individual is—
(a) employed by an employer for the 
industry (whether in the ACT or 
elsewhere); or
(b) declared to be an employee for the 
industry under section 11
(2) In this section:
employed includes employed as—
 (a) a full-time employee; or
 (b) a part-time employee; or
 (c) a casual employee; or
 (d) a person remunerated at piecework 
rates or completely or partly by 
commission; or
 (e) an apprentice.
Note For this Act, an individual declared 
to be an employee of a stated employer is 
taken to be employed by the employer (see 
s 11 (3)).
s 10 Who is a contractor?
(1)  An individual (other than an employee) is 
a contractor for a covered industry if the  
individual—
(a)  carries out work in the industry for 
another person for fee or reward on 
the individual’s own account; or
(b)  is declared to be a contractor for the 
industry under section 11.
(2)  Also, an individual who is a working 
director of an employer for a covered 
industry is taken to be a contractor for 
the industry.
s. 1.13 Leave payments for service as 
registered contractor— building and 
construction industry
(1) For section 1.11 (How are leave 
payments worked out for the building 
and construction industry?), the amount 
payable to a registered worker for the 
building and construction industry for 
long service leave for service accrued as 
a contractor is the total of the following 
for the service:
(a) amounts paid by the worker to the 
authority under section 56
(Determination of levy—contractors);
(b) interest at the determined rate worked 
out from the date of receipt of each 
amount paid under section 56 until 
the designated day for the leave.
(2) The governing board must determine an 
interim rate of interest from time to time 
prior to the determination of the rate 
under subsection (1). 
(3) The determined rate of interest must be 
determined at the end of each financial 
year for the previous financial year, and 
is—
(a) if the construction industry 
scheme funds invested made a 
return—75% of the rate of the return 
for the financial year in which the 
determination is made; or
(b) if the fund did not make a return or 
made a loss—nil.
BOx 3.4
long SeRvice leave (PoRtable ScheMeS) act 2009 (act)S 8 who iS a woRkeR?
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3.4  Review of  
the established  
PLSL schemes
In order to assess the advantages and 
disadvantages of the established PLSL schemes, 
we have considered the following information:
 The arguments for and against the introduction 
of these schemes, as set out in Parliamentary 
debates/policy papers/feasibility studies when 
these schemes were first established and/or 
under consideration;
 Previous Parliamentary reviews of some 
of the PLSL schemes; and
 Feedback from stakeholders: interviews 
conducted with the employee and employer 
representatives in industries with PLSL 
schemes and with the board members of 
these schemes.
3.4.1. Arguments for and Against 
the establishment of PLSL Schemes
Several new PLSL schemes have been established 
over the last fifteen years, including for the 
Building and Construction Industry in the Northern 
Territory; Contract Cleaners in NSW, the ACT, and 
Queensland; and Community Workers and Security 
Guards in the ACT. 
The State or Territory governments normally 
consulted with stakeholders before introducing the 
new scheme. Typically the consultation processes 
would include publication of discussion papers 
and actuarial feasibility studies; acceptance of 
submissions from stakeholders; interviews with 
industry bodies representing both employers and 
unions; and surveys. 
The unions and employees were generally strongly 
in favour of the new schemes. The employer 
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The government explained the purpose of 
the proposed scheme:
The Contract Cleaning Industry (Portable 
Long Service Leave) Bill 2010 seeks to 
eliminate the inequity experienced by 
thousands of contract cleaners who 
are unable to access long service leave 
entitlements through no fault of their 
own.21 The scheme further delivers on the 
Government’s commitment to protect low-
paid and vulnerable workers who, through 
no fault of their own, have been unable to 
access their entitlements because of the 
nature of their industry.22
 The government then consulted with 
stakeholders. It seems that both 
employers and employees supported 
the proposed scheme.
….. I announced that the New South 
Wales Government was committed to 
examining the feasibility of a portable 
long service leave scheme. This was 
met with overwhelming support from 
cleaning workers. This bill will give 
cleaners a fair deal for all the hours they 
have dedicated to their job. Since then 
New South Wales Industrial Relations has 
undertaken a comprehensive consultation 
process to ascertain the level of industry 
support for the scheme, to assess the 
scheme’s financial viability and to explore 
optimum governance and administrative 
arrangements. Peak industry stakeholders 
who participated in regular consultation 
meetings include the Liquor, Hospitality 
and Miscellaneous Union, the Building 
Service Contractors’ Association of 
Australia, NSW Division and the Australian 
Cleaning Contractors Association. I am 
told that it was immediately evident that 
each of the stakeholders had considered 
exAmpLe: 
nSw contRact cleaning PlSl ScheMe
reactions were more mixed (often depending on the 
size of the employer organisation). The employers 
could see that the proposed schemes provided 
some benefits for the employer as well as the 
employees (albeit at some cost).
The following examples illustrate the consultative 
processes and the rationale for the introduction of 
new industry-based PLSL schemes in recent years.
Queensland introduced a PLSL scheme for 
cleaners in 2005. The Queensland government held 
extensive consultations before introducing the new 
scheme, and obtained the support of employer 
organisations.
In 2010 the ACT established a new PLSL fund for 
the Community Services Sector.
Proposals for the establishment of more PLSL 
schemes have not always been successful.  
Several years ago, the Victorian government 
proposed the establishment of a PLSL scheme 
for community workers. In 2007 the government 
commissioned a feasibility report which included 
actuarial recommendations on the design of the 
scheme and provided an initial estimate of costs. 
In 2009, the Department of Human Services 
held meetings to discuss these proposals with 
stakeholders. As a result of this process “it 
became apparent that there was substantial 
employer opposition to the proposed CSS PLSL 
scheme, particularly on the basis of the cost 
and administration requirements.” Eventually, 
the government decided not to proceed with the 
proposed scheme.28
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a scheme of this kind in some detail, with 
many elements of the proposal meeting with 
unanimous support and/or a high degree of 
consensus.
The benefits for employers were identified:
The support of industry stakeholders reflects 
the strong belief that a statutory scheme 
supported by a comprehensive workplace 
education and compliance regime will act as 
a practical and effective deterrent for non-
compliant operators. Importantly, the new 
scheme will help maintain a level playing field 
for employers competitively tendering for 
cleaning services contracts while protecting 
the core benefits of essential service workers. 
I am told that the stakeholder consultations 
were characterised by a spirit of informed and 
constructive engagement.23
 It is anticipated that, apart from the obvious 
benefit to cleaners and their families, there 
will be a number of related positive effects 
including a boost to industry retention rates 
and, by retaining skills and experience, 
increased service standards in industry 
performance. This is a significant step forward 
to the cleaning industry, which has often been 
characterised by a race to the bottom on 
wages and conditions.24
There will be benefits for New South Wales 
in the form of a more stable industry, and 
workers will be able to take their long service 
leave and come back to their jobs. Formerly, 
when employees wanted a rest from work or 
to take a holiday or a trip back home, many of 
them had to leave their positions and hope to 
find another position later. Employers would 
lose the benefit of their valued employees’ 
expertise and loyalty. Employers know the 
value of keeping their valued and trusted 
workers: it is good for business. The constant 
search for new staff is costly and time 
consuming. There are also costs in taking 
on new workers, including their training 
and supervision, and the uncertainty of the 
performance of new staff and how it might 
affect contractual obligations.25
It appears that the peak industry body 
supported the new scheme, although this 
support was not unanimous.
The Government announced its intention 
to examine the feasibility of a portable long 
service leave scheme for cleaning workers in 
August and claims to have consulted widely 
since and to have received support from 
stakeholders for the scheme. The Australian 
Contract Cleaners Association has confirmed 
to me that this is the case, but concerns have 
been raised from others that that organisation, 
or any other organisation, is unlikely to 
represent the whole of the industry.26
The Opposition (Liberal/National Parties) did 
not oppose the legislation, and the PLSL 
Scheme for Contract Cleaners commenced 
operations in 2011.
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The following information is taken from a 
report on Portable Long Service Leave for the 
ACT Community Services Sector, prepared 
for the Department of Disability, Housing, and 
Community Services (March 2009).
The main purpose of the scheme was to 
“support the community sector to attract and 
retain a skilled workforce and foster a more 
sustainable Community Services Sector in the 
ACT.”
The government started by consulting the 
peak bodies in the industry and the employers/
managers of large organisations. This was 
done by issuing a discussion paper, collecting 
submissions, and holding targeted interviews. 
The key finding of this consultation process 
were:
“The proposed Scheme was strongly supported 
by unions and employees as an appropriate 
strengthening of employees’ entitlements. 
However the degree of support from employers 
was mixed, with smaller employers showing 
significantly more support for the scheme than 
larger employers. The primary objection from 
many large employers in the community sector 
was that such a Scheme will not achieve success 
in the apparent goal of supporting the retention 
of staff within the sector.”
The ACT government also commissioned a 
survey of employers and employees. 122 people 
responded to the survey: 60% were employees 
and 40% were employers. The survey results 
were:
“Overall there were very high levels of support for 
the Portable Long Service Leave Scheme. The 
statement I would support the introduction of a 
Portable Long Service Leave Scheme’ received a 
very strong mean score of 4.1 out of 5 (where 1 = 
strongly disagree and 5 = strong agree)”.
Most respondents believed that the new scheme 
would allow the sector to attract and retain staff; 
and would be of benefit to employees. 
Survey respondents provided the following 
comments on the advantages of the scheme:
“It allows [for] employees who may need a break 
from particularly stressful areas of community 
service (high risk, behavioural management, 
mental health) and leave[s] the door open for a 
return to the sector without penalty or fear of 
losing entitlements”
“Moving between jobs is often the only way to 
advance in a career in the community sector and 
thus portability of long service leave will enable 
people to increase skills, experience, training, 
and thus provide more valuable service to clients 
and employees.”
“It allows for extended periods of leave, 
particularly since mostly women work in the 
sector. I am thinking about the time women take 
to step out of the workforce, have children and 
raise them to school age, re-engage with work.”
“Allows for employees to plan the work/life 
balance better and with greater security.”
On the other hand, the consultation process 
also identified a number of concerns about the 
proposed scheme. 
Many of the Community Sector organisations 
were concerned about the cost of providing 
additional LSL benefits. Since there is generally 
high staff turnover in this sector, LSL costs were 
only about 1% of salaries. The provision of PLSL 
was expected to push LSL costs up to 2% of 
salaries. Since most of these Community Sector 
organisations operated on very tight budgets, 
the additional cost would lead to a reduction of 
service standards; lay-off of some staff; or an 
increase in the fees charged to customers for 
their services. These organisations suggested 
that the increased LSL costs should be funded 
by an increase in government funding for the 
Community Services sector.
Some employers were also concerned about the 
difficulties of finding staff to “fill in” while others 
were on leave. They suggested that employers 
might be reluctant to hire people who already 
had accrued LSL entitlements from prior jobs, 
since this would cause staffing difficulties. During 
the consultation process, some employers 
suggested that new employees should not be 
act coMMunity SectoR ScheMe
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allowed to take LSL within the first 12 months at 
their new organisation.
Although the employers did have some 
concerns, the strength of support for the 
scheme outweighed these reservations. The ACT 
government decided to go ahead and establish 
a PLSL scheme for Community Sector Workers, 
and the new scheme commenced operations in 
2010. 
Three years into the operation of the scheme, the 
experience of both employers and employees is 
reported to have been largely positive. Recent 
interviews with employer representatives found:
“The way the scheme has been administered 
in the ACT is really good. Certainly when the 
community sector scheme came on board it 
coincided with new technology that allows 
electronic submissions. It makes a big difference 
in terms of us just being able to upload ordinary 
files from our administration systems and it has 
made the process quite easy. If that had not been 
the case, and we had to prepare paper returns, 
then it would have been quite onerous. But the 
technology is now at a point where is it a much 
simpler process to administer.”
Compliance was not seen as a significant issue 
either: “We have very high rates of compliance. 
There was significant education that occurred in 
the lead-up to the scheme and the Authority has 
a regulatory role and has active discussions with 
employers and agencies. In fact all four schemes 
in the ACT have very high rates of compliance.” 
Nevertheless, challenges were evident, for 
example: “The biggest challenge is the need to 
run dual administration systems in the transition 
phase because part of the entitlement is held 
with the organisation and part with the board. 
But once the transitional period is over it will be 
much simpler.” 
In terms of the scheme’s advantages and 
disadvantages the employer representative 
noted: “We always saw that the key advantage 
was that the employees got their entitlements. 
From a purely financial perspective a portable 
long service scheme is more expensive – 
particularly in a sector like ours where a lot of the 
LSL allocations weren’t being realised because 
we have high turnover and people often work 
in multiple part-time or casual positions. These 
are hard jobs to work in and this is one of the 
sectors where you really encourage people to 
take some decent time out – because they need 
it. To be supportive of these types of schemes 
sends a very strong message to our staff; that 
we do actually understand the reality of their 
everyday work and we are looking out for them in 
terms of them accessing it. This is an entitlement. 
[PLSL] actually recognises the need to take a 
break after a long and intensive period of work. 
It is a significant issue in a sector like ours where 
we know that there is a lot of movement across 
organisations but potentially not any break of 
activity and service. If [workers] are taking a 
break, they are rejuvenating then they are more 
likely to stay in the sector. 
“Overall there has been a really strong 
acceptance of this scheme in this industry. 
There are still pockets of employers who 
raise concerns, who take longer to get their 
heads around it, although they do tend to be 
concentrated in sub-sectors, and those are 
potentially subsectors that are going through 
a whole range of change anyway. In a sense it 
largely reflects other things going on. But overall, 
I think it has been a really smooth transition; it 
certainly costs more, it does. But in terms of what 
the benefits are, they outweigh all the obvious 
costs. You have to take that broader perspective, 
if you are seen as a good, flexible employer who 
is looking out for their staff then that impacts 
retention and good people will come work for 
you. You save money on a lot of the hidden 
costs associated with burnout, turnover and lost 
productivity. It is absolutely in our interest [to 
have PLSL]. To be able to ensure that there is 
recognition of service and staff are able to realise 
their entitlements is a real benefit. The ability to 
provide a better environment for staff is the main 
advantage of portability.”
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3.4.2. Previous official reviews 
of established PLSL schemes
Some of the industry-based PLSL schemes  
have been in operation for many years. From  
time to time, their operations have been subjected 
to review.
A review of the WA construction industry  
scheme in 1996 found that 56% of employers 
and 69% of employees supported the scheme. 
Nevertheless the report recommended that 
the scheme be scrapped, because of the high 
turnover of construction industry workers. The 
high turnover rates meant that many employees 
would not remain in the industry long enough to 
obtain benefits.29
In 1997, the Minister for Workplace Relations and 
Small Business (Peter Reith) initiated a review of the 
LSL funding arrangements in the black coal mining 
industry.30
Some of the larger employers in the industry 
favoured closing down the PLSL fund and 
distributing its assets back to the employers. These 
employers felt that the system was not flexible 
enough to cope with the changing patterns of 
employment and remuneration in the industry. Other 
employers (mainly the smaller employers) were 
satisfied with existing arrangements and reluctant to 
disturb the status quo. The review recommended 
the scheme’s closure, and suggested that the fund’s 
assets should be returned to the mining industry 
employers. The CFMEU announced its “implacable 
opposition” to any such changes and threatened 
to go on strike to defend PLSL. The report’s 
recommendations were never implemented.31
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In 2003 the Cole Royal Commission reviewed  
PLSL schemes in the building and construction 
industry. Submissions from employer organisations 
and unions “without exception supported 
the retention of the existing schemes”.32 The 
Commissioner did note some problems with the 
financial management of these schemes, which are 
discussed in Section 4 below.
In 2011 a Tasmanian Parliamentary Committee 
recommended the dissolution of the  
Tasmanian PLSL scheme (TasBuild). Many 
employers were quite satisfied with Tasbuild, 
but others were rather critical. The majority of 
Committee members favoured winding up TasBuild, 
and replacing it with an increase in contributions to 
superannuation funds: the increased contributions 
would be set aside to provide LSL benefits, 
although it appears that this would contravene the 
superannuation fund sole purpose test. Despite 
these findings, the Tasmanian Government has 
reportedly promised to consider extending  
PLSL to a wider range of industries.
3.4.3. Feedback from stakeholders
In the course of our research, we interviewed a 
number of people involved in the management 
of established PLSL schemes: representatives of 
employers, employees, and administrators.
These stakeholders generally presented a positive 
view of these schemes and saw the advantages of 
PLSL as outweighing its costs. 
A number of interviewees (including employer 
representatives) said that PLSL allowed workers 
to receive their LSL entitlements, and that the levy 
system was an effective way of collecting funds 
without imposing an administrative burden on 
employers. However, some interviewees said that 
the obligation to make LSL payments into industry 
funds effectively imposed an additional cost burden 
on employers operating in industries where the 
profit margins were typically very small.
Potential advantages  
of PSL schemes
 Retention of workers – A key consideration 
underpinning the creation of PLSL schemes 
was the high levels of labour mobility and the 
prevalence of non-permanent and short-term 
working arrangements in these industries, 
which created difficulties for employers 
in retaining staff and meant that workers 
had difficulties in qualifying for their LSL 
entitlements. The introduction of PLSL was 
intended to address these challenges, but it is 
difficult to determine whether or not the industry 
schemes have helped to meet this objective. 
PLSL can allow workers to take a break from 
mentally or physically challenging jobs with a 
high rate of burnout or injury. These outcomes 
could lead to high levels of workers exiting the 
industry and thereby erode employer incentives 
to invest in human capital. Conversely, the costs 
of LSL for employers could be potentially offset 
by improved health and safety outcomes.
 Equity – Workers in highly casualised or 
contract roles would otherwise have no 
practical access to LSL.
 Mobility and flexibility – Workers have 
more capacity to move between employers  
or take short periods out of employment 
to meet commitments such as carer 
responsibilities without losing the accumulated 
entitlement to LSL.
 Work environment – Workers have the 
capacity to take a sustained period of leave to 
rejuvenate after a lengthy period of continued 
work, which has advantages for boosting 
productivity and employee morale.
 Employee attraction – Flexibility for workers 
is seen as a benefit for “good employers” as 
employees felt less compelled to stay in poorly 
managed workplaces in order to meet LSL 
eligibility requirements.
 Non compliance problems reduced – 
Employers would pay for entitlements  
as they accrue.
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 Free-riding problems reduced – Under the 
existing rules, employers have no obligation 
to provide any LSL benefits to employees 
who leave before completing the vesting 
period (5 or 7 years’ service depending on the 
jurisdiction). As a result, employers might be 
tempted to sack employees shortly before they 
become eligible for benefits. Industry-based 
LSL schemes mean that all employers are 
obliged to fund LSL entitlements, regardless of 
whether they retain employees who reach the 
vesting period for taking leave.
 Administrative benefits for employers –
Industry funds effectively remove from 
employers the responsibility for administering 
LSL arrangements and payment for 
employees. The industry-based funds have 
improved efficiency in record-keeping.
 Cost certainty – Greater cost stability is 
provided to employers because the pay-as-
you-go operation of portable schemes limits 
the potential for employers to accumulate 
liabilities and not being able to pay employees 
their entitlements if they become insolvent or 
have trading difficulties.
 Tax benefits – Employers can claim a tax 
deduction for payment of the levies; and the 
portable industry funds are not required to pay 
tax on their investment income. An illustration 
of the potential tax advantages is given later in 
this document. 
Potential disadvantages  
of LSL portability
 Administration costs for employers – 
This factor was pronounced during transitional 
periods of newly established schemes and 
was particularly onerous under schemes that 
previously used paper systems of returns (but 
have largely been alleviated by the advent of 
electronic return systems).
 Financial costs of providing benefits for 
employees who leave after a short period 
of service – In industries where many workers 
would not have achieved the qualifying period 
under non-portable schemes, the introduction 
of PLSL has effectively imposed an additional 
financial cost for employers. By contrast, PLSL 
often means that employers are required to 
provide levy contributions for all potentially 
eligible employees.
 Prefunding impact on business cash 
flows – One interviewee noted that many 
(particularly smaller) employers had failed to 
provide for LSL benefits in their accounting 
systems and simply paid LSL payments from 
consolidated revenues as required. The PLSL 
schemes require employers to prefund these 
benefit payments. This has an impact on the 
employers’ cash flows.
3.5  Extra benefits of Long 
Service Leave
3.5.1. Research into the benefits of 
taking leave for employees
There is very little research into the benefits of 
long service leave. However, there is research 
into annual leave, and some of this research 
sheds light on the need for LSL. In general the 
importance of leave from work for employee 
health, well-being and work/life balance has been 
widely acknowledged.33 Long hours of work with 
a lack of adequate leave have been associated 
with stress-related illness, including heart disease 
and stroke. This can represent a significant cost to 
employers.
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The key findings in a report released by Safe Work 
Australia in April 2013 included, for example, that 
“Mental stress claims are the most expensive form 
of workers’ compensation claims” - primarily due 
to the lengthy periods of work absence typical of 
these claims.34 Furthermore, more psychosocial 
compensation claims related to work pressure than 
any other subcategory of mental stress.35 
While 70% of workers who experience mental 
stress do not apply for compensation,36 stress 
is linked to cognitive risk factors that drive many 
workplace accidents and illnesses. Employers 
can also face significant non-compensable costs 
arising from the negative impact of work stress 
on staff morale, productivity, ‘presenteeism’ and 
dysfunctional behaviours. Conversely, studies 
such as Cairncross and Waller have pointed 
out that people who take leave are generally 
more productive and exhibit fewer symptoms of 
workplace stress. Allowing workers to take LSL 
is therefore likely to benefit employers by helping 
to improve productivity and reduce employers’ 
occupational health and safety and costs.37 
Annual leave provides an opportunity to take a 
short break from work each year. However, previous 
studies have shown that about six in ten workers 
are “stockpiling” their annual leave. According to 
research from the Centre for Work + Life, the most 
common reason for not taking leave is that workers 
are saving it for a future holiday (this was the reason 
specified by about 40% of full-time workers).38 
Similarly, a study commissioned by Tourism Australia 
also found that many Australian workers are 
stockpiling their annual leave. When asked about 
barriers to leave-taking, 40% cited concerns about 
availability of funds; 24% said that they were saving 
up leave for a big holiday; and 26% said that they 
wanted to have leave available for emergencies, 
such as illness or job loss.39 Of course, better LSL 
entitlements would help to meet these needs. 
According to the survey conducted by the Centre 
for Work + Life, about 56% of workers would rather 
have 2 weeks additional leave instead of a 4% pay 
rise. This suggests that: 
“...	increased	leave	opportunities,	
including	longer	holidays,	are	
likely	to	be	associated	with	
improved	work-life	outcomes	
and	appreciative	workers.”40
LSL also provides an important period of rest 
for workers in those occupations, particularly 
susceptible to long-term fatigue and associated 
stress.  Shiftworkers are a key group in this regard, 
given that circadian rhythms do not adapt easily 
to changing work schedules and fatigue is an 
additional health and safety risk factor in stress 
responses to the shiftwork experience.41 As Smith 
noted, the shiftworker ‘is engaged in trying to 
achieve a complex balance between useful hours 
of wakefulness for work, family and leisure with 
the maintenance of an individually acceptable level 
of fatigue for both sleep and wakefulness’.42 LSL 
provides an opportunity for extended relief from the 
fatigue and stress involved.
Some studies have suggested that the provision 
of leave will also produce benefits for employers. 
For example, Cairncross and Waller have pointed 
out that people who take leave are generally 
more productive and exhibit fewer symptoms of 
workplace stress. Stress is linked to higher levels of 
claims for workplace accidents and illness (including 
mental health claims, which have been escalating in 
recent years). Allowing workers to take LSL might 
help to reduce employers’ occupational health and 
safety costs.43
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3.5.2. Benefits to tourism 
 and hospitality
The study by Tourism Australia referred to above 
was part of its extensive No Leave, No Life 
campaign designed to encourage employees 
to take their leave instead of stockpiling it.44 The 
tourism and hospitality industries would be obvious 
beneficiaries. Although this campaign was focused 
on annual leave, many of the same arguments 
for taking funded accrued leave to the benefit of 
industry as well as employees could be mounted for 
long service leave. The Business SA chief executive, 
Peter Vaughan, made this connection in 2009.45
Similar arguments have been mounted in Europe 
where the tourism and hospitality sector is a 
beneficiary of extensive annual leave and paid 
public holiday provisions. The EU sets a paid leave 
floor of 20 days (4 weeks) per annum, but several 
countries provide for more, notably France with 
30 days (6 weeks) and Sweden with 25 days (5 
weeks). Extra paid holidays are up to 13 extra days 
in some European countries.46 Commentators 
have noted the coincidence of generous leave 
and productivity in the same European countries 
and suggested a link between the two, benefiting 
industry as a whole as well as the tourism and 
hospitality sector.47
In addition, it is common in a number of European 
countries for employees to receive extra payments 
for their leave periods as a result of collective 
agreements. For example, Danish workers receive a 
12.5% bonus during their holiday, Swedish workers 
receive 12%, and Norwegian workers receive 11%. 
Employees in Luxembourg receive a 13th monthly 
wage, and in Italy 13th and 14th monthly wages. 
In Iceland annual leave entitlements increase with 
long service.48 Outside Europe, Brazil, Singapore 
and the Philippines have employee entitlements 
for a 13th month of pay for annual leave.49 The 
tourism and hospitality is a strong supporter of 
these arrangements since it generally considers 
that it is a major beneficiary and that employment 
opportunities in the sector are sustained at higher 
levels than they would otherwise be.
3.5.3. Fair Entitlements 
Guarantee and payment of LSL 
entitlements in event of insolvency
A major problem for a substantial number of 
employees over the years has been the non- 
payment of entitlements when companies became 
insolvent. One of the entitlements affected has been 
LSL, for which organisations do not normally set 
aside funds as the entitlements accrue, but pay 
from revenue when employees are due to take the 
leave. One of the advantages of PLSL funds for 
employees is that these entitlements can be paid in 
full in the event of insolvency.
For the same reasons, the extension of PLSL 
funds would result in a significant saving to the 
Commonwealth government budget. The Fair 
Entitlements Guarantee (FEG) is the Commonwealth 
government fund from which minimum payments 
are made for employee entitlements owed 
when businesses become insolvent. The FEG 
replaced the General Employee Entitlements and 
Redundancy Scheme (GEERS) on 5 December 
2012. GEERS/FEG covers a wide range of 
employee entitlements, including unpaid wages, 
unused annual leave, pay in lieu of notice, and 
redundancy payments as well as LSL. 
Payments under this scheme are funded from 
general tax revenue. Commonwealth budget 
allocation to GEERS has increased from $40m 
upon the scheme’s inception in 2001/02 to $195m 
in 2011/12. LSL entitlements made a substantial 
contribution to the total spend for GEERS, and can 
be expected to continue to do so for the FEG.
Table 3.6 shows the proportion of LSL entitlements 
compared with the total GEERS payments by the 
Commonwealth government for the period 2007/08 
to 2011/12. Here we find three trends. First, the 
total expenditure on GEERS more than tripled in the 
period to reach almost $200 million. Correspondingly, 
the LSL component of the GEERS expenditure 
also tripled, to exceed $24.5 million. Finally, as a 
proportion of the total GEERS expenditure in this 
period, the LSL fluctuated slightly, but accounted 
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Sources: Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2012) Annual Report 2011-12, Canberra, accessed April 10 2013, 
available at http://foi.deewr.gov.au/documents/deewr-annual-report-2011-12-full-version;
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2011) Annual Report 2010-11, Canberra, accessed April 10 2013, available at 
http://foi.deewr.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/annual_report_201011.pdf;
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2010) Annual Report 2009-10, Canberra, accessed April 10 2013, available at 
http://foi.deewr.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/annual_report_200910_part_1.pdf;
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2009) Annual Report 2008-09, Canberra, accessed April 10 2013, available at 
http://foi.deewr.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/annual_report_200809_part_1.pdf;
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2008) Annual Report 2007-08, Canberra, accessed April 10 2013, available at 
http://foi.deewr.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/annual_report_200708_volume_1.pdf.
Financial 
yeaR
total geeRS 
exPendituRe $
lSl coMPonent  
oF geeRS $
lSl % oF  
total geeRS
2007-08 60,779,791 7,856,104 12.9
2008-09 99,756,911 13,403,266 13.4
2009-10 154,058,670 17,799,682 11.6
2010-11 151,497,218 17,959,723 11.9
2011-12 195,534,647 24,503,383 12.5
tABLe 3.6
long SeRvice leave coMPonent oF geeRS exPendituRe, 2007/08-2011/12
for between 11.6 and 13.4%. This represents a 
substantial government funding commitment without 
a PLSL scheme.
This expenditure continues to rise significantly. 
The Department of Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations (DEEWR) increased the 
2012/3 budget for GEERS/FEG to $304 million after 
higher than expected payouts in the second half 
of 2012. Recently reported figures from DEEWR 
reveal that in the nine months to March 2013, 
$205 million had been spent.51 The LSL proportion 
of this will no doubt fall as a result of redundancy 
payments being uncapped in the new FEG. 
Nevertheless, LSL entitlements remain a substantial 
contributor and will continue to rise in absolute 
terms as total expenditure continues to increase.52
3.5.4. Contribution to national 
saving and investment
One of the potential benefits of establishing PLSL 
funds to cover the workforce generally is the 
contribution they could make to national saving and 
investment. The argument in this regard is similar to 
that for superannuation.
Both saving and investment have tended to be 
higher as a share of GDP in Australia relative to 
other advanced economies. Consensus is lacking 
over the explanations for this, but according to 
a number of substantial analyses, part of the 
explanation for Australia’s relatively high and 
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increasing level of national saving is the gradual 
growth of compulsory superannuation.53 Gruen and 
Soding (2011) estimate the boost to national saving 
over recent years from compulsory superannuation 
to be about 1.5% of GDP, up from around 0.5% of 
GDP in 1992.
PLSL funds will not result in as substantial a 
contribution to savings as superannuation, since 
the percentage of contributions to them would be 
much lower. Nevertheless, they could be expected 
over time to significantly add to national savings in 
the same way as superannuation, thus providing a 
further substantial source of investment capital.
3.6 PLSL and small business
Small business is of special importance for PLSL 
arrangements because it is such a large employer 
and is often identified with low rates of survival. 
High turnover in small businesses would mean that 
their employees were especially vulnerable to loss 
of LSL entitlements without a portable scheme.
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
around 96% of all ‘businesses’ are small 
businesses, defined as employing less than 20 
employees. However, around 64% of these small 
‘businesses’ do not employ staff.54 Every ABN 
is counted as a ‘business’, including individual 
contractors. So if we only count businesses that 
employ people, then around 89% are small. Small 
businesses account for 39% of total employment, 
or 46% of private sector employment in Australia.55 
They account for the greatest proportion of 
employment in the following sectors:
 Agriculture, forestry and fishery – 86%; 
 Rental, hiring & real estate – 77%;
 Construction – 63%;
 Professional, scientific & technical services – 
56%;
 Accommodation & food services – 51%;
 Transport, postal & warehousing – 41%; 
 Retail trade – 38%.56
One of the sectors with a high proportion of small 
businesses, construction, is already working with 
PLSL schemes that have high levels of approval 
from employers. 
Interestingly, it is a myth that business size heavily 
influences survival rates and that small businesses 
generally have a lower survival rate than larger ones. 
That simply is not supported by the data. Non-
employing small businesses have the worst survival 
rate, but they are not relevant for LSL. It is only by 
combining non-employing with employing small 
businesses that all small businesses of less than 20 
employees appear to have low survival rates.57 
In fact, amongst employing businesses, small 
businesses appear to have no worse and in many 
cases, better survival rates than larger businesses. 
It is true that businesses employing 1-4 employees 
do consistently have lower survival rates than 
businesses with 5-19 employees, but not by much, 
and not consistently lower than the overall average 
or businesses which were larger still.
For business entries in 2007/08 the average survival 
rates for just employing businesses were as follows:
 83% for small business, compared with 82% 
for all employing businesses at 2009;
 70% for small business, compared with 69% 
for all employing businesses at 2010; 
 62% for small business, compared with 60% 
for all employing businesses at 2011.
What this means is that small business will not 
represent a disproportionate call on PLSL funds as 
a result of more frequent turnover in that sector.
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Under the Fair Work Act 2009, the 
government has the power to establish 
National Employment Standards, including 
standards for long service leave entitlements. 
If the government decides to extend the 
portability of long service leave benefits, how 
could this be done to include as wide a range 
of workers as possible, including those who 
are casual, contract and part-time?
There are three aspects to this problem: possible 
limitations in the Constitutional powers of the 
Commonwealth, and assuming these can be 
overcome, vesting of entitlements, and transfer of 
entitlements. 
Firstly, it is not entirely clear how LSL would 
be established at a national level if it is to be 
generalised, and therefore, involve compulsory 
levies on employers similar to existing portable 
schemes or superannuation. The existing PLSL 
schemes were set up under State legislation. The 
Commonwealth government has two options. One 
is to legislate directly, which could be subject to 
constitutional challenge by the States. However, the 
Commonwealth has expanded its direct regulation 
of various forms of leave in recent years, e.g. carers’ 
leave, without constitutional challenge, and it may 
therefore be able to extend its powers further. The 
Corporations Power of the constitution has enabled 
substantial Commonwealth expansion of industrial 
relations jurisdiction in recent years. The Fair Work 
Act might give the Commonwealth government the 
power to require compulsory LSL contributions. 
An alternative approach would be to provide the 
PLSL through cooperative arrangements with the 
States whilst the Commonwealth institutes model 
legislation, as it did with occupational health and 
safety. A cooperative approach was implied by the 
Fair Work Review proposal for national streamlining 
of LSL, referred to at the beginning of this report. 
This would require support from the States. This 
report is not intended to address this political and 
legal issue, but instead focuses upon the technical 
aspects of design of a PLSL scheme.
Secondly, portability requires full vesting of each 
worker’s LSL entitlements. At present, workers only 
receive their pro rata LSL entitlements if they remain 
with the same employer for a specified period, 
known as the “vesting period”.58 If the worker leaves 
service before the completion of this vesting period, 
the worker forfeits their accrued LSL benefits. In 
order to improve portability, workers should be 
entitled to a pro rata benefit whenever they leave 
service, even after a short period of service, for 
whatever reason.59 Effectively, the “vesting period” 
would be reduced to zero. Each employer would 
have a liability to pay a specified amount (a levy 
or contribution) in respect of the LSL entitlements 
accruing for each worker during each worker’s 
period of employment. 
Thirdly, it would be necessary to develop rules 
for the payment of LSL benefits and the transfer 
of leave entitlements. At present, in each State, 
pro rata LSL benefits are paid in cash when an 
employee leaves service; and employees cannot 
transfer their leave entitlements to the next 
employer. This means that a worker might not be 
able to take LSL until s/he has completed another 
ten years of service with a new employer. However, 
under a PLSL scheme, a worker might not take 
a cash payment when s/he leaves a job. Instead, 
Designing portable  
long service leave 
schemes
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the money set aside to pay the accrued benefits 
would be held in reserve (either in a defined benefit 
fund or in a separate accumulation account, as 
described below). The worker would then transfer 
his/her leave entitlements to the new employer, and 
continue to accrue more leave in the new job. When 
he/she did eventually take leave, s/he would be 
able to draw upon the reserved funds from previous 
periods of employment in order to finance leave. 
Of course, some workers might prefer to take the 
cash payment, instead of transferring their benefit 
to the new employer – although this would mean 
that they will not be eligible to take leave for another 
10 years. Others might prefer to forego the cash 
payment, while retaining the right to take leave at an 
earlier date. Should the portability allow the worker 
to choose either alternative? Or should there be 
restriction in the payment of cash pro rata benefits?
Mr John Doe has worked for 8 years 
for Employer A in Victoria. He has just 
resigned and is due to start work for 
Employer B.
Under the current rules, he would 
receive a lump sum payment for his 
accrued LSL benefits. He will be eligible 
to take LSL after another ten years of 
work, i.e. after completing ten service 
years for Employer B. [Note that if he 
changes jobs over and over again, and 
never completes ten years service, he 
may receive several lump payments but 
never actually take any LSL.]
Under the proposed portability rules, 
he would not receive a cash payment 
from Employer A – instead, the pro 
rata payment from employer A would 
be held in a special PLSL fund or 
account. John could transfer his leave 
entitlement to his next employer, 
Employer B. After two more years 
of service, he would be eligible to 
take LSL. The money from the LSL 
fund, which had been contributed by 
Employer A, would be available to pay 
him an income while he is on leave. His 
new employer, Employer B, would also 
contribute his share of the LSL costs.
exAmpLe: 
tRanSFeR oF accRued lSl 
entitleMentS
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These policy decisions will also affect employers. 
Many employers may be reluctant to give LSL to 
a new employee after a relatively short period of 
service, i.e. where the new employee has transferred 
LSL entitlements from a prior job. It might be 
desirable to give the employer greater flexibility to 
manage LSL for their employees, i.e. the employer 
might be given the option to defer providing LSL to 
an employee who has less than a specified number 
of years’ service in the current job.
PLSL is a benefit designed for the benefit of 
workers who change employment, remaining in the 
workforce while switching from one job to another. 
However, further discussion may be needed for 
workers in other circumstances:
 At present, many workers use their LSL as a 
de facto redundancy payment, to cover living 
expenses while looking for another job. Would 
workers still be able to take a cash payment 
of the accrued LSL benefits in the event of 
redundancy?
 How would the portability rules apply to people 
who are temporarily or permanently leaving 
the workforce to look after children or to act 
as carers for family members? Would they 
be eligible for a payout of their accrued LSL 
payments? Would their benefit be held in reserve 
until they rejoined the workforce or retired (i.e. 
as a de facto superannuation benefit)? Or would 
their LSL benefits be forfeited? If forfeited, who 
would receive the money which had been set 
aside to pay this benefit?
 How would the portability rules apply to people 
who are leaving their job with the intention of 
becoming self-employed? 
 How would the portability rules apply to people 
who are permanently leaving the Australian 
workforce to relocate overseas? Would they 
be eligible for a payout of their accrued LSL 
benefits, or would their accrued LSL benefits 
be forfeited?
 How would the portability rules apply to people 
who are permanently leaving the workforce in 
order to retire? At what age would workers be 
able to obtain a cash payout of their accrued 
LSL benefits? 
 Would “cashing out” be allowed? At present 
some schemes allow employees to take a 
cash payment for LSL entitlements while still 
working, i.e. without actually taking leave. 
This would seem to undermine the socially 
desirable objectives for LSL benefits, i.e. to 
allow the employee to take a break for rest and 
refreshment. 
Similar issues have arisen in the superannuation 
industry. The superannuation regulations include 
“conditions of release”: superannuation payments 
may not be made unless the fund member has met 
one of these conditions of release. If LSL benefits 
are to be portable as workers move from job to job, 
it will be necessary to develop similar conditions 
for LSL benefits. These benefit design decisions 
will affect the scheme costs and the ease of 
implementation.60
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4.1  Desirable features of 
PLSL arrangements
In this section, we will examine different approaches 
to the provision of fully vested and PLSL benefits. 
That is, we will assume that the objective is to: 
 Allow employees to accrue LSL entitlements 
while they are working in any job; 
 Allow employees to retain a pro rata 
entitlement when they leave employment, even 
after a short period of service (full vesting); and
 Allow the accrued leave entitlement to be 
transferred to their next job, so that the 
employee will be entitled to take leave after 
working for at least 10 years service in total, 
across one or more jobs (portability).
Once the LSL vesting rules have been specified, 
and the portability rules have been determined, 
then it will be necessary to determine the best 
mechanism for implementing the new standards. 
Any such mechanism must manage the  
following tasks: 
 Record-keeping – How will benefit 
entitlements be preserved and transferred from 
one employer to the next? It may be necessary 
to maintain service records across several 
periods of employment over decades. 
 Funding – An employee’s LSL benefits may 
be the result of two or three or more periods 
of employment. How can we ensure that each 
employer pays an appropriate share of the 
costs of providing those benefits?
 Management of investments – If the LSL 
benefits are funded in advance, then the 
money set aside to provide these LSL benefits 
must be held securely and invested prudently. 
This section examines different alternatives for 
implementation of the proposed portability rules. 
Before designing a scheme to provide LSL benefits, 
we should identify the desirable features of such 
a scheme, allowing for the needs of different 
stakeholders. Ideally, any LSL scheme should 
ensure that employees will have a high probability 
of receiving their legally-defined LSL entitlements. 
Presumably employers will prefer a system which 
minimises the administrative burden, in both time 
and money (e.g. administration costs), and provides 
some stability in costs from year to year. 
We use the following criteria for identifying the 
factors that would allow for the design of a 
nationally consistent PLSL scheme that would 
accommodate the needs of these stakeholders:
1.  Transitional arrangements;
2.  Simplicity;
3.  Adequacy of benefits;
4.  Compliance;
5.  Protection in the event of insolvency;
6.  Prudential management and solvency;
7.  Payment of benefits (unclaimed money/lost 
members);
8.  Administrative burden for employers;
9.  Administration costs;
10. Stability of employer costs;
11.  Employer cross-subsidisation; and
12.  Flexibility.
1. tRanSitional aRRangeMentS
It is desirable to implement a new scheme as 
smoothly as possible and with minimum disruption 
to existing arrangements for those employers/
employees already providing/receiving LSL 
entitlements. In terms of the reduction of vesting 
periods, this could occur gradually over time so as 
to phase-in costs of providing PLSL for employers. 
However, this consideration needs to be balanced 
against extra administrative complications of such 
an approach when the level of extra cost is small.
One transitional approach might also involve 
employees forgoing a portion of a wage increase 
for the minimum wage, awards, and/or collective 
agreements on a one-off basis as a contribution 
to the costs of establishing PLSL. This approach 
was adopted for the extension of superannuation in 
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1986. As a result of agreement between the ACTU 
and the government under the Prices and Incomes 
Accord, the unions were willing to forgo a claim 
for a 3% wage increase for productivity before the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
under the national wage guidelines of the time. 
Instead, they sought 3% employer contributions 
for superannuation and the Commission endorsed 
claims on an industry basis through variation 
of awards on a consent basis. This led to the 
doubling of the workforce with superannuation 
from about 40% to 79% to 1989, mainly through 
multi-industry funds jointly sponsored by 
unions and employer associations, prior to the 
generalised phasing in of superannuation by the 
government in 1992.61 This phased introduction 
of superannuation, therefore, was the result of 
a consensus process between government, 
employers and the unions. In the case of PLSL it 
would only be necessary to forgo 1-2% of wage 
increases if this consensus model were adopted. 
2. SiMPlicity
Ideally, the rules of the scheme should be defined 
as simply and unambiguously as possible (while 
maintaining equitable treatment for all participants). 
Workers should be able to understand their 
entitlements easily, and employers should be able to 
understand their obligations. If the rules are simple, 
this will help to reduce administrative costs and 
improve compliance. 
3. adequacy oF beneFitS 
(incoMe RePlaceMent)
At present, LSL entitlements are usually determined 
on a “defined benefit” basis.62 When an employee 
takes leave, s/he receives a benefit which is equal 
to the number of weeks of LSL taken multiplied 
by her/his weekly wages at the date the benefit is 
taken.63
Arguably, a defined benefit is suitable for our 
purposes, because it provides a benefit which 
allows the employee’s normal income to be 
maintained during the period of LSL.64 
Alternatively, employers might fund LSL payments 
on an “accumulation” basis. The employer would 
periodically pay contributions, equal to a fixed 
percentage of salary, into an employee’s LSL 
account. The contributions would accumulate 
with interest, less administration fees. When the 
employee takes leave, s/he would be entitled to 
withdraw money from their account. Under an 
accumulation arrangement, the contribution would 
presumably be set at a level which would be 
expected to provide an adequate LSL benefit. 
However, the accumulation approach presents 
greater risk for employees than a defined benefit. 
The account balance might not be sufficient to 
provide the worker’s normal income during the 
period of leave, because:
 The investment returns on the account might 
be lower than expected, or even negative;
 The administration fees might consume an 
undue proportion of the account balance;  
and/or
 If the worker’s wages have increased 
sharply, then the investment returns on the 
account might not match the growth of the 
worker’s wages.
On the other hand, if investment returns are better 
than expected, the account might be more than 
sufficient to fund the worker’s leave. The fund rules 
would need to specify the allocation of any such 
surpluses. Would the surplus belong to the worker? 
Would the worker be able to take LSL payments 
which provided a higher-than-usual income during 
any period of leave? Or would the excess funds 
be held in reserve in order to fund future periods of 
leave, or to provide additional retirement savings? 
These are significant design issues.
4. coMPliance
A PLSL scheme should have systems in place 
to ensure that employers meet their obligations. 
High levels of compliance are obviously in the best 
interests of the workers and law-abiding employers. 
If everyone is required to obey the same rules, this 
creates a level playing field. Otherwise, employers 
who evade their obligations may have lower labour 
costs, which would give them a competitive 
advantage. As noted previously (see Section 3.4), 
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responsible employers have been willing to support 
the introduction of PLSL schemes in industries 
where poor compliance is a problem.
What systems are currently in place to ensure 
compliance with LSL obligations? The Fair Work 
Ombudsman is responsible for ensuring that 
employers comply with their obligations under 
the Fair Work Act 2009. The Ombudsman’s 
officers conduct targeted campaigns to monitor 
and enforce compliance in particular industries. 
Industries may be targeted in response to 
complaints from workers. 
Some employers fail to meet their obligations 
because they simply do not understand the 
requirements. The Ombudsman’s office responds to 
this problem by providing information and training 
for employers.
However, it is clear that some companies 
deliberately avoid paying employee entitlements. 
For example, a report by the Ombudsmen into 
the contract cleaning industry found that 37% of 
employers were non-compliant with employment 
laws: effectively this allowed these employers to 
undercut compliant employers. The Ombudsman’s 
office has also noted that “sham contracting” and 
the misclassification of employees as independent 
contractors to evade employer obligations is a 
serious problem in many other industries, such as 
building and construction, and security.65
If employers are misclassifying or underpaying 
their workers and neglecting their record-keeping 
obligations, it seems probable that they are also 
failing to pay the correct LSL benefits. There is 
very little data available which specifically focuses 
on the level of compliance with LSL obligations, 
however other studies have found high levels of 
non-compliance in the provision of other employee 
entitlements, e.g. superannuation guarantee 
obligations. Superannuation non-compliance was 
highest for the most vulnerable workers: those in 
low paid and casual employment, young people, 
and people employed in specific industries, e.g. 
hospitality, hairdressers, restaurant workers, 
cleaners, transport, etc. 66 
The Global Financial Crisis has also had an impact 
on compliance. For example, in the NSW building 
and construction scheme compliance has fallen 
significantly since 2008. The fund administrators 
placed considerable emphasis on pursuing unmet 
liabilities in 2012, with some success. This was 
particularly important in maintaining the levy at 
the same level rather than increasing it as claims 
increased during the economic downturn.
The existing building and construction industry 
PLSL schemes have compliance functions, which 
not only educate employers and employees but 
also, importantly, have investigative and prosecution 
powers. Some stakeholders consider this preferable 
to the Ombudsman model described in this section, 
since the latter relies on complaints from employees 
in order to detect non-compliance. However, 
employees often may not understand their 
entitlements and options. The means for enforcing 
compliance with LSL obligations is an area that 
merits further investigation. 
5. PRotection oF eMPloyee 
entitleMentS in the event  
oF eMPloyeR inSolvency
At present, employers use their business assets 
and/or cash flow to pay LSL benefits as they arise 
from time to time. This means that the security 
of employee entitlements may be threatened by 
the insolvency of the employer. If the employer 
becomes insolvent, then employees become 
creditors, with a claim against the employer’s 
assets. However, under the current legislation, 
the employees do not have first priority. Under 
the Corporations Act 2001, the company’s assets 
are firstly used to defray the liquidator’s costs and 
secondly used to pay secured creditors. After these 
priority creditors are paid, there might not always 
be enough money available to cover employee 
entitlements in full.67
Once again, it is difficult to estimate the magnitude 
of the problem. 
The Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission records data on corporate 
insolvencies. In the 2011/12 financial year, 
approximately 10,000 companies were placed 
under external administration. Most of these were 
small businesses with less than 20 employees. 
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According to returns filed by external administrators, 
947 of these companies (about 9.4%) had unpaid 
LSL liabilities, of varying amounts, as shown in the 
graph in Figure 4.1 above.68  The ASIC data covers 
the insolvency of companies. However, only 33% 
of Australian businesses are companies; there 
are hundreds of thousands of businesses which 
are operated by sole proprietors, partnerships, 
or trusts. According to the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, thousands of these businesses go out of 
business each year.69 We do not have any data on 
unpaid LSL liabilities of these businesses. 
The security of employees’ LSL benefits was 
improved by the creation of the General Employee 
Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme (GEERS) 
in 2001. GEERS was initially set up as an 
administrative arrangement. The Fair Entitlements 
Guarantee Act 2012 (FEGA) now provides a formal 
legislative basis for these arrangements. Although 
the Fair Entitlements Guarantee has alleviated the 
risk of loss of employee entitlements, it does so by 
imposing a cost on the taxpayers. To some extent, 
this allows employers to transfer their financial 
responsibilities to the government.70
From time to time, the government has considered 
various proposals for improving the security of 
employee entitlements in the event of employer 
insolvency. One approach would require employers 
to make contributions to a separate trust fund, 
which would hold assets sufficient to cover accrued 
employee entitlements. Employer groups have 
generally opposed generalising such proposals, on 
the grounds that they would impact on all employers 
when only a minority are likely to face insolvency. 
However, most objections of employer organisations 
have related to extra costs associated with insurance 
funds, rather than to employee entitlement trust 
funds.71 Some trust funds of this kind have already 
been established; this is, in fact, the model used for 
existing industry-based PLSL schemes. 
The established industry-based PLSL funds have 
already improved the security of employees’ LSL 
entitlements. Employees of insolvent employers 
can usually claim their accrued LSL benefits directly 
from the industry-based funds. 
Figure 4.1
unPaid eMPloyee entitileMentS (long SeRvice leave)  
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6. PRudential ManageMent and 
Solvency
Section 4.2 describes three different models  
which may be used to implement PLSL 
entitlements. Whichever model is chosen, 
legislation will be necessary to ensure that the 
money held by the fund is managed properly 
and invested prudently. Any such fund should 
be subject to appropriate corporate governance 
standards (including fit-and-proper person 
requirements for those who manage the funds). 
If a defined benefit model of entitlements were to 
be adopted, the financial status of the fund should 
be monitored to ensure that the fund assets are 
sufficient to provide the benefits promised, with a 
high degree of certainty. In particular, the legislation 
should prevent any diversion of the fund’s assets 
for other purposes. Any such diversion has the 
potential to undermine the solvency of the fund. 
This requirement would be analogous to the 
“sole purpose test” which already applies to all 
Australian superannuation funds.
7. unclaiMed Money  
and loSt MeMbeRS
Over time superannuation funds sometimes lose 
contact with their members. The money remains 
unclaimed long after the members would be entitled 
to claim their benefits. Similar problems are likely 
to arise in relation to PLSL benefits. In fact, it is 
clear that the established industry-based PLSL 
funds already hold millions of dollars in unclaimed 
money. When implementing PLSL rules, it would be 
desirable to incorporate measures to minimise the 
number of lost members. 
8. adMiniStRative buRden FoR 
eMPloyeRS
Under the current (non-portable) LSL rules, 
each employer must retain records for their own 
employees, which does create an administrative 
burden for employers. In order to calculate  
LSL benefits correctly, they must keep records  
for all of their employees, throughout their entire 
period of employment and indeed for several  
years afterwards.72
If the legislation is changed to provide portable 
benefits, this could reduce rather than increase the 
administrative burden for employers. In the existing 
PLSL schemes the fund administrator keeps the 
records of the worker’s employment history in one 
place. In this way the worker’s records are also 
secure if one or more of his or her employers goes 
out of business.
9. adMiniStRation coStS
The contribution required to provide fully vested and 
PLSL benefits is likely to be around either 1.75% 
to 2.5% of wages per annum, depending on the 
level of benefits provided.73 For a full-time worker 
earning the average wage, the LSL contribution 
will be around $1300 to $1800 per annum. Of 
course, the annual contribution will be much lower 
for low-paid and part-time workers.74 Although these 
contributions will gradually build up over time, the 
fund will also be diminished by payments made 
when the worker takes her/his LSL. 
This suggests that any PLSL system will be required 
to administer a large number of relatively small 
sums. It is essential, therefore, to ensure that the 
funds are administered as efficiently as possible, 
in order to minimise costs to the employers and to 
maximise benefits for workers. 
10. Stability oF eMPloyeR coStS
Any well-run business needs to plan ahead: it must 
account for its labour costs, manage its cash flows, 
and monitor its liabilities. Therefore the employer’s LSL 
costs should be as stable and predictable as possible.
If LSL benefits are provided on a defined benefit 
basis, the employer’s contributions could fluctuate 
from year to year – potentially quite sharply. 
Although LSL levies are likely to represent a small 
component of an employer’s labour costs, this 
might still cause problems for employers who are 
operating on thin margins. This potential problem, 
however, can be mitigated by holding a margin 
(reserve) of assets over accruing liabilities and 
setting the levy accordingly. (See Section 5.8 
Defined Benefit Funds: Variability in the Levy Rate, 
for comments on the management of the variability 
of defined benefit levies).
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If benefits are provided on an accumulation basis, 
then the employer’s costs will be stable from year 
to year, i.e. contributions will be a fixed percentage 
of salaries. In an accumulation fund, the employees 
bear investment and inflation risks, not the 
employers. 
In the superannuation industry, employers are given 
a choice: they can meet their Superannuation 
Guarantee obligations by providing either defined 
benefits or accumulation benefits.75 Over the last 30 
years, employers have shown a strong preference 
for accumulation funds. The number of defined 
benefit funds has steadily declined. It seems that 
most employers prefer to avoid the risk of variability 
in labour costs. 
11. eMPloyeR cRoSS-SubSidiSation
Under current arrangements, most employers 
provide non-PLSL benefits. Each employer provides 
benefits for its own employees – there are no cross-
subsidies between different employers or different 
industries. 
However, if LSL benefits are to be provided on a 
portable basis, via a centralised multi-employer 
fund, then cross-subsidies may arise. The money 
paid in by any one employer will not necessarily 
be used to provide benefits solely for its own 
employees. Such cross-subsidies are most likely to 
arise when one fund covers employers which have 
different patterns of staff turnover, different wage 
growth rates and/or different benefit entitlements 
(see Box 4.1). 
A defined benefit fund is most likely to be 
successful when each fund contains a homogenous 
group of employers (e.g. all employers are in the 
same industry); and/or when the fund rules impose 
uniformity across all employees (e.g. benefits are 
based on standardised award rates of pay, instead 
of the rates actually paid by each employer). 
However this uniformity reduces workplace 
flexibility. 
If the fund membership is too heterogeneous, and 
this creates cross-subsidies, then some employers 
are likely to object. AUSCOAL, which is one of the 
largest industry-based PLSL funds in Australia, 
recently switched to a new model: for benefits 
accruing after 1 January 2012, the fund will provide 
benefits on an accumulation basis. The rationale for 
this change is to:
“	 Improve	the	operation	of	the	
scheme	so	that	the	amounts	
that	employers	are	reimbursed	
from	the	Fund	in	respect	of	
long	service	leave	payments	
more	closely	correspond	to	the	
amounts	that	they	have	paid	
into	the	Coal	Mining	Industry	
(Long	Service	Leave)	Fund	by	
way	of	levy”.76
If LSL benefits are provided on an accumulation 
basis, then cross-subsidisation is less likely to 
occur.77 
12. Flexibility
Any PLSL system must be flexible. At present, 
each State and Territory has its own minimum LSL 
benefits. Each award can specify different LSL 
benefits. Each employer can negotiate a workplace 
agreement which provides different LSL benefits. 
Any LSL system which is portable across industries 
must allow for these variations.
In the future, changes to the National Employment 
Standards might lead to greater uniformity in benefit 
entitlements. But even if benefits become more 
uniform across the States, the system must still 
allow for flexibility, because the rules are likely to 
change from time to time. Any PLSL system must 
be flexible to allow for changes in the rules, without 
creating excessive complexity. In defined benefit 
funds, rule changes often require “grandfathering” 
of pre-existing entitlements, and this may lead to 
greater complexity in the calculation of benefits. 
Accumulation funds are generally more flexible.
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exaMPle a:  
cross subsidies caused by differential withdrawal patterns
Employer A and Employer B both have 100 employees, who are all 
earning the same rate of pay. Both employers pay the same amount 
of levies into the defined benefit LSL fund each year. All of these 
payments are pooled into one fund, which will be used to pay LSL 
benefits. Employer A has high staff turnover and most of his/her 
employees leave service before qualifying for any benefits. Most of 
its employees do not receive any money from the LSL fund. All of 
Employer B’s workers remain in service for 10 years and become 
eligible to receive benefits from the fund. Effectively, Employer A’s 
levies are providing benefit payments to Employer B’s employees.
exaMPle b:  
cross subsidies caused by differential wages growth
Employer C and Employer D both have 100 employees, who are 
all earning the same rate of pay. Both employers pay the same 
amount of levies into the defined benefit LSL fund each year. All 
of these payments are pooled into one fund, which will be used to 
pay LSL benefits. All of the workers remain in service with the same 
employer for many years, and they all decide to take their long 
service leave just prior to retirement. Employer D decides to give all 
of its workers a 10% pay rise shortly before they take leave. Hence, 
they all become eligible for higher LSL payments.78 Employer C and 
Employer D have both made the same contributions into the fund, 
but Employer D’s employees will receive higher benefits. Effectively, 
Employer C is subsidising benefits for Employer D’s employees.
Note that this problem is likely to arise if a single fund contains 
workers from different industries, and one industry is experiencing 
more rapid wage increases than other industries.
exaMPle c: 
cross subsidies between new and old employers
Employers E,F, and G contribute to an LSL fund for several years. 
The fund has low levy rates. Unfortunately, the LSL fund develops a 
deficit. The deficit might arise because the levy rate has been kept 
too low; or because the fund suffers investment losses. 
In order to fund the deficit, and return the fund to solvency, the levy 
rate is doubled for the next five years. 
A new employer, Employer H, enters the industry. The new 
Employer is required to pay an abnormally high levy in order  
to pay for LSL benefits for workers who were previously  
employed by Employers E,F, and G.
BOx 4.1 
cRoSS SubSidieS in deFined beneFit FundS
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4.2  Comparison of 
alternative models
The following section uses these criteria to assess 
the likely effectiveness of three different models 
as the basis for designing a nationally-consistent 
PLSL scheme. Each model assumes the operation 
of a number of different funds, largely industry-
based, as with superannuation. A further option 
might be the creation of a single national fund for 
all employees, on a defined benefit or accumulation 
basis, but this was not considered in detail because 
of our judgment that it seems an unlikely choice in 
the contemporary public policy environment, and 
because there are strong models already provided 
in the superannuation approach. In each of the 
three models examined in detail the objective is the 
provision of fully vested and PLSL benefits. Each 
model has different advantages and disadvantages, 
for employers and employees:
OptiOn A: The ADF model;
OptiOn B: The Defined Benefit Fund model; 
OptiOn C: The Accumulation Fund model.
4.2.1. Option A: The ADF model
The ADF model is based on the system of 
Approved Deposit Funds (ADFs) established in the 
superannuation industry during the 1980s. 
Prior to 1984, superannuation benefits were usually 
paid as a lump sum benefit to the employee, 
whenever they left service due to resignation, 
retrenchment, or dismissal. Many employees simply 
spent their lump sum, instead of transferring the 
money into their new employer’s superannuation 
fund. The government wanted to encourage 
workers to save their superannuation payments 
for retirement, so legislation was passed to create 
Approved Deposit Funds (also known as Rollover 
Funds or ADFs). Employees who left service could 
roll over their lump sum benefit into an ADF. The 
ADF simply invested the money in an accumulation-
style account on behalf of the employee until the 
employee was eligible to receive their benefit.79
A similar model could be adopted for PLSL 
benefits:
 Relevant legislation or awards could be 
amended to require the payment of an LSL 
benefit whenever an employee leaves service 
after completing more than a specific “vesting 
period” of service;
 Initially, the vesting period would be set at 5 
or 7 years, i.e. to match current State LSL 
legislation. The vesting period would gradually 
be reduced so that employees with shorter 
periods of service would become eligible for 
pro rata benefits;
 The lump sum would represent any LSL 
benefit which had accrued during this period 
of employment, adjusted to allow for any LSL 
leave which had already been taken while the 
employee was still in service;
 The accrued benefit payable at exit would be 
calculated using a defined benefit formula, 
based on the employee’s wages at the date 
of exit, in line with existing legislation, awards 
and/or workplace agreements;
 The lump sum benefit would not normally be 
payable in cash (unless the employee met a 
LSL condition of release, see below). Instead, 
the benefit would be automatically rolled over 
into any ADF specified by the employee;
 Each worker would have just one ADF account 
for LSL benefits. If the worker worked in a series 
of different jobs, all LSL payments would be 
made into the same ADF account. If the worker 
worked in two or more part-time jobs, the LSL 
payments would be made into the same ADF 
account. This rule would help to prevent the 
proliferation of multiple small accounts;
 Each employer would provide the ADF with 
information about the period of service 
applicable to each lump sum payment. The 
ADF would be required to maintain records 
and
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sufficient to determine the worker’s eligibility 
for LSL cash payments in the future;
 The ADF would invest the money on behalf 
of the account-holder, and credit investment 
earnings to the account. The ADF would also 
deduct administration fees from the account;
 Cash payments from the ADF to the worker 
would be subject to “LSL preservation 
requirements”, similar to the preservation 
requirements applicable to superannuation 
benefits. The LSL benefit would not become 
payable in cash until the worker met an  
“LSL condition of release”, e.g. when 
the worker took his/her LSL, became 
permanently disabled, reached retirement 
age, or died. The preservation rules would 
also specify the amount payable if the worker 
only took part of their accrued LSL (e.g. took 
only one month of leave when they were 
entitled to take two months). The worker’s 
employer would be required to verify that a 
condition of release has been met (e.g. by 
certifying that the worker is taking LSL);
 The LSL ADF provider would be required 
to meet registration, reporting, and 
corporate governance requirements, similar 
to those imposed on the ADFs that hold 
superannuation savings. Financial institutions 
would be required to apply for permission to 
manage LSL ADF accounts. The Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) would 
set standards for authorisation and would 
monitor ADF providers. Banks, life insurers, 
and superannuation funds would be eligible 
to offer LSL ADFs, as long as they met the 
authorisation standards;
 Each employee would have just one LSL ADF 
account. If the employee received benefits 
from several different jobs, all benefits would 
be payable into the same account. This would 
reduce administrative expenses and reduce 
the risk of “lost members”. It would also 
centralise record-keeping for each employee, 
and hence make it much simpler to assess 
eligibility for LSL payments. 
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Assessment of the ADF model against 
specified criteria
1.  tRanSitional aRRangeMentS
The ADF model could be implemented with 
relatively little disruption to employers, who would 
continue to hold LSL provisions internally. There 
would be no impact on the employer’s cash flows 
until an employee exited from service or took 
LSL. The amount payable at that time by the 
employer to the ADF fund would be calculated on 
a defined benefit basis, consistent with current LSL 
legislation. Under this model, employers would 
not incur any additional LSL costs for employees 
who already meet the current vesting standards. 
However, employers would be subject to additional 
costs to pay for short-service employees who were 
previously ineligible for LSL benefits.
This model could be implemented progressively, 
by changing the vesting period. In many States, 
pro rata benefits are available after 5 or 7 years’ 
service.80 The vesting period could be gradually 
reduced over time. This would “phase in” the cost 
to employers of providing PLSL. This might be 
achieved via the National Employment Standards. 
2.  SiMPlicity
In general, the ADF method would be simple 
and easy to understand, for both employers and 
employees. 
The calculation of cash benefit payments could 
require some thought for those employees who 
have accrued benefits across two or more jobs. If 
the employee takes only part of their accrued leave, 
it would be necessary to devise rules to determine 
the amount of LSL payable by the current employer 
and the amount payable from the ADF. These 
considerations are illustrated in Box 4A.1.
Mr Smith works in Job A for five years 
and accrues one month of LSL. When 
he quits this job, a lump sum benefit 
of $3000 is paid into an ADF, and over 
the next 10 years this accumulates to 
$5000. Mr Smith then works in Job B 
for 10 years and accrues an additional 
2 months of leave. While still working 
in this job, he opts to take LSL for just 
2 months. What benefit should be 
payable to cover the 2 months of leave?
Should he receive all the money in 
his ADF account, which represents 
approximately one month’s LSL from 
his prior job; plus receive one month’s 
LSL from Employer B? Employer B 
would then retain a liability to pay an 
additional month of LSL at a later date. 
Note that the account balance might be 
insufficient to provide a month’s wages.
Should he receive 2 months’ LSL 
benefit from Employer B, leaving his 
ADF account intact until he takes 
additional LSL at a later date?
BOx 4A.1 
SiMPlicity oF beneFit calculationS 
undeR the adF Model
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3. adequacy oF beneFitS
As noted previously, for our purposes, defined 
benefits are more suitable than accumulation 
benefits, in the sense that defined benefits provide 
an amount which allows the employee’s income 
to be maintained during the period of leave. The 
ADF system provides a mix of defined benefits and 
accumulation benefits. 
A worker who remains in the same job over the 
long term, and takes their LSL while in service, will 
receive a defined benefit. 
A more mobile worker who changes jobs from time 
to time would receive a defined benefit whenever 
they leave any job. These benefits would not be 
payable in cash, but would be rolled over into an 
ADF. The benefits will accumulate with interest 
(less fees and charges) until the worker meets an 
LSL condition of release (e.g. s/he takes leave). 
This means that the worker will be exposed to 
investment risk from the date of leaving each job up 
to the date they take their LSL. If the ADF can earn 
net investment returns exceeding the worker’s pay 
increases, then the LSL account should be more 
than sufficient to provide the worker’s usual income 
during periods of leave. However, the account may 
be insufficient for this purpose if there are poor 
investment returns and/or large pay rises. The 
worker might take one months’ LSL, but the account 
balance might be less than a months’ wages. It 
would be important to keep this risk in mind when 
choosing an investment strategy for the ADF. 
4. coMPliance
Under the ADF method, employees would rely 
on their employers to provide the correct benefit 
payments, as specified in the legislation, whenever 
the employee leaves service and/or takes LSL. 
The Commonwealth and State employment 
inspectorates would continue in their current 
roles, i.e. providing information to employers and 
employees, conducting targeted inspections, 
responding to complaints, and taking action to 
enforce compliance where necessary. As noted 
previously, this may or may not be effective in 
ensuring high levels of compliance. 
The ADF model does not include any additional 
measures to ensure that employers meet their LSL 
obligations. This is a weakness of this model, in 
contrast to some of the alternatives described below. 
Compliance problems might also arise in relation to 
payments from the ADF to employees. Employees 
might seek to bypass the LSL preservation 
requirements, to obtain early access to their 
accounts. For example, workers might “quit their 
job”, claim a pro rata LSL benefits, and then 
“recommence work” with the same employer a 
few days later. As a result, LSL savings might be 
used for purposes other than LSL. This has been a 
problem in relation to the early release of retirement 
savings in the superannuation industry. In some 
cases, such as financial hardship, early release 
might be permitted by regulation, but this creates 
an additional administrative burden (i.e. in assessing 
the validity of hardship claims). 
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5. PRotection oF eMPloyee 
beneFitS in the event oF 
eMPloyeR inSolvency
The ADF model does not require employers to pre-
fund the LSL benefits, therefore it may not provide 
good protection against the lost entitlements in the 
event of insolvency. 
If a worker has remained in the same job for many 
years building up their LSL entitlements, they will 
be vulnerable to a loss of all their benefits if their 
employer becomes insolvent. 
On the other hand, workers who have changed 
from one employer to another will have better 
security, because the ADF will hold assets sufficient 
to provide all the LSL benefits which arose from 
prior employment. Their loss will be limited to the 
amount of LSL accrued with their most recent 
employer. 
Workers would continue to rely on the Fair 
Entitlements Guarantee for compensation for any 
lost entitlements. 
6. PRudential ManageMent  
and Solvency
Under the ADF model, there would be strong 
prudential controls to protect LSL accounts. 
Financial institutions would be required to apply 
for permission to manage these accounts. The 
ADF would be required to meet registration, 
reporting and corporate governance requirements, 
similar to those imposed on the ADFs that hold 
superannuation savings. APRA would set standards 
for authorisation and supervise ADF providers. 
7. unclaiMed Money  
and loSt MeMbeRS
Over time, the ADFs will probably lose contact with 
many of their account-holders. Some workers will 
inevitably forget that they hold any money in an LSL 
account, and will fail to claim their benefits, even 
when they are entitled to do so. This has been a 
common problem in the superannuation industry. 
The problem of lost members is likely to be even 
more severe for LSL accounts, when relatively small 
sums may be untouched for many years. In the 
case of superannuation, the Australian Tax Office 
attempts to help people find their lost accounts. 
If the ADF LSL model is adopted, then similar 
measures should be taken to minimise the number 
of lost members. 
8. adMiniStRative buRden  
FoR eMPloyeRS
The ADF model would not impose a significant 
additional burden on most employers, compared 
to the current LSL arrangements. There would be 
some additional paperwork: whenever an employee 
left service, the employer would be required to 
make a payment to an ADF and provide some 
information about the worker’s length of service. 
And whenever an employee wanted to access 
money in their LSL account, his/her employer would 
be required to provide information to the ADF to 
verify that the employee had met a condition of 
release (e.g. the employee was indeed taking leave). 
9. adMiniStRation coStS 
Under this model, the ADFs would deduct 
administration fees from each LSL account. These 
administration fees are likely to have a significant 
impact on the adequacy of benefits for mobile 
workers. The ADF system is likely to produce 
a large number of small accounts. For small 
accounts, annual administration fees may well 
exceed investment returns, which means that the 
account would diminish over time (see Box 4A.2).
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Similar problems arose in the superannuation 
system when compulsory contributions were first 
introduced in the late 1980s/early 1990s. The 
small accounts problem is likely to be even more 
severe for LSL contributions, because the LSL 
benefits are much smaller than superannuation 
benefits. LSL benefits accrue at about 1.67% or 
2.5% of pay per annum, compared to 9% of pay for 
compulsory superannuation benefits. Furthermore, 
people will be able to make withdrawals from LSL 
accounts whenever they take leave, and this will 
tend to prevent the build-up of larger accounts 
over time. As a result, many LSL accounts will have 
small balances, which may be gradually eroded by 
administration charges. 
The superannuation industry has developed a 
number of methods for dealing with the small 
accounts problem:
 Member protection rules limiting the 
administration fees for small accounts;
 Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs) that 
charge low fees but also provide low returns;
 Amalgamation of Accounts that encourage 
customers to combine separate small 
accounts into one larger account wherever 
possible;
 Benefits of less than $200 may be paid in cash 
(no requirement to preserve small benefits); and
 Compulsory contributions are not required for 
people who earn less than $450 per month.
These measures might have alleviated the small 
accounts problem but none of them provide a 
wholly satisfactory solution. For example, member 
protection rules usually require larger accounts to 
cross-subsidise the administration costs of small 
accounts. 
Retirement Savings Accounts provide a low-
risk (capital guaranteed) vehicle for super 
superannuation savings, and they are designed 
especially for small accounts. However, the 
administration costs for RSAs are relatively high. 
According to the most recent Rice-Warner survey, 
RSAs fees were approximately 2.3% p.a. – much 
higher than the average fees for the typical retail 
fund or industry fund.81 Moreover, because low-fee 
accounts such as Retirement Savings Accounts 
usually have low investment returns, the account 
balance is unlikely to grow quickly enough to keep 
pace with pay rises. RSAs have not been very 
popular and currently have only a small share of the 
superannuation market.
Theoretically, market forces would put downwards 
pressure on administration fees. The workers 
would be entitled to transfer their LSL accounts 
from one ADF to another, on request. If workers 
shopped around for the best deal, then the 
ADFS would compete to offer the lowest fees. 
However, the Cooper Review of the superannuation 
Ms Jane Doe is a part-time worker 
earning $20,000 per annum. She 
accrues LSL at the rate of 2 months 
per 10 years’ service. Ms Doe resigns 
from her job after 2 years, and under 
the new portability rules she would be 
entitled to a benefit of $667. This sum 
is rolled over to an ADF LSL account. 
The fund invests her money to earn 4% 
interest, which amounts to about $27 
per annum. However the fund charges 
administration fees of $50 per annum. 
At the end of the year, her balance has 
reduced instead of increasing. This 
erosion of savings might continue for 
several years, until she is eligible to 
take leave.
BOx 4A.2 
adMiniStRation coStS oF SMall 
accountS undeR the adF Model
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industry found that that most people do not pay 
much attention to fees, nor do they shop around 
for the best deal. As a result, “… the model of 
member‐driven competition through ‘choice of fund’ 
has struggled to deliver a competitive market that 
reduces costs for members.” 82 As a result, the 
Cooper Review recommended the introduction of 
MySuper products, which are designed to be simple, 
low cost vehicles for superannuation savings.
A study of superannuation fund operating costs for 
the MySuper product was conducted by Deloitte as 
part of the Super System Review. If the ADF model 
is to be adopted to provide LSL benefits, then it 
would be desirable to conduct a similar study for the 
proposed system. 
10. Stability oF eMPloyeR coStS
Under this model, LSL benefits are not prefunded. 
Employers would have to pay LSL benefits whenever 
an employee took LSL and/or left service. Under the 
current system, employers already manage these 
cash flow issues. 
11. eMPloyeR cRoSS-SubSidiSation
The ADF model would not create cross-subsidies 
between different employers and/or different 
industries. Each employer would pay benefits for his/
her own employees.
12. Flexibility
This system would be flexible by allowing for 
different LSL rules for different employees in different 
jurisdictions, occupations and industries. If one group 
of workers negotiated higher LSL benefits with their 
employer (e.g. by including bonuses or commission in 
the definition of salary), these changes would only affect 
the benefits accrued while working with this specific 
employer. There would be no impact on the benefits 
which had been earned in any previous job, and no 
impact on any other employer’s costs.
Overall assessment of the ADF Model
This model has many advantages: 
 It could be phased in gradually over time;
 It is relatively simple to understand;
 It does not create a great deal of extra 
administrative work for employers;
 This system does not require pre-funding, 
therefore the employers’ cash flows would not 
be affected until their employees left service or 
took LSL;
 It is flexible;
 It does not create cross-subsidies between 
different employers or industries;
 It reduces (but does not eliminate) the risk 
of loss of entitlements due to employer 
insolvency; and
 It could make use of existing infrastructure, 
i.e. it would not be necessary to create new 
organisations to provide ADF LSL accounts.
However this model does have significant 
weaknesses: 
 The administrative costs are likely to be high 
relative to the size of the account balances, 
and this will erode workers’ LSL benefits;
 Financial institutions may be reluctant to offer 
products which are likely to have low balances 
and hence limited profitability;83
 Workers who hold money in ADF accounts 
are exposed to investment and inflation risks: 
so the account balance might not always be 
sufficient to provide a replacement of income 
when the worker takes leave;
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 This model does not incorporate any additional 
mechanisms for ensuring that employers will 
comply with their LSL obligations (other than 
the existing compliance checks performed by 
Fair Work Australia); and
 Unless regulated to restrict payments 
to one ADF, this model could mean that 
workers end up with multiple LSL accounts 
in different ADF’s. Multiple accounts would 
create problems in assessing eligibility for 
entitlements, and risk many workers losing 
track of their accounts and becoming “lost 
members” leading to lost monies, as occurs in 
the superannuation system.
4.2.2. Option B: The Industry-based 
Defined Benefit Fund model
An alternative model could involve the creation of a 
range of industry-based defined benefit funds. 
There are already more than a dozen established 
industry-based PLSL arrangements covering 
workers in the coal mining, construction, contract 
cleaning, community services and security 
industries (see Section 3). However, each of these 
industry-based PLSL funds provides only limited 
portability. Workers only accrue LSL benefits while 
working within the industry, and may forfeit their 
entitlements if they cease working in the industry 
prior to completing the vesting period of service. 
Workers who complete the vesting period, and then 
leave the industry, are usually entitled to claim a 
cash payout. 
As outlined in Section 3, employers in the industries 
covered by existing schemes are required to be 
registered with the relevant fund. The employers 
periodically provide information about each 
employee and periodically pay levies to the fund 
administrators. Each fund is invested in line 
with a strategy determined by the Board and/
or approved by the Minister or Trustee. When an 
employee becomes eligible for an LSL payment, 
a benefit may be payable directly from the LSL 
fund; or may be payable by the employer, who 
then claims reimbursement from the fund.84 The 
benefits payable are calculated in accordance with 
the relevant legislation and/or award. This currently 
means that LSL benefits are defined benefits (equal 
to the number of weeks of LSL multiplied by the 
weekly wages or salary).85
Each fund is periodically reviewed by an actuary. 
The actuary assesses the adequacy of the 
fund’s assets, relative to the fund’s liabilities, 
using reasonable assumptions about the future 
experience of the fund. The actuary might 
recommend an increase or a decrease in the 
levy rate, in order to maintain an acceptable level 
of solvency. The fund administrators play a role 
in ensuring that employers comply with their 
obligations, for example, educating new employers, 
inspecting records of registered employers, 
imposing financial penalties for late payments.
The established funds have limited portability. If a 
worker leaves the industry, then they either forfeit 
their entitlements or receive payment for any vested 
accrued benefits. If these schemes are extended 
to provide full portability, then presumably the 
LSL benefit entitlements would be transferred to 
a different industry fund. This would necessitate 
transfers of the corresponding sums between 
different funds, from time to time. For example, if a 
person working in the retail industry transferred to the 
hotel industry, LSL funds would be transferred from 
the retail industry fund to the hotel industry fund.
This would allow more workers to claim their LSL 
benefits, but the complexity of the administration 
would be increased, as assets and liabilities would 
be transferred from one fund to another.
Note that the established industry funds already 
make some arrangements for the transfer of 
entitlements between different funds. For example, 
the construction industry schemes have a reciprocal 
agreement to deal with workers who transfer from 
one State/Territory to another. Where a worker 
becomes eligible for an LSL payment under one 
scheme, and has previously worked in a different 
jurisdiction, each scheme fund must pay its own 
share of the benefit. 
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Assessment of the industry-based 
PSL Model against specified criteria
PLSL schemes could be extended to a wider range 
of workers, simply by setting up new industry-
based funds, one by one. 
Note that this industry-by-industry approach was 
successfully used by trade unions in the 1980s in 
order to increase superannuation coverage across 
the community. The strongest unions set up their 
own industry funds, and negotiated to include 
superannuation benefits in awards. New schemes 
proliferated over several years, as other unions 
followed this example. This approach led to a 
sharp increase in superannuation coverage among 
Australian workers in a relatively short period. 
However this award-based approach did create 
some administrative problems. The Commonwealth 
government eventually decided that it would be 
preferable to introduce uniform national legislation 
for compulsory minimum superannuation 
contributions (i.e. the Superannuation Guarantee 
system which commenced in 1992). 
Using this approach of extending LSL funds would 
probably require the co-operation of all the State 
governments, which might pose a challenge. 
1. tRanSitional aRRangeMentS
When a new industry-based PLSL scheme is 
created, the scheme covers all LSL benefits 
which are earned after the commencement 
date of the scheme. Employers continue to 
be responsible for paying LSL benefits earned 
prior to the commencement date. Therefore, 
both arrangements will run in tandem during a 
transitional period, which might last several years. 
2. SiMPlicity
At present, most of the industry-based schemes 
have a defined benefit structure. The same rules are 
applied to determine the benefits for all employees 
within the fund; and the same rules are used 
to determine the levy payable by all employers 
within the fund.86 Each scheme has its own rules, 
describing matters such as who is covered by the 
scheme, what counts for service, what components 
of salary are included for LSL purposes, how 
benefits are determined for people with variable 
hours, the treatment of various types of other leave 
when determining service, and the time limit for 
deregistration of employees.
If the system is extended to provide portability 
across industries, so that benefit entitlements 
can be transferred from one industry fund to 
another, then it might be difficult to work out 
consistent transfer rules. This is likely to create 
greater complexity (unless benefit entitlements 
are eventually standardised under the National 
Employment Standards). 
For example, many universities currently allow 
transfer of entitlements when academic staff move 
from one institution to another. When a professor 
starts a new job, he or she is given credit for 
previous service and the previous employer pays a 
corresponding sum to the new employer. However, 
each university has different LSL rules, which may 
be embedded in workplace agreements. According 
to our interviews with university HR administrators, 
this diversity sometimes creates problems. The 
transfer system is still viable, but only because the 
number of such transfers is relatively low. 
Alternatively, a worker who switches from one 
job to another might be allowed to build up 
entitlements in several different industry funds. This 
is the system which applies in the construction 
industry under interstate reciprocal arrangements. 
No inter-fund payments are made when the worker 
moves between States/Territories. But when the 
worker finally claims an LSL benefit, each fund 
pays its own share of that benefit. The fact that 
there are only a few industry funds allows this 
system to be workable. But if PLSL is extended 
to cover a wide range of industries, the system 
is likely to cause administrative complexity and 
higher administrative costs.
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3. adequacy oF beneFitS
Most of the industry-based funds provide defined 
benefits, i.e. benefits are based on the employee’s 
wages at the time leave is taken, which is 
consistent with the provisions specified by State/
Territory legislation. This system also provides 
workers with a replacement of their normal income 
while they are on leave, which is a central purpose 
of LSL benefits. 
4. coMPliance
Each of the existing portable industry-based LSL 
schemes has been established by legislation (as 
described in Section 3 above). Employers have 
a legal obligation to make contributions to these 
schemes (the contributions are usually described 
as levies). Fund administrators are given powers to 
conduct investigations to ensure that employers are 
paying the appropriate sums.87 Penalties may be 
imposed on employers who make late payments 
and/or otherwise fail to meet their obligations. 
Whenever a new industry fund is created, 
employers in the industry must be identified. This 
is not a simple process. For example, this is a 
description of the process adopted by the NSW 
Long Service Leave Corporation when establishing 
a new fund for contract cleaners: 
“	 The	Contract	Cleaning	Industry	
Portable	Long	Service	Scheme	
commenced	operation	on		
1	July	2011.	Scheme	promotion	
became	the	Corporation’s	
responsibility	from	that	date	
onwards	with	significant	efforts	
made	to	identify	industry	
employers	and	to	advise	them	of	
their	obligations	under	the	Act.
	 Local	councils,	cleaning	franchises,	
accounting	and	bookkeeping	bodies	
and	other	organisations	were	
issued	with	requests	to	advise	their	
cleaning	providers	and	members	
of	the	scheme’s	existence	and	their	
obligations.	A	significant	amount	
of	research	was	undertaken	–	data	
was	accessed	from	the	Australian	
Business	Register	and	more	than	
11,000	letters	issued	to	industry	
participants.	Further	industry	
employers	were	identified	using	
various	directory	and	other	
sources.	Editorials	were	also	
placed	in	the	 	magazine	
and	the	NSW	IR	email	update	
service.	In	addition	WorkCover	
NSW	performed	a	mail-out	on	
behalf	of	the	Corporation	to	more	
than	1,700	workers	compensation	
policy	holders	that	were	classified	
as	being	members	of	the	contract	
cleaning	industry.	Scheme	training	
was	delivered	to	delegates	of	United	
Voice	–	the	union	representing	
the	cleaning	industry	–	and	a	
presentation	was	delivered	to	the	
NSW	Building	Service	Contractors	
Association	of	Australia	annual	
general	meeting.”88
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After the creation of an industry fund, the 
administrators must regularly update their  
records, looking for new employers who enter  
the industry, and identifying any employers  
who cease operations. 
All of the PLSL schemes devote considerable 
resources towards ensuring compliance. Staff 
members attend trade shows, industry events and 
union meetings to provide information to employers 
and workers. They visit workplaces in order to 
raise awareness and provide information about the 
scheme. They publish bulletins and advertise in 
trade journals. Some schemes also allow workers 
to check their LSL records via the internet. This 
allows workers to detect errors, such as missing 
service periods. 
Some of the PLSL schemes report that a high level 
of compliance has been attained; other schemes 
have reported problems in ensuring compliance. For 
example, under the Northern Territory construction 
industry fund, where employer levies are based on 
a percentage of costs for each construction project, 
the NT Auditor General has noted that it is difficult 
to be sure that levy income is being collected from 
every leviable project.89 
Stronger enforcement measures may be necessary 
for some schemes. Legislation for the coal mining 
industry scheme has recently been amended to 
strengthen compliance in response to complaints 
from the CFMEU.90 The scheme now requires 
employers to obtain an annual certificate from an 
auditor to confirm that they have paid the correct 
amount in levy payments and claimed the correct 
amount from the LSL fund in respect of LSL 
payments made to employees. 
Most of the PLSL funds incur some legal expenses 
in order to enforce compliance. Legal action is 
always costly, but may be necessary in order to 
protect the revenue stream which provides LSL 
benefits to workers.
5. PRotection in the event  
oF inSolvency
Existing PLSL schemes provides a good level of 
protection for employee entitlements in the event 
of employer insolvency. Most of the PLSL funds 
pay workers their full LSL entitlements, even when 
the employer has gone out of business and/or 
failed to pay the correct amount in levies. Note 
that several of the established PLSL funds operate 
in industries where there is a relatively high level 
of employer insolvency, so this is an important 
advantage for the workers. For example, when 
the Oakdale Colliery was closed in May 1999, the 
employer became insolvent and was unable to 
pay employee entitlements of about $6.3 million. 
Fortunately, the miners were covered by the Coal 
Industry Long Service Leave Fund, which ensured 
that members would receive their full LSL benefits.
If the scheme manages to attain a high level of 
compliance, collecting all levies in a timely fashion, 
then the LSL benefits for each employer should 
be fully funded, and the fund should not suffer 
significant additional costs in covering LSL benefits 
in respect of insolvent employers. However, there 
is a risk that employers who are facing financial 
difficulties will defer making levy payments to 
the fund. If an employer becomes insolvent 
while owing large sums to the fund, then other 
employers will be required to cover the shortfall in 
benefit payments. 
This raises a legal issue: should the fund become 
a creditor, with a claim to the insolvent employer’s 
remaining assets? If so, should the fund be a high 
priority creditor? 
6. PRudential ManageMent  
and Solvency
Each scheme has a Board with some responsibility 
for the management of the scheme, although the 
roles vary in different jurisdictions. All of the State-
based PLSL funds are also subject to some degree 
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of government oversight. For example, in some 
cases, the relevant State/Territory government 
Minister might have the power to determine the levy 
rate and the investment strategy for the fund. 
The State/Territory governments might even have 
the authority to divert the fund’s assets to uses 
other than the payment of LSL benefits.
For example, many of the PLSL funds earned 
excellent investment returns and built up large 
surpluses during the 1980 and 1990s. The NSW 
construction industry fund had a very large surplus, 
and the levy rate was reduced to 0% for several 
years. However, in 1996 the NSW government 
decided to take $120 million out of the fund, in 
order to reduce the State’s budget deficit. The 
following year, the government withdrew an 
additional $60 million. Since the fund no longer had 
a surplus, it was necessary to reintroduce the levy, 
which was set at 0.2% of construction costs from 
1 July 1997.91 This “repatriation of funds” was quite 
controversial. The legislation which established the 
PLSL fund did not include any specific provisions 
for making such payments to the State. However, 
the government claimed that it had the legal powers 
to do so under the Public Finance and Audit Act.92 
The NSW fund now has a substantial deficit, 
and the fund actuary has recently recommended 
another increase in the levy rate. 
The collapse of the Oakdale Colliery provides 
another example. Although the coal mining 
industry LSL fund was available to pay the workers 
their LSL benefits, the fund had no responsibility 
for paying any of the other entitlements. The 
unions representing these workers argued that 
the rules should be changed to allow the LSL fund 
to pay all of the workers’ entitlements (including 
annual leave and redundancy pay). Initially the 
government refused to countenance any such 
payments. However, the unions ran a very effective 
campaign and called a one-day strike in support 
of the Oakdale miners. Soon afterwards, the 
government passed special amendments to the 
legislation, and the LSL fund paid several million 
dollars to Oakdale workers.
The investment of fund assets has also aroused 
some controversy from time to time. In 1999, the 
body responsible for administering the Tasmanian 
construction industry PLSL scheme (TasBuild 
Ltd) proposed using its funds to support the 
development new major infrastructure projects. 
Tasbuild’s chairman reportedly said that:
“	 TasBuild	would	assess	every	
project	brief	received	and	
funds	made	available	would	be	
at	an	extremely	competitive	
interest	rate….	developers	
should	be	mindful	that	TasBuild	
was	committed	to	project	
development	and	job	creation	
rather	than	a	commercial	rate	
of	return.	…There	are	projects	
in	Tasmania	which	are	of	a	size	
that	is	either	not	sufficient	to	
attract	commercial	finance	
or	of	a	risk	nature	that	they	
cannot	gain	financial	support	
without	further	funds	being	
introduced….	There	are	several	
good	construction	projects	
in	Tasmania	at	present	and	
TasBuild	is	keen	to	assist	them	
get	off	the	ground.”	93
Although these projects might be good for the 
Tasmanian economy, they might also reduce returns 
and increase risks for the LSL fund. 
These examples all raise the dilemma of the ‘sole 
purpose test’ mentioned earlier. Should assets be 
invested to provide the best return for the fund? 
Or should assets be directed into socially desirable 
investments? If assets are used for other purposes, 
could this undermine the scheme’s solvency? 
This issue was identified by Commissioner Cole,  
in his 2003 review of PLSL funds in the 
Construction and Building Industry.
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“	 Employers	are	required	under	
long	service	leave	legislation	
to	contribute	to	long	service	
leave	for	the	purpose	of	funding	
their	employee’s	long	service	
leave,	yet	much	of	the	money	
contributed,	or	raised	from	
capital	investment	of	the	long	
service	leave	fund,	is	used	
for	other	purposes.	Money	
compulsorily	acquired	should	be	
used	for	the	purpose	for	which	
it	is	collected.”	94
Commissioner Cole recommended that “the 
Commonwealth should encourage the States 
and Territories to ensure that the moneys held or 
received by long service funds should be used only 
for the purpose of paying employee’s long service 
leave entitlements.” 95
In some of the established industry funds, the 
government has the authority to change the 
employer’s levy rate from time to time. Usually, the 
rules will require an actuarial review, and the actuary 
will comment on the adequacy of the levy, and 
may recommend an increase or decrease in the 
rate. The government need not follow the actuary’s 
recommendation.
In practice, employers are naturally likely to oppose 
levy increases and may well express their views to 
those who are responsible for setting the levy rate. 
Any increase might be particularly problematic if 
the industry is going through a downturn. If the 
employers are successful in resisting levy increases, 
this may cause financial difficulties for the LSL 
fund. In order to balance the books, the scheme 
administrators might seek to reduce LSL benefits. 
A few PLSL funds have reduced benefits in recent 
years. In some cases, these benefit reductions 
simply unwound benefit increases that had been 
granted in a previous era, when the funds had a 
surplus. However, workers are likely to prefer a 
system which provides greater certainty in the level 
of benefits.
If this model is adopted, and more industry-based 
PLSL benefits are created, then the legislation 
should clearly specify the rules for the management 
of deficits. In particular, there should be clear 
guidelines for the determination of the levy rate; the 
circumstances which would justify a reduction in 
benefits; and the equitable treatment of employees 
in the event that a fund becomes insolvent. 
As at 30 June 2012, both the NSW and Victorian 
Construction Industry LSL schemes had substantial 
deficits. (Victoria had a deficit of about $160 million, 
relative to liabilities of $823 million; NSW had a 
deficit of about $139 million, relative to liabilities of 
$734 million).
7. unclaiMed Money and loSt 
MeMbeRS
The established industry-based PLSL schemes 
were designed to encourage people to remain 
in the same industry over the long term (i.e. the 
retention of workers was often a key rationale 
for the creation of these schemes). Therefore, in 
these schemes, workers lose their benefits if they 
leave the industry before completing the specified 
qualifying period. Workers are allowed to take 
temporary breaks from the industry without losing 
their entitlements. 
For example, in the ACT Community Services 
Industry Scheme, a worker can take a break of up to 
four years without losing LSL benefits. If they return 
to work within that time frame, even as a casual 
or part-time worker, accrued entitlements will be 
retained. During this period, the worker is usually 
categorised as an “inactive worker”.96 The worker 
will be deregistered and lose all benefit entitlements 
for past service if they take a longer break without 
having already qualified for an LSL benefit. If the 
worker re-enters the industry at a later date, they will 
start from scratch and gain no credit for past service.
The established PLSL schemes deregister 
thousands of workers each year.97 A worker forfeits 
their entitlements upon deregistration. The money 
which had been set aside to pay their benefits 
can be used for other purposes, such as paying 
administration costs for the fund and/or reducing 
the employer levies.
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For example, Queensland’s construction industry 
scheme deregistered 27,324 workers in 2011/12, 
which represents 10% of all workers who were 
registered at the start of the year. This reflects the 
impact of the boom/bust cycle on the construction 
industry. In the years prior to the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), many workers were attracted into the 
construction industry by high rates of pay. After the 
GFC many of those jobs disappeared and workers 
moved into other industries. Many of these workers 
would have forfeited their entitlement to LSL 
benefits. Others (those who remained in the industry 
long enough to complete the vesting period) would 
be eligible for some benefits, but they might well 
become “lost members”.
This creates some administrative difficulties.
In general, the fund has a liability to any member 
who does qualify for a LSL benefit by completing 
the specified qualifying period. The member’s 
benefit “vests” (and becomes a “vested benefit”) as 
soon as they complete this period. For example, in 
the NSW construction industry scheme, a worker 
is entitled to receive a LSL payment if they cease 
working in the industry after completing five years 
of service. 
Consider the example of a worker who has 
completed five years of service. He loses his job 
and switches to a new line of work in another 
industry. Perhaps he intends to return to the 
construction industry at a later date, when the 
economy improves. Therefore he does not claim his 
LSL benefit. After a while, he may even forget about 
the LSL benefit. Perhaps he does not even realise 
that he has an LSL benefit. The LSL fund maintains 
records for this worker, showing a liability for their 
vested benefit. But years go by, and the benefit is 
never claimed. The fund loses contact with these 
members. 
It seems that some of the established industry 
funds are holding large sums in reserve for these 
lost members. According to the 2012 actuarial 
report for the NSW construction industry scheme, 
the fund has liabilities amounting to $72 million for 
vested benefits for workers who have not worked 
in the industry for more than four years, who have 
never claimed their benefits. The actuaries note 
that: “Although some of the out of force workers 
will resume work in the industry and become active 
workers again, it is likely that many of them will have 
lost contact with the Corporation and may never 
claim their benefit”.98
As noted previously, similar problems have plagued 
the superannuation industry. Many employees 
simply lose contact with their superannuation fund, 
and never claim their benefits.
8. adMiniStRative buRden FoR 
eMPloyeRS
LSL legislation inevitably creates some paperwork 
for employers, even when the LSL benefits are  
not portable. Employers must keep records for 
every employee throughout their service, and 
indeed for several more years after the employee 
leaves service. 
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To some extent, the industry-based PLSL funds 
take over this record-keeping task. Each of the 
established portable industry-based funds has 
now established a central register and database 
to keep records of all registered employees and 
their benefits accrued. Each participating employer 
must pass on information to the central register. 
Most funds require monthly or quarterly returns 
from employers, which undoubtedly creates 
some additional work for employers. However, 
it is clear that administrators of the established 
PLSL schemes have taken steps to reduce the 
administrative burden for employers, as much as 
possible. Based on our interviews with employers 
who participate in these schemes, it appears that 
they have been quite successful in doing so.99
Most of the PLSL schemes allow employers to 
submit returns and make payments electronically. 
The funds have developed software which  
makes it very easy to input the required data.  
The administrators send staff members out to  
teach new employers how to use this software. 
Many of the fund administrators conduct customer 
service surveys, and the results are generally 
very positive. For example, 93% of employers 
responding to a recent survey expressed 
satisfaction with the operation of the Queensland 
construction industry scheme.100 
To some extent, the burden of record keeping  
has been transferred from employers to the LSL 
fund administrators. Unfortunately, some employers 
do not provide accurate information to the LSL 
funds.101 Of course, this creates extra work for 
the LSL funds.
Employers sometimes have difficulty in determining 
whether or not employees are covered by a 
particular industry-based fund. For example, this 
issue came up in the review of the Tasmanian 
scheme for building and construction workers. 
Employers complained about the “uncertain and 
complex definition of the construction industry”, 
which created confusion.102 Did the scheme 
cover landscape gardeners? People who installed 
sprinkler systems? People who installed burglar 
alarms? Kitchen-makers? The following exchange 
illustrates some of the definitional difficulties. 
If many different industry-based PLSL schemes 
are created, each covering a different category 
of workers, these administrative complexities 
may become more burdensome for employers. 
Employers might be required to make contributions 
to different schemes for different employees.  
These issues are exacerbated when employers 
operate in two or more different jurisdictions, and 
each jurisdiction has a separate scheme. 
extract from hearings by  
the houSe oF aSSeMbly 
Select coMMittee on coStS 
oF houSing, building and 
conStRuction
Mr BOOTH - Do you collect long service 
off someone who makes kitchens, for 
example?
Mr ATKINS (CEO of TASBUILD)- 
There is a subtlety in relation to 
kitchen manufacturers which we 
are wrestling with. A manufacturer 
of a flat-pack kitchen selling to the 
public, they generally wouldn’t, but 
if the kitchen manufacturer also then 
installs then they would be covered. 
It is a moot point; one is deemed to 
be a manufacturer and the other one 
is deemed to be in the construction 
industry….
Mr BOOTH - Window manufacturers?
Mr ATKINS - On the same scenario, if 
they are just manufacturing and selling 
to builders and the public without any 
installation, then they are out, but if they 
are actually manufacturing and installing 
then they would be in.103
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9. adMiniStRation coStS
The established PLSL schemes have taken 
pains to control administration expenses. Most 
funds encourage employers to provide returns 
electronically, which has streamlined administration 
for both employers and the fund’s administrative 
staff. For the smaller funds, administration costs 
have been managed by sharing resources, for 
example, through the administration of multiple 
funds by a single body in Queensland and the ACT. 
The construction industry LSL schemes in each 
State/Territory have set up a National Cooperation 
Project, and are currently working together to 
improve the efficiency of administration to achieve 
greater consistency between the different funds. 
The reasoning behind this initiative is “to reduce 
operating costs and ensure that employers and 
workers who work across State boundaries are not 
disadvantaged by different processes and rules.”104 
Indeed, interviews with employer representatives 
identified inconsistencies between different 
schemes as an administrative burden for employers 
operating in multiple jurisdictions.
The Coal Mining Industry PLSL fund tries to reduce 
costs by taking advantage of synergies with the 
superannuation system. According to the annual 
report, the LSL fund employs AUSCOAL Services 
to collect levies and pay claims. 
“	 AUSCOAL	Services	Pty	Ltd	is	
also	the	administrator	of	the	coal	
industry	superannuation	scheme	
and	serves	substantially	the	
same	employers	and	employees	
as	are	subject	to	the	long	service	
leave	legislation…We	believe	that	
the	close	synergy	between	these	
administrations	also	continues	to	
produce	efficiencies	and	a	benefit	
in	administration	costs…The	
Corporation	regularly	tests	the	
costs	of	administration	provided	by	
AUSCOAL	Services	Pty	LTD	against	
the	general	marketplace	to	ensure	
they	remain	cost-effective.”105
Administration costs will vary between funds, 
depending on a range of factors, such as : 
 the length of time the fund has been in 
operation; 
 the number of registered employees; 
 the proportion of active and inactive registered 
employees; 
 the number of employers; 
 the average size of the levy per member; 
 the method of collection of the levies; 
 the number of LSL benefit claims made;
 the turnover of employees and employers; 
 the average rates of remuneration for the 
workers in each industry; and 
 the amount of assets under management. 
For example, 
 the costs of education and monitoring 
compliance will vary depending on the number 
of employers;
 the cost of collecting contributions will vary 
depending on the method of payment (for 
example, some States determine levies as 
percentage of payroll, while others determine 
levies as a percentage of construction project 
costs, using local councils as agents to collect 
these levies); 
 the cost of paying benefits will vary depending 
on the average length of service for fund 
members;
 the cost of manageing the investments will 
vary depending on the amount of assets held 
in the fund; and
 the costs of auditing and actuarial reviews will 
be an overhead for every fund.
The annual reports for the established industry-
based funds do not provide enough information to 
break down the cost structures in any detail.
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 Table 4.1 presents the expense ratios, measured 
as a percentage of assets, for existing PLSL funds. 
It shows that the NSW Cleaners and the ACT 
Community Services funds have high expense ratios. 
No doubt this reflects the fact that these are relatively 
new schemes. There are significant establishment 
costs for new schemes. For example, the Bendzulla 
feasibility study for the Victorian Community Sector 
scheme estimated establishment costs would be 
between $500,000 and $1 million. The establishment 
costs for the ACT Community Sector scheme were 
estimated to be $500,000.103 The newer schemes 
have not yet had time to build up a large amount 
of assets, so the ratio of expenses to assets will 
be higher than for long-established schemes. The 
Coal Industry has the lowest expense ratio, when 
measured as a percentage of assets. 
Ideally we would also like to calculate the 
administrative costs per member in each fund. 
However, this is difficult because there are many 
different categories of members. A fund might 
include workers who are currently employed; 
members who are not currently employed in the 
industry but have been employed at some time 
within the last year; members who are not working 
in the industry any more, but are still on the register; 
and members who have not been employed in 
the industry for more than x years (deregistered 
members, who may or may not be included in the 
membership count). 
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Fund  date exPenSeS (1000s)
aSSetS 
(1000s)
exPenSeS  
x 100 aSSetS
Coal Industry 2011 $ 3,148 $826,270 0.38
NSW Building and Construction 2012 $15,100 $601,800 2.51
NSW Building and Construction 2011 $9,100 $610,000 1.49
NSW Building and Construction 2010 $10,200 $663,700 1.54
NSW Cleaners 2012 $1,600 $7,100 22.54
Queensland Building and Construction 2012 $8,705 $642,162 1.36
Queensland Building and Construction 2011 $9,746 $509,910 1.91
Queensland Cleaners 2011 $1,042 $26,683 3.91
Queensland Cleaners 2010 $840 $20,678 4.06
South Australia Building and Construction 2012 $1,448 $85,460 1.69
South Australia Building and Construction 2011 $1,272 $80,930 1.57
South Australia Building and Construction 2010 $1,221 $69,630 1.75
South Australia Building and Construction 2009 $1,080 $58,750 1.84
Northern Territory Building and Construction 2012 $1,469 $53,490 2.75
Northern Territory Building and Construction 2011 $1,409 $41,906 3.36
Tasmania Building and Construction 2012 $1,139 $70,878 1.61
Tasmania Building and Construction 2011 $,046 $67,475 1.55
Western Australia Building and Construction 2012 $4,033 $268,877 1.50
Western Australia Building and Construction 2011 $3,715 $223,380 1.66
Australian Capital Territory Building and Construction 2012 $1,408 $67,169 2.10
Australian Capital Territory Building and Construction 2011 $1,090 $65,115 1.67
Australian Capital Territory Cleaners 2012 $293 $6,979 4.20
Australian Capital Territory Cleaners 2011 $371 $6,215 5.97
Australian Capital Territory Community Sector 2012 $551 $7,339 7.51
Australian Capital Territory Community Sector 2011 $555 $3,506 15.83
Victorian Building and Construction 2012 $14,031 $663,583 2.11
Victorian Building and Construction 2011 $12,884 $625,846 2.06
tABLe 4.1 
exPenSe RatioS (= exPenSeS / aSSetS * 100) FoR induStRy-baSed PlSl ScheMe
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Fund date exPenSeS ($1000s)
MeMbeRS 
who aRe 
cuRRently 
/ Recently 
eMPloyed
exPenSeS 
PeR 
active 
MeMbeR $
aveRage 
balance 
PeR active 
MeMbeR $ 
(See note 1)
Coal Industry 
(National)
2011 3,148 44,880 70.14 18,421 
NSW Building  
and Construction
2012 15,100 181,175 83.34 3,322 
NSW Cleaners 2012 1,600 23,797 67.24 298 (new fund)
Queensland 
Building and 
Construction
2011 9,746 142,680 68.31 3,574
Queensland 
Cleaners
2011 1,042 14,396 72.38 1,853
South Australia 
Building and 
Construction
2012 1,448 19,250 75.22 4,439
Northern Territory 
Building and 
Construction
2011 1,409 n/a n/a n/a
Tasmania Building 
and Construction
2012 1,139 11,695 97.39 6,061 
Western Australia 
Building and 
Construction
2012 4,033 69,619 57.93 3,862 
Australian Capital 
Territory Building 
and Construction
2012 1,408 18,063 77.95 3,719 
Australian Capital 
Territory Cleaners
2012 371 5,169 71.70 1,350 
Australian 
Capital Territory 
Community Sector
2012 551 12413 44.39 591 (new fund) 
Victorian Building 
and Construction
2012 14,031 120,039 116.89 5,528 
tABLe 4.2 
exPenSeS PeR active MeMbeR FoR induStRy-baSed PlSl ScheMe
Note 1: The average balance per member has been calculated by 
dividing the total assets by the estimated number of members who 
are currently employed. Some of the assets belong to members 
who are no longer working, who still have a vested LSL benefit in 
the fund. Therefore these figures overstate the average balance 
per member. The data provided in the fund accounts does not 
enable a more accurate estimate. Note that the average balance 
per member will also be affected by wage rates; by the proportion 
of part-time-workers; and by the average length of service of 
members who remain in the fund.
Note 2: The Queensland Building and Construction fund 
membership numbers include members who received a service 
credit during the year plus anyone eligible for a pro rata benefit. 
Hence the membership numbers are overstated by an unknown 
amount relative to the other schemes.  
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The membership rules are different for  
each fund, and each fund has provided 
membership statistics based on its own 
classifications. We have attempted to assess  
the expenses per employed member, as shown 
 in Table 4.2. But the inconsistency between  
funds means that these figures do not  
provide a reliable basis for comparisons.
If we look at expense rates per member, the coal 
industry expense rates are more in line with the other 
funds. The miners have higher average rates of pay, 
and higher average length of service, compared 
to other funds, and this has led to a much higher 
accumulation of assets per member. The figures 
shown in Table 4.2 indicate that some of the smaller 
funds have significantly higher expense ratios. 
If the industry-based defined benefit model 
is adopted as the basis for expanding the 
availability of PLSL benefits to more workers, then 
administration costs may consume an even higher 
proportion of fund income. For reasons outlined 
above, this model relies on the assumption that 
each industry has its own LSL fund. This may well 
lead to a proliferation of small funds with a relatively 
small number of members and a relatively low level 
of assets. This is likely to be economically inefficient, 
because small funds typically have higher per-capita 
costs. A 2007 study of the established industry-
based PLSL schemes found that there were 
economies of scale in administration costs.107
This is consistent with experience in the 
superannuation industry. The Cooper Review of 
the efficiency of the superannuation system found 
that “scale matters”. The following graph gives the 
estimated costs for funds of different sizes.108 
The compulsory superannuation system initially 
involved the creation of a multitude of relatively small 
industry-based superannuation schemes. Over the 
years, the smaller funds have amalgamated or been 
swallowed up by larger superannuation funds. 
Before establishing new industry-based PLSL funds, 
it would be sensible to conduct a more thorough 
analysis of the administration costs – similar to the 
Deloitte Analysis which was prepared for the Super 
System Review. This information would be necessary 
in order to make an accurate assessment of the 
level of levies which would be needed to provide the 
minimum statutory LSL benefits. 
Figure 4.2
eStiMated SuPeRannuation Fund exPenSeS by Size oF Fund
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10. Stability oF eMPloyeR coStS
The creation of a new industry-based PLSL fund will 
affect each employer’s cash flow. 
Under this model, employers no longer incur LSL 
costs when an employee takes LSL or exits from 
service. Instead, employers are required to make 
regular periodical payments of LSL levies.109 In other 
words, the LSL benefits will be funded in advance, 
well before the employee ever becomes eligible 
to take leave. In recent years, when new PLSL 
schemes have been proposed, some employers 
have objected to the imposition of such levy 
payments on the ground that some businesses 
would not be able to afford the levy payments. 
This was the view expressed by some employer 
representatives in the community services sector, 
the cleaning industry, and the securities industry, 
when new schemes were proposed. 
The industry-based schemes were all designed to 
provide defined benefits. In a defined benefit fund, 
the employer’s costs will vary depending on the 
experience of the fund in relation to factors such 
as the benefit rules, investment returns, salary 
growth rates, administration costs, and employee 
working patterns and turnover (the impact of these 
variables is described in Section 5 of this report). 
An actuary can provide an estimate of the levy 
rates required to provide the promised benefits, 
based on reasonable assumptions about future 
experience. However, the fund will require regular 
actuarial reviews in order to re-assess the progress 
of the fund and review the adequacy of the levy 
rate. Most of the established PLSL funds  
require an actuarial review every three years  
(or more frequently).
Several of the PLSL schemes have experienced 
significant changes in the levy rates over the years. 
Although employers are usually pleased when levy 
rates drop, they are naturally unhappy when levy 
rates increase, particularly if rates increase during 
economic downturns when employers are already 
facing difficult trading conditions. 
Levies are likely to be particularly volatile in 
industries which are cyclical, such as the 
construction industry. During boom times the 
workforce expands, the workers build up large 
LSL entitlements, and the LSL fund builds up large 
liabilities. When markets crash, funds suffer large 
investment losses, which creates large deficits. At 
the same time, many employers go out of business 
and the workforce shrinks. At this stage, a relatively 
small number of employers will be asked to pay 
higher levies, in order to pay off the LSL deficit. 
The surviving employers face higher costs when 
they are already struggling to stay in business. 
Any new company which commences operations 
will face high costs, to pay for LSL benefits 
accrued by other employers in the past. Without 
careful management, a defined benefit fund may 
exacerbate negative business cycles.
This is evident in the case of the Tasmanian 
construction industry fund, which has experienced 
wide fluctuations in levy rates over the years. From 
October 1998 to June 2006, employers paid just 
0.7% of wages, which dropped to just 0.3% from 
July 2006 to March 2009.110 After the fund suffered 
quite severe investment losses during the global 
financial crisis, the levy increase was necessary to 
restore the solvency of the fund, increasing to 0.6% 
from April 2009 and then jumped sharply to 2.0% 
six months later. Many employers were upset by the 
sharp increases in the LSL levy rate. In evidence to 
the Parliamentary Inquiry, one employer complained 
that his LSL levy had increased from $115 per 
month in 2008 to $889 in 2011. New employers 
entering the industry in 2010 were particularly 
unhappy about paying off deficits which had arisen 
before they joined the fund: 
“	 Current	employers	are	
now	being	charged	a	700	
per	cent	increase	to	pay	
for	the	global	financial	
crisis	and	in	many	cases	to	
pay	for	long	service	leave	
entitlements	that	might	
have	been	from	six	or	eight	
years	before,	from	other	
employers.”111
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Defined benefit funds are also vulnerable to the risk 
of wage and salary increases, e.g. as a result of a 
boom in the construction industry. When there are 
large increases in the level of remuneration, then 
defined LSL benefits will also increase sharply. This 
may force an increase in levy rates, to cover the 
increased benefits. 
The variability of levy rates will be influenced, 
to some extent, by management decisions. As 
an example, consider a fund which has earned 
excellent investment returns, so that the fund has 
a surplus of assets over liabilities. The board of 
the fund has two options: set aside the surplus 
as a buffer against future adverse experience and 
maintain a stable levy rate, or spend the surplus 
by cutting the levy rate and increasing benefits. 
The second option may well be quite attractive to 
both employers and employees, whose views will 
both be represented on the board. However, if this 
strategy is adopted, then a cut in the levy rate may 
well be followed by a sharp increase if the fund 
subsequently suffers any adverse experience.
It is clear that in the past, many of the industry-
based PLSL funds have adopted policies which 
have tended to increase the variability of the levy 
rates. According to the Cole Royal Commission, 
several of the construction industry funds cut levies 
and increased benefits during the prosperous 
1990s, but were forced to increase levies during the 
economic downturn of 2001/02. 
Appendix 3 shows the variability in the levy rate for 
the industry-based funds. 
This pattern is quite consistent with the experience 
of many defined benefit superannuation funds over 
recent years. Many employer-sponsors cut their 
superannuation contributions whenever the fund 
had a surplus, thereby maintaining fund assets 
at a level only slightly higher than fund liabilities. 
As a result, a large number of defined benefit 
superannuation funds were in an unsatisfactory 
financial position in the aftermath of the GFC.112 
There are measures which can be taken to reduce 
the volatility of levy rates in defined benefit funds: 
for example the fund might adopt a low-volatility 
investment strategy. But this stability comes at 
some cost (e.g. lower long term average returns). 
The volatility of contribution rates is discussed in 
Section 5. 
11. eMPloyeR cRoSS-SubSidiSation
When LSL is not portable, each employer pays 
the LSL costs for their own employees. Different 
employers will incur different costs, reflecting the 
wage increases and staff turnover in their own 
business. However, in a PLSL which operates on a 
defined benefit basis, the same levy rate is applied 
to all employers, and these levies are pooled.  
All benefits are paid from the central pool.  
There is no direct link between the contributions 
made in respect of any employee and the benefits 
that they receive. Some will receive more than they  
pay; others will pay more than they receive.  
This creates the potential for cross-subsidies 
between employers.
These cross-subsidies may be considered desirable 
and introduced into the rules quite deliberately. For 
example, in some funds, the rules allow apprentices 
to accrue LSL benefits, even though employers 
are not required to pay levies for apprentices. This 
reduces the cost of employing apprentices, which 
is considered to be beneficial for the industry. 
However, there might be simpler, more transparent 
methods of providing such subsidies.
Some cross-subsidises may arise as a result of 
employer insolvency. The PLSL funds generally 
provide LSL benefits for employees of insolvent 
employers. If an employer becomes insolvent while 
owing levies to the fund, then other employers 
will inevitably be required to cover the shortfall. 
However, the established industry-based funds 
generally have quite a low level of bad debts as a 
result of employer insolvency: therefore this has not 
been a serious problem for these funds. 
As explained previously, there might be cross-
subsidies between different generations of 
employers. If a fund develops a large deficit for 
benefits owing to past-service employees, it will be 
compelled to increase levy rates. Any new-entrant 
employers will be paying higher rates to cover the 
deficits incurred by previous generations and of 
course this is even more likely to be a problem if 
levy rates have been kept at artificially low rates 
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in the past). As an example, consider the coal 
industry PLSL fund. Prior to 1992, the scheme was 
severely underfunded, and as a result a large deficit 
developed. After a review of the scheme, employer 
levies were increased to 5%, consisting of 2.8% to 
cover the current year’s liabilities and 2.2% to make 
up for the deficit. New entrants to the industry in 
the 1990s had to pay for losses accrued by other 
employers in the 1980s. 
Other cross-subsidies may arise from differences 
in wages growth. In a defined benefit fund, LSL 
benefits depend on the worker’s wages at the date 
LSL is paid. Those employees who get large pay 
increases obtain better benefits than those who 
have no increase in wages. If both types of workers 
are included in the same defined benefit fund, and 
the same levy is paid in respect of both types of 
workers, then there will be cross-subsidies between 
the employers of these two groups. (SeeTable 4.1 
for a numerical illustration). 
In any LSL fund, the level of cross-subsidy will 
depend on the diversity of the employees and 
employers. If all the employers belong to the same 
industry, and all employers in the industry have 
very similar wage rates and staff turnover patterns, 
then cross-subsidies are reduced. But if the fund 
covers a wider range of employers, then cross 
subsidies are likely to be more of an issue. It would 
be theoretically possible to reduce cross-subsidies 
by charging different levies to different employers, 
based on their own employees’ LSL costs, but this 
would make the levy system much more complex 
and difficult to administer.
The existence of cross-subsidies was considered to 
be an undesirable feature of the coal industry PLSL 
scheme, which was previously a defined benefit 
fund. In response to employer concerns about 
cross-subsidies, the industry has now switched 
to an accumulation-type scheme for all service 
after 1 January 2012. Each employee now has an 
individual account. When an employee takes LSL, 
the fund will pay no more than the balance of their 
account.113 
Cross-subsidies may also arise if employers work 
out how to “game the system”. For example, 
suppose that a worker is temporarily employed in 
an exceptionally high-paying job (e.g. a construction 
job in a remote location). This worker might realise 
that it is beneficial to claim LSL benefits immediately 
after completing this job, before returning to work 
in a job which has a lower rate of pay.114 This type 
of behaviour would increase the benefit costs for 
the LSL fund, which could put a strain on the fund’s 
solvency. 
This type of behaviour could be avoided by making 
LSL payments based on standardised rates of pay 
(instead of the employees’ actual remuneration); 
and/or apply a cap to the LSL pay rates. For 
example, the Northern Territory construction 
industry fund uses a fixed rate payment system for 
LSL benefits based on average weekly earnings in 
the industry. According to an actuarial review of the 
scheme, this system provides a number of benefits: 
“The use of a fixed rate for benefit payments 
establishes equity between workers in different 
parts of the industry, simplifies administration of the 
scheme and removes some potential abuses of 
the scheme such as artificially inflated salaries for 
benefit payment purposes”.115 However, this means 
that the LSL benefit would not be sufficient to 
provide a replacement of normal income levels.
An alternative approach, which has been adopted 
in some of the established industry-based funds, 
uses averageing, i.e. the LSL benefit is based on 
the average rate of pay over the previous year.
12. Flexibility
Ideally, our LSL system should be flexible. The 
system should allow for differences in LSL 
entitlements for different employers. And it should 
allow for changes in LSL entitlements over time.  
Industry-based defined benefit funds are not very 
flexible. The same standard formula is usually used 
to calculate benefit payments for all employees, for 
all employers. 
This became an issue when the Victorian 
government was considering the establishment of 
a PLSL scheme for Community Sector Workers. 
The proposed scheme would have provided LSL 
benefits at the minimum level required by law (i.e. 
two months leave after ten years). But about 90% 
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of Community Sector Workers employees were 
already on awards or agreements which provided 
a higher level of benefits. This meant that the 
employers would have had to administer two long 
service leave systems, the portable base-level LSL 
and the employer-specific LSL. The PLSL scheme 
could be redesigned to provide more flexible 
benefits (essentially taking over the administration 
of the employer-specific benefits) – but this would 
have increased the administration costs.116 
Overall assessment of Option B: Industry-
based Defined Benefit PLSL funds
Industry-based PLSL funds have the following 
advantages:
 The defined benefit structure provides benefits 
which are suitable for our purposes, i.e. 
providing a replacement of normal income 
while the employee is on LSL; 
 The established industry-based funds have 
been successful in developing administration 
systems which minimise the administrative 
burden for employers;
 The larger industry-based funds have 
apparently been able to keep administration 
costs at about 1.5% to 2% of assets or less;
 The established funds have devoted resources 
towards improving compliance, i.e. ensuring 
that workers receive their entitlements; and
 Improved compliance also provides a level-
playing field for employers, i.e. by limiting the 
risk that irresponsible employers will be able to 
undercut responsible employers.
However this option also has disadvantages:
 Defined benefits superannuation funds were 
traditionally created by a single employer-
sponsor paying standardised benefits on 
behalf of its own long-serving employers. 
Defined benefit funds are more difficult to 
manage when there are multiple employers 
with a diverse group of employees who are 
frequently switching between funds;
 If new schemes are created for each industry, 
this will create administrative difficulties, e.g. if 
workers accrue benefits in multiple industries 
across multiple jurisdictions;
 If new schemes are created for each industry, 
it is likely that many of these schemes will 
be too small to operate efficiently. If they 
are unable to attain economies of scale, 
employers will have to pay higher contributions 
in order to cover higher administration fees;
 The defined benefit structure might create 
cross-subsidies between different employers 
and different generations of employers;
 Based on the experience of the established 
PLSL schemes, the levy rate is likely to vary 
over time, creating difficulties for employers. 
This problem is likely to be more severe in 
cyclical industries and/or in funds which adopt 
more volatile investment strategies;
 Defined benefit funds may develop large 
deficits (especially if there is pressure to keep 
levy rates low); it would be desirable to have 
clear-cut rules for the management of fund 
surpluses and deficits (which might entail 
benefit reductions); and
 Defined benefit schemes are less flexible than 
accumulation schemes, i.e. less able to cope 
with variations in entitlements across different 
categories or workers, and less able to cope 
with changes in entitlements over time. 
If this option is adopted, it would be desirable to 
introduce “sole purpose” rules to ensure that LSL 
fund assets are used solely for the purposes of 
providing LSL benefits.
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4.2.3. Option C:  
The Accumulation model 
PLSL benefits could be provided by requiring 
employers to make regular contributions for all 
eligible employees. The minimum amount of the 
contribution would be determined by the National 
Employment Standards. These contributions 
would be payable into designated LSL accounts 
administered by superannuation funds and/or 
authorised financial institutions.
 The money held in the account would be 
invested on behalf of the account holder  
and investment earnings would be credited  
to the account;
 Administration fees would be deducted from 
the account; 
 The account-provider would be required to 
maintain records sufficient to determine the 
worker’s eligibility for LSL cash payments in 
the future;
 Cash payments from the LSL account to the 
worker would be subject to “LSL preservation 
requirements”, similar to the preservation 
requirements applicable to superannuation 
benefits. The LSL benefit would not become 
payable in cash until the worker met an “LSL 
condition of release”, e.g. when a worker took 
LSL, became permanently disabled, reached 
retirement age, or died. The preservation 
rules would also specify the amount payable 
if the worker only took part of their accrued 
LSL (e.g. took only one month of leave when 
they were entitled to take two months). The 
worker’s employer would be required to verify 
that a condition of release has been met (e.g. 
by certifying that the worker is taking LSL);
 The LSL account-provider would be required 
to meet registration, reporting, and corporate 
governance requirements, similar to those 
imposed on the financial institutions that 
hold superannuation savings. APRA would 
set standards for authorisation and would 
monitor account-providers. Banks, life 
insurers, and superannuation funds would be 
eligible to offer LSL accounts, as long as they 
met the authorisation standards;
 The employee would be entitled to choose 
the LSL account-provider and to transfer the 
LSL account from one provider to another. 
This would enable the employee to combine 
LSL payments from two or more employers 
into one account. This would improve the 
efficiency of the system, i.e. minimising 
administration fees; and
 If the employee did not exercise the right 
to choose, then the employer would be 
required to make payments to an LSL 
account administered by a default account-
provider. The default account-provider would 
be chosen according to the same principles 
which are applied to choose a default 
superannuation fund.
In practice, of course, the employer’s 
administrative burden would be reduced if there 
was consistency between the superannuation 
system and the LSL system. 
It would be necessary to carefully consider the 
tax treatment of these LSL accounts. As noted 
previously, the established industry-based PLSL 
schemes are not required to pay any tax on levies 
received or on the investment income earned. 
However LSL benefits are taxed in the hands 
of recipients when the benefits are ultimately 
paid. The tax treatment of these accounts will, of 
course, affect the costing of the LSL benefits. If 
the LSL accounts are taxed, then the employers 
will have to pay a higher rate of contributions 
in order to fund the same level of benefits. The 
impact of taxes is discussed in more detail in 
Section 5.
If the LSL accounts are given favourable tax 
treatment, then it will be necessary to impose 
some limits on the amounts paid into these 
accounts. The annual contributions should not 
exceed the amount needed to fund the accruing 
LSL entitlements (e.g. fixed as a percentage of 
wages or salary).
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Compulsory superannuation is set up under the 
Commonwealth government’s taxation powers. 
If an employer does not pay superannuation 
contributions, then it is liable to pay additional taxes; 
the additional taxes are high enough to provide an 
incentive for employers to pay the contributions. 
Similarly, superannuation funds must comply with 
the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, 
because non-complying funds might risk losing their 
tax concessions. 
It is not entirely clear that the Commonwealth could 
treat compulsory LSL in the same way under its 
taxation powers. The issues and possible approaches 
have already been canvassed at the beginning of 
Section 4 in relation to compulsory LSL generally.
1. tRanSitional aRRangeMentS
If this model is adopted, then it will cover all LSL 
benefits which are earned after the commencement 
date of the scheme. Employers would continue 
to be responsible for paying LSL benefits earned 
prior to the commencement date. Therefore 
both arrangements will run in tandem during a 
transitional period which might last several years. 
2. SiMPlicity
This model would be simple for workers to 
understand. The LSL account is simply a special-
purpose savings account, with restrictions on 
withdrawals. 
The Super System Review found that many 
Australian workers do not pay much attention to 
their superannuation accounts, and they simply join 
the default fund and accept the trustee’s default 
investment strategy. Since LSL accounts balances 
are likely to be even smaller than superannuation 
balances, it seems likely that workers will also be 
“disengaged” from the LSL accounts. 
The Super System Review noted that: 
“	 If	members	are	not	interested,	
then	the	system	should	still	
work	to	provide	optimal	
outcomes	for	them.”117
Ideally, the same principles should be applied to the 
design of LSL savings accounts. The LSL accounts 
should as simple as possible: low cost, low risk 
products without any “bells and whistles”, consistent 
with the MySuper products recommended by the 
Super System Review. The LSL savings accounts 
would have a single diversified investment strategy; 
no entry fees; no commissions or fees for advice; 
and streamlined reporting to members. 
3. adequacy oF beneFitS
This model would provide accumulation-type 
benefits, instead of defined benefits. 
If a worker took all of the accrued long service leave 
at the end of ten years, he or she would be entitled 
to all of the money held in the LSL account. This 
amount would be the accumulated value of past 
contributions, plus investment income, less fees 
and taxes (if applicable). This sum might not be 
sufficient to provide the usual level of income during 
the period of leave. 
The accumulation benefit is likely to be inadequate 
if the worker’s remuneration has increased at a rate 
which exceeds the net growth rate of the account 
balance (where the net growth rate depends on 
investment income less fees and taxes). That is, the 
worker will bear the risks.
The magnitude of these risks would be affected by 
the investment strategy which is adopted for these 
accounts. Superannuation savings have a long term 
time horizon, so superannuation funds often adopt 
a balanced asset allocation as a default strategy. 
LSL accounts are likely to have a much shorter time 
horizon, so a more conservative (low-risk, low-return) 
investment strategy might be more appropriate. 
However, if the expected investment returns are 
low, then slightly higher employer contributions 
would be required in order to provide the same level 
of expected benefits. 
There is a trade-off between the cost to the 
employers and the risks to the employee. If the 
employer pays a slightly higher contribution rate, 
then there is obviously a smaller risk that the 
account balance will be insufficient to provide the 
worker’s normal income while on leave. 
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4. coMPliance
Ideally we would like to find a way to make sure 
that employers pay the correct LSL contributions 
into an account for each employee. However, the 
compliance mechanism will depend on the legal 
framework for the new LSL system.
At present, Fair Work Australia is responsible for 
ensuring compliance with National Employment 
Standards, including payment of LSL benefits.
On the other hand, the compulsory superannuation 
system relies on the taxation system to ensure 
compliance. If an employer fails to make 
compulsory superannuation payments, then  
the employer is required to pay additional taxes. 
The employer has a financial incentive to make  
the superannuation contributions, in order  
to avoid the tax. Similarly, superannuation 
funds must comply with the provisions of the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act – 
otherwise the fund might be subject to financial 
penalties (even the loss of tax concessions).  
As a result, the Australian Taxation Office is  
primarily responsible for ensuring compliance. 
In 2010 the Inspector General reviewed the ATO’s 
administration of the Superannuation Guarantee 
Charge. The Inspector General found that the SG 
system worked well for the majority of Australians, 
but there were some problems. It was difficult 
to determine the level of non-compliance. In 
many cases, the ATO only became aware of 
non-compliance when an employee complained. 
But this is not a reliable means of detecting 
non-compliance. Employees might not know 
that the employer was supposed to be making 
contributions; might not be aware that the employer 
was failing to make contributions; or might be afraid 
to complain. Although the ATO was attempting to 
introduce more pro-active methods of detecting 
non-compliance (e.g. data matching and risk 
analytics). However, the enforcement of compliance 
is often time-consuming and expensive.118
The Inspector General noted that certain categories 
of workers had a higher risk of missing out on their 
superannuation contributions: low paid workers, 
young people, contractors and casuals, employees 
working in micro-businesses, and employees 
working in particular sectors – arts and recreation 
services; transport, postal and warehousing sectors; 
accommodation and food services; and the 
agriculture, forestry and fishing sector.
The Inspector General made a number of 
recommendations for improving compliance, 
including stricter financial penalties for employers 
who fail to meet their obligations. 
No doubt there will be similar problems in enforcing 
compliance with any compulsory LSL scheme. 
Therefore the development of effective monitoring, 
enforcement, and deterrence measures should be 
incorporated into any new LSL legislation.
5. PRotection in the  
event oF inSolvency
Under this model, the LSL benefits are prefunded, 
so the employee is (theoretically) protected against 
the risk that the employer will become insolvent. 
Assuming that the employer pays contributions 
on a quarterly basis, the employee’s losses would 
be limited to approximately three months of LSL 
contributions.
In practice, of course, this will depend on the 
efficacy of compliance enforcement. In the 
superannuation system, many employers fail to pay 
their contributions on time and in full. Employers 
who are experiencing financial difficulties are 
particularly prone to delay payment of compulsory 
superannuation contributions for many months 
and even years. Employees often suffer substantial 
losses when employers become insolvent.119 
It seems likely that similar problems will affect  
LSL contributions. 
The Fair Entitlements Guarantee Act 2012 (FEGA) 
currently provides protection for employees’ LSL 
entitlements in the event of employer insolvency. 
Under this model, we would expect that FEGA’s 
annual costs would be lower (hence reducing the 
impost on Australian taxpayers, who ultimately 
provide the funding for FEGA). However, FEGA 
would presumably still cover any unpaid LSL 
contributions and lost interest earnings on those 
contributions. This would require an amendment to 
the FEGA legislation.
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6. PRudential ManageMent and 
Solvency
At present, superannuation can be provided by 
regulated superannuation funds (under a trust 
structure) or by authorised financial institutions such 
as banks and building societies (via Retirement 
Savings Accounts). Superannuation funds and 
authorised RSA providers are monitored and 
supervised by the Australian Prudential Supervision 
Authority. Fund members and RSA account holders 
have the added protection of certain government 
guarantee arrangements.120
Similarly, LSL savings accounts could be 
administered by superannuation funds or by 
authorised financial institutions. Financial institutions 
would be required to apply for permission to 
manage these accounts. They would be required 
to meet registration, reporting and corporate 
governance requirements, similar to those imposed 
on the superannuation funds and RSA providers. 
APRA would be responsible for the prudential 
supervision of LSL account-providers. 
7. unclaiMed Money  
and loSt MeMbeRS
As noted previously, the superannuation system 
has experienced some difficulties in relation 
to unclaimed money and lost members. As at 
June 2009, there was almost $13.6 billion held 
in superannuation accounts for lost members. 
The Super System Review recommended that 
the objective should be “to reconnect members 
and their accounts quickly and efficiently and to 
introduce measures that make this less likely to 
occur in future”. A number of new measures have 
been adopted to meet these objectives, e.g. the 
use of Tax File Numbers and improved electronic 
record-keeping with standardised formats.
If the proposed LSL system is integrated with the 
superannuation system, then these same measures 
should be extended to LSL savings accounts, in 
order to minimise the number of lost LSL accounts. 
8. adMiniStRative buRden  
FoR eMPloyeRS
Employers would be expected to pay compulsory 
LSL contributions into the LSL savings account on 
a regular basis. The LSL contributions would be a 
fixed percentage of the employee’s wages or salary.
The employers’ administrative burden could be 
minimised by integrating the LSL system with the 
superannuation system. 
It would take some work to develop consistency 
between the two regimes, e.g.
 Consistent definition of eligible employees;
 Consistent definition of salary for 
superannuation and LSL purposes; and
 Consistent frequency and timing of 
contribution payments.
If this could be achieved, then the employer could 
simply make LSL payments along with compulsory 
superannuation contributions, without a substantial 
additional administrative burden.
In response to the recommendations arising from the 
Super System Review, the superannuation industry 
is currently working to develop a more streamlined, 
efficient “back-office” payments system. 
“	 SuperStream	is	a	package	of	
measures	designed	to	bring	the	
back-office	of	superannuation	
into	the	21st	century.	Its	key	
components	are	the	increased	
use	of	technology,	uniform	
data	standards,	use	of	the	tax	
file	number	as	a	key	identifier	
and	the	straight-through	
processing	of	superannuation	
transactions.”121
SuperStream is expected to reduce the 
administrative burden for employers, as well  
as cutting costs significantly. 
Ideally, any LSL savings account should be 
established with similar administrative  
efficiencies in mind. 
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9. adMiniStRation coStS
The proposed LSL savings accounts would be 
similar to the MySuper accounts, i.e. a low cost,  
low risk product without any “bells and whistles”. 
The LSL savings accounts will have a single 
diversified investment strategy; no entry fees;  
no commissions or fees for advice; and streamlined 
reporting to members. 
Therefore the estimated costs for the MySuper 
product should give a rough guide to the costs of 
the LSL savings accounts. Deloitte provided an 
estimate of the expected costs of the MySuper 
product for the Super System Review. Costs were 
divided into two categories:
 Operating costs expressed as dollars 
per member; and
 Investment management costs expressed 
as a percentage of assets.
Deloitte found that economies of scale had  
a strong influence on operating costs. For  
a large fund (more than 800,000 members) 
the operating costs were estimated at $74 per 
member per annum; but for a small fund, the 
operating costs were estimated to be $262 per 
member per annum.
The investment costs will depend on the 
investment strategy: e.g. passive or active funds 
management, conservative or balanced asset 
allocation. An active investment management for 
a conservative asset allocation was expected to 
incur costs of between 20 basis points (for a very 
large fund with assets of $20 billion or more) up 
to 47 basis points (for a small fund with less than 
$100 million in assets).
Note that there are some significant differences 
between LSL savings accounts and 
superannuation funds, which will affect costs. In 
particular, LSL savings accounts will have much 
lower balances than superannuation accounts, 
on average. Therefore the Deloitte report on 
the MySuper product cannot be relied upon to 
estimate the costs of the LSL savings accounts. 
The proposed LSL savings accounts might also 
be compared to Retirement Savings Accounts 
(RSAs). RSAs were designed to be low-risk (capital 
guaranteed) accounts suitable for people with 
low balances. The average RSA balance is about 
$10,000. According to Rice Warner’s 2008 survey 
of Superannuation Fees, the average RSA expense 
charges were about 2.3% of assets. However, 
RSAs have not been a very popular product, and 
only a few financial institutions provide RSAs (and 
most of these are credit unions). 
If the government decides to adopt this model 
for PLSL, it would be desirable to conduct a 
thorough actuarial review of the expected costs. 
In particular, it would be important to examine any 
possible synergies between the LSL system and 
the superannuation system, which could be used 
to reduce costs.
Minimisation of administration costs will be 
particularly important for part-time workers and 
low paid workers. As an example, suppose that 
the LSL contributon is just 2% of annual wages of 
$20,000, i.e. $400. An annual administration fee of 
say $100 would consume a large proportion of the 
worker’s LSL savings. (Refer to the discussion of 
the Small Accounts Problem in Section 4.2)
10. Stability oF eMPloyeR coStS
This model would require employers to make 
contributions as a fixed percentage of wages and 
salaries. Hence the employer’s LSL costs would be 
quite stable and predictable from year to year.
11. eMPloyeR  
cRoSS-SubSidiSation
This model requires each employer to  
make contributions for its own employees.  
Hence this model does not create any  
substantial cross-subsidies between  
employers and/or industries.
However, note that there might be some small 
amount of cross-subsidisation between accounts  
via administration charges, e.g. if large accounts 
are required to pay higher administration  
fees to provide “member protection” for  
smaller accounts.
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12. Flexibility
The LSL savings account model is quite flexible in 
many respects.
Firstly, it can be extended to cover a wider range 
of workers, e.g. self employed people. Some of 
the established industry-based PLSL funds already 
provide accumulation accounts which provide LSL 
benefits for self employed contractors. 
Secondly, it would allow for variations in benefit 
levels. For example, at present, South Australia 
and the Northern Territory require employers  
to provide 3 months LSL per ten years of service, 
while other States only allow 2 months LSL  
per ten years of service. Under this model, 
employers in South Australia and the Northern 
Territory would simply be required to make 
contributions at a higher rate, reflecting the  
higher level of benefit accruals. 
Overall assessment of Option C:  
The Accumulation Model
The advantages of this model are:
 It is simple to understand;
 Assuming that the administrative 
arrangements can be integrated with the 
superannuation system, the administrative 
burdens for the employer should be 
acceptable;
 Assuming that the LSL savings account is 
designed to be a low cost, no-frills product; 
that the industry can achieve economies of 
scale in providing these products; and that 
there are synergies with superannuation;  
then the administration costs should be  
lower than Option B; 
 The employers cost is stable and predictable;
 It avoids cross subsidies between employers 
and industries; and
 It is flexible.
On the other hand, this model also has some 
disadvantages:
 The legal framework for creating this system 
has not been specified and it might be difficult 
to achieve consensus;
 It would require some additional resources to 
monitor and enforce compliance;
 Accumulation benefits may not provide a 
replacement of income during leave – the risks 
are passed to the employees; and
 As with Options A and B, the system is 
vulnerable to the “small accounts problem”, 
i.e. relatively high administration costs for 
accounts with small balances.
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This section examines the cost of funding a 
defined benefit PLSL fund. The following analysis 
is not intended to recommend a levy rate for 
any specific fund. The levy rate will vary from 
one fund to the next, depending on a number 
of different variables. The following analysis is 
intended to help the reader understand the most 
important influences on the cost of providing 
LSL benefits.122 As a basic principle, over the 
long term, the income received by any fund 
must cover the payments made from the fund 
according to the following formula:
Employer levies PluS investment 
income on assets must be sufficient 
to cover Benefit Payments PluS 
Administration Expenses PluS Tax.
The employer’s levy is the balancing item in this 
equation. Therefore the levy rate will depend on 
the following factors:
 The accrual rate for LSL benefits provided;
 The growth in wages over time (which 
affects the amount of the benefit);
 The investment returns of the fund (net of 
tax on investment income);
 The timing of LSL benefit payments;
 The number of people who exit from the 
fund before qualifying for an LSL benefit 
(which will depend on staff turnover, as well 
as death and disability rates);
 Administration costs; and
 Taxes.
Different funds have different benefit rules, 
investment strategies, wages growth and staff 
turnover rates. Therefore, different LSL funds 
require different levy rates. It is impossible to 
make precise estimates of the levy rate, unless 
the rules of the fund are known and detailed 
demographic information is available about the 
fund’s membership. 
We will estimate the levy rate for a hypothetical 
group of new entrants, i.e. people who are just 
starting work, with no retrospective entitlements 
to LSL benefits for previous service. The levy is 
calculated as a percentage of the employees’ 
ordinary earnings each year, payable monthly.123 
This exercise is designed to estimate the long 
term average expected cost to the employer. In 
a defined benefit scheme, the levy rate is likely to 
fluctuate over time, depending on the experience 
of the scheme. For example, if the fund earns 
higher than expected investment returns, then 
it might be possible to reduce the levy (perhaps 
only temporarily). However, if wage increases are 
higher than expected, then the cost of benefit 
payments will increase and it might be necessary 
to increase the levy. 
Since the levy rate depends on the experience 
of the fund, defined benefit LSL schemes will 
require actuarial reviews at regular intervals, in 
order to assess the adequacy of the levy rate 
and recommend changes in the levy rate if 
necessary. This issue is discussed below under 
the heading Variability in the Levy Rate. 
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5.1 The rate  
of accrual  
of LSL benefits
The levy rate will depend on the benefit 
accrual rate, i.e. the amount of LSL which 
is earned for each year of service.  
We can calculate the annualised accrual 
rate as the number of months leave per 
10 years of service, divided by 10 years, 
divided by 12 months. For example: 
If the fund provides 2 months of LSL 
for 10 years’ service (as with NSW, 
Victoria, WA, Queensland, Tasmania  
and the ACT), then the accrual rate is 
1.67% (2/10 ÷12 = 0.0167);
If the fund provides 3 months of LSL  
for 10 years’ service (as with SA and  
the NT, then the accrual rate is 2.50% 
(3/10 ÷12 = 0.025).
The accrual rate gives us a “first 
approximation” of the levy rate. It is the 
rate which would be payable if we ignored 
the impact of investment income, salary 
growth rates, administration costs, and 
staff turnover (see Box 5.1).
exaMPle a:  
accrual rate 1.67%
Suppose that Mr Smith earns $60,000 per 
annum ($5,000 per month). Suppose that he 
will be entitled to 2 months LSL after 10 years 
(accrual rate 1.67%). His employer contributes 
1.67% of his wages into the LSL fund each 
year, i.e. $1,000 per annum. At the end of 10 
years, the fund holds $10,000. This is just 
enough to cover Mr Smith’s LSL benefit, i.e. it 
provides 2 months’ pay at $5000 per month.
exaMPle b:  
accrual rate 2.50%
Suppose that Ms Doe earns $60,000 per 
annum ($5,000 per month). Suppose that she 
will be entitled to 3 months LSL after 10 years 
(accrual rate 2.5%). Her employer contributes 
2.5% of her wages into the LSL fund each 
year, i.e. $1,500 per annum. At the end of 10 
years, the fund holds $15,000. This is just 
enough to cover Ms Doe’s LSL benefit, i.e. it 
provides 3 months’ pay at $5,000 per month.
BOx 5.1 
levy calculation ignoRing SalaRy 
incReaSeS, inveStMent RetuRnS, 
exPenSeS, and exitS
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5.2  Investment returns 
relative to wage 
increases
In practice, of course, the levy rate is also affected by 
a number of other factors, including wage increases 
and the investment returns on the fund. In a defined 
benefit scheme, the LSL benefit will be calculated 
based on the worker’s wages at the date they take 
leave. The previous examples assumed that the 
worker’s pay remains unchanged throughout their 
career; it would be more realistic to allow for wage 
increases of say 4% per annum. The accrued benefit 
entitlements at the start of the year will increase by 
4% during the year. 
We should also allow for investment returns on fund 
assets. The above examples ignored investment 
income. It would be more realistic to allow for investment 
returns of say 4% per annum. Therefore the assets 
held by the fund at the start of the year will increase by 
4% per annum. In this case, we have assumed that 
assets and liabilities are both growing at the same rate, 
i.e. both are increasing at 4% per annum. Under these 
circumstances, investment income on the assets will 
be enough to pay for almost all of the extra benefit 
payments.124 As a result, it would not be necessary to 
make significant changes in the levy rate.
exaMPle a:  
accrual rate 1.67%
Suppose that Mr Smith earns $60,000 
per annum ($5,000 per month) in the first 
year. He gets a pay rise of 4% at the end 
of each year. By the end of 10 years, his 
pay has increased to $88,815 p.a. ($7,401 
per month). At that time, Mr Smith will be 
entitled to take 2 months leave, and his 
LSL benefit payment would be $14,802. 
The employer’s levies will be invested in 
a fund which earns 4% per annum. If his 
employer contributed 1.67% of his wages 
into the LSL fund, this would not be quite 
enough to cover the expected benefit 
payments. But if the employer contributes 
at a slightly higher rate of 1.71%, then 
at the end of 10 years, the fund will hold 
$14,869. This will be more than enough to 
pay Mr Smith’s LSL benefits.
exaMPle b:  
accrual Rate 2.5%
Suppose that Ms Doe also earns 
$60,000 per annum ($5,000 per month) 
in this first year. She also gets a pay rise 
of 4% at the end of each year. By the 
end of 10 years, her pay has increased 
to $88,815 p.a. ($7,401 per month). 
At that time, Ms Doe will be entitled 
to take 3 months leave, and her LSL 
benefit payment would be $22,203. 
The employer’s levies will be invested 
in a fund which earns 4% per annum. If 
her employer contributed 2.50% of her 
wages into the LSL fund, this would not 
be quite enough to cover the expected 
benefit payments. But if the employer 
contributes at a slightly higher rate of 
2.56%, then at the end of 10 years, 
the fund will hold $22,260. This will be 
more than enough to pay Ms Doe’s LSL 
benefits.
BOx 5.2
allowing FoR SalaRy incReaSeS 
and inveStMent RetuRnS; ignoRing 
exPenSeS and exitS
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In general, if investment returns match wages 
growth rates, then the levy rate would be only 
slightly higher than the benefit accrual rate (ignoring 
other factors such as expenses and exits, which 
are described below). However, past experience 
shows that on average, over the long term, 
investment returns usually exceed wages growth 
rates. If so, then the fund investment income would 
be more than is necessary to cover the increasing 
LSL liabilities. The additional investment income 
could be used to reduce the employer levy. As an 
example, suppose that wages grow at 4% p.a. but 
the fund can earn investment returns of 6% p.a. 
(see Box 5.3).
When actuaries are costing LSL schemes, they 
must make some assumptions about the expected 
investment returns (i% p.a.), relative to the expected 
wages growth (f% p.a.). If the actuary assumes a 
high “gap” between i% and f%, then the estimated 
levy will be lower (other things being equal). The 
examples in Box 5.3 show that the levy rate will 
depend on the rate of investment returns relative 
to the wages growth rate (the difference between 
these two rates is commonly called “the gap”). 
When estimating the levy, the actuary will make an 
assumption about the appropriate “gap”. 
This raises the question: what “gap” assumptions 
are reasonable? There is no simple answer to this 
question. Different assumptions will be needed for 
different industries. Long term prediction of wages 
growth is difficult, because wages growth rates will 
vary from one industry to another and also over time 
(as the economy moves through booms and busts), 
and will depend on bargaining between employers 
and employees. In many industries, wages for 
individuals will also increase over time as a result 
of promotions (e.g. older and more experienced 
workers will have higher pay than workers who have 
relatively less experience).
Long term prediction of investment returns is also 
difficult, because financial markets are inherently 
volatile. Moreover, the expected rate of return will 
depend on the investment strategy adopted by the 
fund managers. Funds which adopt a higher-risk 
strategy might have higher expected long term 
average returns, producing a higher “gap” (but the 
returns are more likely to fluctuate from year to year). 
exaMPle a: 
accrual rate 1.67%
Repeat Example A in Box 5.2 for Mr 
Smith, but assume that investment 
income is 6% instead of 4%. The 
employer contributes at the accrual 
rate, 1.67% per annum. At the end 
of 10 years, the fund holds $15,985, 
compared to the LSL liability of 
$14,802. The fund has built up a surplus 
of assets. If the employer levy had been 
set at just 1.55% instead of 1.71%, this 
would have been enough to pay Mr 
Smith’s full LSL benefit.
exaMPle b:  
accrual rate 2.5%
Repeat Example A in Box 5.2 for Ms 
Doe, but assume that investment 
income is 6% instead of 4%. The 
employer contributes at the accrual 
rate, 2.50% per annum. At the end 
of 10 years, the fund holds $23,929, 
compared to the LSL liability of 
$22,203. The fund has built up a surplus 
of assets. If the employer levy had been 
set at just 2.32% instead of 2.50%, this 
would have been enough to pay Ms 
Doe’s full LSL benefit.
exaMPle c: 
gap of 4% (rather than 2%)
Repeat Example B above (Box 5.3), but 
assume that investment income is 8% 
instead of 6%. Assume the employer 
continues to pay levies of 1.70% per 
annum. At the end of 10 years, the 
fund holds $23,212, compared to the 
LSL liability of $14,802. The fund has 
built up a large surplus of assets. If 
the employer levy had been set at just 
1.41% instead of 1.70%, this would 
have been enough to pay Ms Doe’s full 
LSL benefit.
BOx 5.3 
allowing FoR SalaRy incReaSeS and 
inveStMent RetuRnS with a 2% gaP; 
ignoRing tax, exPenSeS, and exitS
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Actuaries often use stochastic investment models 
to make their “best estimate” of expected long 
term returns for particular investment strategies. 
These models are based on studies of the historical 
performance of different types of assets (e.g. 
shares, property, bonds). However these models 
cannot really predict the future, so there is a great 
deal of uncertainty about both wages growth rates 
and investment returns. Actuaries usually provide 
estimates on a range of different assumptions in 
order to show how the employer levy would be 
affected by changes in the assumptions. These are 
called “sensitivity tests”. Table 5.1 shows the impact 
of different gap assumptions, which demonstrate 
that the higher the gap, the lower the levy rate. 
(Note: At this stage, we are still ignoring the impact 
of expenses and exits.) 
Clearly, it requires some judgement to choose the 
most appropriate financial assumptions for any 
fund. Different assumptions will be suitable for 
different funds. No set of standard assumptions 
will be suitable for all funds, since different funds 
have different investment strategies. Net investment 
returns will also be affected by any taxes which are 
applied to investment returns.125 
As a rough guide to the assumptions which are 
typically used in practice, we can look at actuarial 
assumptions currently used by established PLSL 
schemes in their most recent actuarial reviews. Gap 
assumptions of 2% p.a. to 4% p.a. are common. 
If we adopt assumptions at the more conservative 
end of this range, then the levy rate (ignoring timing 
of payments, withdrawals, and expense) would  
be approximately 
 1.55% of wages to provide benefits with an 
accrual rate of 1.67%;
 2.32% of wages to provide benefits with an 
accrual rate of 2.50%.
However, we still need to adjust for the timing  
of benefit payments, withdrawal surplus,  
and expenses.
accRual Rate wageS gRowth (F)
inveStMent 
RetuRnS (i) gaP (i - F)
levy 
RequiRed 
2 months per  
10 years’ service
4% 4% 0% 1.71%
Accrual rate 1.67% 5% 1% 1.63%
6% 2% 1.55%
7% 3% 1.48%
8% 4% 1.41%
3 months per  
10 years’ service
4% 4% 0% 2.56%
Accrual rate 2.50% 5% 1% 2.44%
6% 2% 2.32%
7% 3% 2.22%
8% 4% 2.11%
tABLe 5.1 
levy RateS RequiRed to addReSS the wageS gRowth/inveStMent RetuRnS gaP
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5.3  Length of time until 
payment of benefits
The levy rate will be also affected by the timing of 
LSL payments. In the above examples, we have 
assumed that the worker takes their LSL after 10 
years’ service.126 In reality, they might take their 
accrued benefit at an earlier date or at a later date, 
which will affect the employer’s costs. If workers 
take their benefits at an earlier date, the cost will 
increase. If workers delay taking their benefit, then 
the cost will be reduced. 
The timing of payments has an impact on 
investment income. If the worker takes their 
benefits at the end of 10 years, the fund can earn 
investment income on its assets for 10 years. If the 
worker delays taking their LSL, the money remains 
invested for a longer period, and the fund earns 
additional investment income, which will naturally 
have a beneficial impact on the fund’s financial 
position. The example in Box 5.4 shows that the 
fund will make a profit if the worker defers their 
leave (this assumes that the fund’s investment 
returns exceed the increase in wage rates, i.e. there 
is a positive “gap”). 
Conversely, fund rules which allow early payment of 
benefits would normally have a negative impact and 
would be likely to increase the cost of the scheme. 
In order to estimate the cost of the LSL benefits, we 
would need to analyse the timing of LSL payments. 
There are many factors which affect the timing of 
LSL payments.
 Fund rules regarding qualifying period 
for taking LSL in service: Different funds 
have different qualifying periods for taking 
LSL. Some funds allow workers to take LSL 
after completing 5 years service, some require 
7 years, and some require 10 years. Others 
allow early payment subject to the permission 
of the employer.
 Fund rules for early payments: Most LSL 
schemes allow pro rata payment of benefits 
prior to completion of the qualifying period, 
under certain circumstances, e.g. when the 
Suppose that Mr Smith has now 
completed 10 years’ service. He is 
entitled to a benefit of $14,802. We will 
assume that fund has assets of exactly 
$14,802 available to pay his benefit. If 
Mr Smith takes his LSL immediately, he 
will receive $14,802 and the fund will 
have $0 left over.
Now suppose that Mr Smith decides 
to wait a year to take his LSL. At that 
time he decides to take 2 months leave. 
Since he has received a pay rise of 
4% during the year, the fund must pay 
a benefit of $15,395 (=14,802*1.04). 
However, the fund will earn 6% 
interest on its assets during the year. 
By the end of the year, the fund will 
have $15,690 (=$14,802*1.06). After 
paying out Smith’s LSL benefit, the 
fund will have $295 left over as surplus 
($15,690-$15,395 = 295). This surplus 
money could be used to reduce the 
employer’s levy.
worker permanently leaves the workforce  
(or leaves the specified industry), dies, 
becomes disabled, or retires after reaching 
retirement age.
 LSL patterns: Based on the data from the 
established PLSL schemes, it is clear that 
many workers do not take their LSL as soon 
as they are entitled to do so and even defer 
taking LSL until they retire.
 Fund rules for payments while working: 
Some LSL schemes might allow a worker to 
apply for a LSL benefit payment, even though 
they do not actually take LSL. This practice 
is known as “cashing out” and is very likely 
to bring forward benefit payments, which 
imposes a higher cost on the fund (compared 
to funds which do not allow cashing out).
BOx 5.4 
allowing FoR SalaRy incReaSeS  
and inveStMent RetuRnS and  
tiMing oF PayMentS; ignoRing 
exPenSeS and exitS
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An understanding of historical payment patterns 
would enable us to make a better estimate of 
the costs of any LSL schemes. Unfortunately, at 
present there is relatively little data available on the 
timing of LSL payments. The actuarial reports on 
the long-established industry-based PLSL schemes 
contain some data on payment patterns. However, 
there is no reason to assume that this data would 
be a reliable guide to payment patterns in  
other industries.
The introduction of a national PLSL scheme would 
probably affect payment patterns. At present, 
many workers receive their LSL benefits when 
they change jobs. A national scheme would 
enable workers to roll over their LSL entitlement 
to their next employer, instead of taking a cash 
payment at resignation, which might lead to a delay 
in payments. On the other hand, if workers are 
allowed to take their cash payment on resignation, 
many workers will prefer to use their LSL benefit 
as a de facto redundancy payment, to cover living 
expenses during the transition between jobs.
LSL payment patterns vary over time, in line with 
economic conditions. There is a higher rate of LSL 
payouts during downturns in a particular industry 
because people would tend to take their benefits 
at an earlier date. For example, the construction 
industry LSL funds experienced an increase in 
claims after the GFC caused a slowdown in the 
construction industry. The scenarios in Box 5.5 can 
help us to understand the financial impact of LSL 
payment patterns.
In practice, of course, any fund will have a range 
of workers of different ages and different working 
patterns – so the cost would lie somewhere 
between the two extreme scenarios presented. 
The results would also be affected by any changes 
in the financial assumptions (i.e. the gap between 
wages growth and investment returns).
Given the lack of data on payment patterns, it 
would be more prudent to calculate levy rates on 
the assumption that workers take their LSL benefits 
as soon as they are entitled to do so. If subsequent 
experience shows that workers tend to defer 
payment, then the rates can be revised later. The 
rates given in Boxes 5.2 and 5.3 were calculated 
assuming that people work for 10 years, on 
average, before taking LSL benefits, and then take 
further LSL benefits at 10-year intervals. Funds that 
allow “cashing out” of LSL benefits would probably 
need a slightly higher rate, whereas funds which do 
not allow cashing out would be able to reduce their 
levy rate
Mr Smith and Ms Doe are both young 
people, just about to start work. They 
both will remain in the workforce for the 
next 35 years. They will accrue LSL at 
the rate of 2 months of LSL for each 10 
years of service and continue to accrue 
service while on leave. Their salaries will 
increase at 4% per annum and the LSL 
fund will earn investment returns of 6% 
per annum. 
Mr Smith takes his LSL as soon as he is 
entitled to do so. His fund has generous 
rules, so he takes one month of leave 
every 5 years. Ms Doe never takes long 
service until she retires after 34.5 years 
of service, at which point she takes 7 
months of accrued LSL. The annual levy 
needed to fund Mr Smith’s benefit is 
1.62%. The annual levy needed to fund 
Ms Doe’s benefit is 1.18%.
BOx 5.5 
iMPact oF lSl PayMent tiMing
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5.4  Exits: Number of people 
who exit from the fund 
before qualifying for  
an LSL benefit
The cost of any LSL scheme will also depend on the 
proportion of workers who exit from the fund before 
qualifying for a benefit. Suppose that employers have 
been making contributions for a group of employees, 
and the fund has built up enough assets to pay LSL 
benefits for all the employees. If one of the employees 
resigns before qualifying for a LSL benefit, then the 
money which had been set aside for their benefit 
is now available to pay benefits for other workers. 
Therefore the employers’ levy can be reduced.
The amount of money released when an employee 
exits without receiving any benefits is often called 
a “withdrawal surplus”. If the actuaries can make a 
reasonably reliable estimate of the number and timing 
of such exits, then they can take credit for these 
savings in advance. The levy rate can be reduced 
now, in the expectation of future withdrawal surpluses. 
The amount of withdrawal surplus will depend on the 
portability rules of the LSL fund. For example:
 Non-portable LSL – If LSL are not portable, 
employees lose their entitlements if they leave 
their job prior to completing the qualifying period. 
Employers with high levels of staff turnover will 
benefit from large withdrawal surpluses.
 Portable within an industry – If LSL benefits 
are portable within an industry, employees lose 
their entitlements if they leave the industry prior 
to completion of the qualifying period, and/
or if they are deregistered after taking a long 
break from working in the industry. If people 
tend to leave the industry after short periods of 
service, then industry-based funds will benefit 
from withdrawal surpluses.
 Portable across industries – If LSL benefits 
are completely portable across industries, 
without risk of deregistration under any 
circumstances, then employees will always 
retain their entitlements. There will be no 
withdrawal surplus.
5.4.1. Non-portable LSL
At present, only a few industries provide PLSL 
benefits (e.g. coal mining, construction, contract 
cleaning). If LSL benefits are not portable, then 
employees will generally only be eligible for LSL 
benefits if they remain with the same employer 
for several years.127 The rules vary: some States 
provide pro rata LSL benefits to people who leave 
after 5 years’ service, while others provide pro rata 
benefits after 7 years’ service.128 As discussed in 
Section 2, only 25% of employees have remained 
with the same employer for 10 years or more, and 
44% have been employed by the same employer 
for at least 5 years. For industries with high staff 
turnover rates (e.g. retail, accommodation and food 
services), non-portable LSL arrangements will allow 
substantial reductions in LSL costs for employers, 
because only a small proportion of workers would 
remain with one employer long enough to qualify for 
LSL benefits. 
5.4.2. PLSL within industry
The established industry-based PLSL schemes 
allow workers to retain their entitlements when 
they change jobs, as long as they remain within 
the same industry. For example, a construction 
worker who works on several different construction 
projects, for different employers, will continue to 
accrue LSL entitlements. However, if the worker 
leaves the industry before completing the qualifying 
period, they will lose their entitlements.
In practice, workers will often have discontinuous 
periods of employment: a worker might be out of 
work for several months between jobs. The worker 
will retain their accrued LSL entitlements during 
these break periods, but if the break is too long, 
then the LSL fund will assume that the worker has 
left the industry. If the worker has not completed 
the qualifying period (i.e. the worker has no vested 
benefits), then they will be deregistered and will lose 
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their accrued LSL entitlements. Most of the industry 
funds allow a break of up to 4 years, although the 
coal mining fund allows breaks of up to 8 years.
Whenever a worker is deregistered, the LSL fund 
will benefit financially, i.e. there will be a withdrawal 
surplus. This surplus can be used to reduce 
the employer levy. The annual reports of the 
construction industry LSL funds indicate that there 
are a large number of deregistrations each year. We 
would expect the rates of deregistration to be even 
higher in industries which have higher staff turnover 
(e.g. contract cleaning and community services). 
When the Victorian government was considering 
the introduction of a portable industry scheme for 
community care workers, the actuarial costings 
were based on assumptions of withdrawal rates 
between 5% and 12% per annum.129 At present, 
there is little published data on exit rates for other 
industries. However, data from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics indicates that many workers do 
switch industries when they change jobs. Of the 1.2 
million workers in 2012 who had changed employer 
or business during the previous 12 months, 57% of 
these had changed from one industry to another.130 
Once again, these rates vary across different 
industry groups (see Figure 5.1).
The amount of withdrawal surplus for any industry-
based fund would depend on the rates of exit from 
the industry. Some industry-based LSL funds would 
have high levels of deregistration and would be able 
to reduce levy rates accordingly. LSL funds in other 
industries would have more stable membership and 
would not benefit from large withdrawal surpluses. 
In order to estimate the amount of withdrawal 
surplus for any industry scheme, it would be 
necessary to collect and analyse more data about 
job mobility patterns.131
Figure 5.1
PeRcentage oF woRkeRS who change induStRy in one yeaR, by induStRy  
(abS labouR Mobility data 2012)
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5.4.3. PLSL across industries
If portability of LSL entitlements was allowed across 
industries, workers would not be deregistered as 
a result of switching from one industry to another. 
Therefore funds would not benefit from withdrawal 
surplus when workers switched jobs. When 
designing this scheme, it would be necessary 
to consider the position of people who leave the 
workforce completely. Suppose that a worker works 
for a few years, in a variety of jobs, and then leaves 
the Australian workforce for several years (e.g. 
due to family responsibilities or working overseas). 
Should they forfeit their accrued LSL entitlements 
after a specified period? For reasons described 
previously, this rule would be difficult to implement. 
If the rules allow the worker to retain their benefit 
entitlements under all circumstances (even while 
out of the workforce), then there will not be any 
withdrawal surplus. 
5.5 Administration 
expenses
The employer’s levy will also need to cover the LSL 
fund’s administration expenses. We can use the 
established industry-based schemes to provide a 
benchmark for administration costs. 
As noted previously, administration costs will 
vary between funds, depending on a range of 
factors: the length of time the fund has been in 
operation; the number of registered employees; 
the proportion of active and inactive registered 
employees; the number of employers; the 
average size of the levy per member; the method 
of collection of the levies; the number of LSL 
benefit claims made; the turnover of employees 
and employers; and the amount of assets under 
management. 
Each of the established PLSL funds has a regular 
actuarial review, which includes an assessment 
of administration expenses. The actuarial reviews 
for the construction industry funds typically allow 
for administration costs between 0.1% and 0.3% 
of the worker’s wages. However, smaller funds 
may have higher per-capita administration costs. 
A 2007 study of the established industry-based 
PLSL schemes found that there were economies 
of scale in administration costs.
“	 In	general,	the	larger	the	
scheme,	the	lower	the	cost	per	
worker.	For	small	schemes	
(less	than	10,000	active	
workers),	management	and	
administration	costs	are	about	
$150	per	worker.	For	schemes	
with	between	10,000	and	
20,000	workers,	these	costs	
are	between	$40	and	$60	per	
worker.	For	schemes	with	
more	than	20,000	workers,	
these	costs	are	about	$40	per	
worker	(reducing	to	about	
$25	per	worker	for	a	very	
large	scheme).”	132
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Suppose that employer A has 10 full-
time employees earning $50,000 each 
(total wages $500,000). Employer B 
has 20 part-time employees earning 
$25,000 each (total wages $500,000). 
The LSL fund has administration 
expenses of $1000. If the fund covers 
administration costs by charging 
0.1% of wages, then both employers 
will pay $500 per annum towards 
these expenses. If the fund covers 
administration costs by charging a fee 
per person, then Employer A will only 
pay $333 and Employer B will pay $667.
BOx 5.6
allocation oF adMiniStRation coStS
The smaller industry-based funds attempt to 
reduce overheads by sharing resources with the 
larger funds, e.g. the contract cleaners fund in 
Queensland contracts out its administration to the 
construction industry fund; the ACT has set up 
one statutory authority to administer all four of its 
industry-based funds.
It would be desirable to obtain actuarial advice 
in order to determine the fairest method of 
charging for administration costs. For example, 
the administration costs might be charged as a 
percentage of employer wages or a flat annual 
charge per employee. A flat fee per employee would 
tend to increase costs for those employers who 
employ a lot of part-time and casual workers, but 
this might be a fairer reflection of the costs incurred 
by the fund (see Box 5.6 for an illustration). 
Administration costs will also reflect the quality 
of services provided. For example, many of the 
established industry-based funds employ staff to 
train employers about their obligations; to inform 
employees about their entitlements, to inspect 
workplace records, and to take legal action against 
recalcitrant employers. Although these services may 
increase expenses in the short term, they also help 
to protect the funds’ revenue stream: otherwise, 
poor compliance might lead to a reduction in 
income.
The design of the LSL benefits will affect the 
administration costs. If the benefit rules are 
complex, if the rules are ambiguous, or if the 
system requires multiple transfers of money 
between different entities, then the administration 
costs will inevitably increase. 
These figures represent the ongoing annual costs 
for an established fund. A new fund would also 
need additional funding to cover establishment 
costs, which may be quite substantial. For example, 
the feasibility study for the Victorian community 
sector fund estimated that the establishment costs 
would be between $500,000 and $1,000,000.133
5.6  Taxes
The established industry-based PLSL schemes are 
not required to pay tax on their levy income or on 
their investment income. 
We have not allowed for tax in our estimate of the 
cost of LSL benefits. If PLSL funds are required to 
pay tax, then it would be necessary to increase the 
levy rates to cover these tax payments. 
The employer’s costs will also be affected by 
the availability of tax deductions for the payment 
of levies into the fund, and this is considered in 
Section 6. 
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5.7  Overview of levy costs
The cost of LSL benefits will depend on the level 
of benefits provided, the fund’s investment returns 
relative to wages growth, the timing of benefit 
payments, the amount of withdrawal surplus, and the 
administration costs. We have estimated the long term 
average levy rate based on the following assumptions:
 The fund can earn investment returns which 
exceed the rate of wages growth by 2% p.a.;
 Benefits are paid to an employee after every 
10 years of service, on average;
 There is no significant amount of withdrawal 
surplus;
 Ongoing administration costs are between 
0.1% and 0.3% of workers’ wages;
 Establishment expenses are not included; and
 Funds do not have to pay tax.
Under these assumptions:
 A fund which provides 2 months LSL after 
10 years of service would require a levy rate 
between 1.6% and 1.9% of worker’s wages; and
 A fund which provides 3 months LSL after 
10 years of service would require a levy rate 
between 2.4% and 2.7% of workers’ wages.
These figures are purely indicative. They should not 
be relied upon as a guide to the levy rate required 
for any specific fund. In order to estimate the costs 
for any specific fund, a full actuarial review should be 
conducted, taking account of the rules of the fund 
and the demographics of the fund membership. 
5.8  Defined Benefit Funds: 
Variability in the  
levy rate
We have estimated the long term average levy 
rate which would be needed to fund LSL benefits. 
However, in a defined benefit fund, levy rates might 
vary widely over time, in response to experience. In our 
calculations, we assumed that wage increases would 
be 4% per annum and investment returns would be 
6% per annum. In practice, of course, both wage rates 
and investment returns can be volatile. To illustrate 
this volatility, Figure 5.2 shows the wage growth rates 
and investment returns from one of the construction 
industry LSL funds (see Box 5.7 for more details).134 
The average “gap” was 1.6% over a 20-year period, 
which was quite consistent with the actuary’s valuation 
assumptions. But the annual “gap” varied from +17.5% 
(in 1997) down to -22.6% (in 2008).
Figure 5.2 
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The other construction industry funds also 
experienced wide fluctuations in wages growth 
and investment returns. As a result, the levy rates 
in all of these funds have varied quite widely over 
the years. At times, the funds had large surpluses 
and the levy rate was reduced (even down to 0% in 
some funds); at other times, the funds experienced 
large deficits and the levy rate was increased 
sharply. Each fund’s administrators must devise 
a risk management plan for dealing with these 
fluctuations in experience:
 The fund administrators might adopt a 
conservative investment policy, investing in 
less volatile asset classes. However, we would 
expect that this would produce lower long 
term average investment returns, so a higher 
long term average levy would be necessary to 
fund the benefits;135
 The fund administrators can adjust the levy 
rate each year, with the intention of eliminating 
surpluses or deficits over a fairly short period 
(say 5 years). This may well create business-
planning difficulties for the employers who are 
paying the levy;
 The fund administrators can maintain a stable 
levy rate, allowing the fund to build up large 
surpluses or deficits which may last for several 
years. However, the existence of a large deficit 
might create concerns about the security of 
workers’ entitlements;136 or
 The fund might aim to build up a surplus of 
assets in the early years, in order to provide 
a buffer against future adverse experience. 
This may be done by charging an initial levy 
rate which is higher than the estimated long 
term average rate and/or by retaining any 
investment surplus arising from better-than-
expected investment performance. Some of 
the PLSL funds have set funding targets of 
110% or 120% of liabilities in order to provide 
such a buffer. 
The volatility of the levy rate will also be affected by any 
changes in the benefit entitlement rules. Theoretically, 
in a defined benefit fund, worker’s benefit entitlements 
should not be affected by adverse investment 
returns, because the employers bear the investment 
risk. In practice, however, employers may resist levy 
increases. In the past, some PLSL funds responded 
to investment losses by changing benefit entitlements, 
e.g. increasing benefits when the fund has a surplus 
and cutting benefits when the fund has a deficit. This 
means that the workers bear some of the investment 
risk. (By comparison, in an accumulation fund, 
workers bear all of the investment risk.) Although the 
above-mentioned measures may help to smooth out 
levy rates over time, it is impossible to eliminate all 
fluctuations. The levy rate will reflect the experience of 
the fund. 
Volatility in the levy rate is also more difficult to 
manage when a fund’s revenue base is cyclical 
or declining. Suppose that a particular industry 
is booming, and a large number of workers 
accumulate LSL benefits. Suppose that the fund 
then suffers large investment losses, creating a 
large deficit. If the industry is stable, then these 
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losses can be spread across a large number of 
employers, i.e. the levy rate would increase by a 
relatively small amount. But what if the industry 
is facing profitability problems, and the number 
of employers in the industry declines? A smaller 
number of employers must pay higher levies in 
order to cover the fund’s deficit.
Clearly, in a defined benefit system, employers bear 
the risk of volatility in levy rates. Many employers are 
unwilling to accept such risks. In the superannuation 
industry, employers have demonstrated a strong 
preference for accumulation benefits. The number of 
defined benefit superannuation funds has declined 
steadily over the last 20 years.137The trend towards 
accumulation benefits has been particularly strong 
amongst smaller employers.
5.9 Accumulation funds: 
Risks to employees
We have estimated the long term average costs  
for defined benefit funds. How would the costs  
be affected if PLSL is provided by means of  
an accumulation fund? In an accumulation fund, 
the workers will bear the investment risk. If there 
are poor investment returns, then the workers’ 
accounts may not provide enough money  
to provide a replacement income during  
periods of LSL. 
As a result, it might be preferable to adopt a low-
risk investment strategy. Since low-risk investments 
are expected to produce lower long-term returns, 
it would be sensible to use a lower long-term “gap” 
to calculate the cost of providing LSL benefits. 
If we assume that the long term investment 
returns are roughly equal to long term increases 
in remuneration (i.e. a 0% gap), then the required 
contribution rates would increase slightly – e.g. 
under these assumptions:
 A fund which provides 2 months LSL after 
10 years of service would require a levy rate 
between 1.8% and 2.1% of worker’s wages; and
 A fund which provides 3 months LSL after 10 
years of service.
Prior to 2007, there was a boom in the 
Queensland Building and Construction 
Industry. In 2007, the actuary pointed out 
that the boom was causing a build-up of 
LSL liabilities:
 Wages rates had increased 
significantly;
 More and more people were working in 
the construction industry (new members 
were registering with the LSL fund); and
 Workers were remaining in the industry 
for longer periods, hence more people 
were becoming eligible for benefits.
Those who were eligible to take LSL were 
too busy to take leave, so they delayed 
taking up their entitlements.
During the GFC, the LSL fund suffered 
investment losses which created a $57 
million deficit in the fund. By 30 June 2008, 
the ratio of assets to liabilities ratio was 
just 83%. At the same time, there was a 
downturn in the construction industry. In 
2009, the actuary determined that a levy 
increase was necessary. 
“The Actuary’s projections found that, at 
the current levy rate (0.2% of construction 
costs), the Scheme is unlikely to attain a 
sound financial position within the next 
ten years, “unless there is a confluence 
of a number of favourable factors. Should 
the levy rate not be raised, the Scheme 
will have continuously unfunded liabilities, 
being unable to meet its liability to pay 
long service leave benefits to workers in 
the building and construction industry in 
Queensland, and thus being unable to fulfil 
the function for which it was established. 
Having a continued period of unfunded 
liabilities could result in the dissolution of 
the Scheme.”
In accordance with these recommendations, 
the levy rate was increased from 0.2% to 
0.3% of construction costs. 
BOx 5.7 
queenSland conStRuction induStRy138
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Currently employers, required to prepare accounts, 
recognise a liability to pay LSL to employees over 
an employee’s period of service and then claim 
that liability as an expense in the accounts each 
reporting period. However for income tax purposes 
no deduction is available in accordance with section 
26-10 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
(‘ITAA1997’) until the LSL benefit is actually paid 
out to the employee or until the employer makes 
a leave transfer payment. As a result there is often 
a mismatch between the liability recognised by 
the employer in the accounts and the amount 
actually claimed as an income tax deduction in any 
particular reporting period. 
By way of comparison where an employer makes 
a LSL contribution to a worker entitlement fund,139 
under an industrial instrument, the contribution 
is treated by the employer as an expense in the 
accounts and is also eligible for an income tax 
deduction in accordance with section 8-1 of the 
ITAA1997.140 Section 26-10 of the ITAA 1997 
does not apply in this instance as the contribution 
paid to the fund is ‘not an outgoing for leave’. To 
be eligible for a deduction under section 8-1 the 
contributions to a worker entitlement fund must be 
non-refundable and made directly to actual member 
accounts. 
A nationally consistent PLSL scheme (‘the scheme’) 
in which employers pay a levy into the scheme 
to cover the estimated cost of LSL liabilities and 
employees are paid their LSL entitlements out of 
the scheme would ensure that the amount provided 
for LSL in a particular year is tax deductible in that 
year. The availability of an income tax deduction 
for a levy paid to the scheme is supported by 
the ATO’s approach to worker entitlement funds 
as it is envisaged that the scheme would have 
similar characteristics. The Commonwealth 
Government could legislate to make the position 
clear in this respect. In addition, because the 
LSL is actually paid directly to the member of the 
scheme, employers would not have to include 
these payments in their workers compensation 
calculations.
Another tax issue that needs to be considered 
relates to the question of whether a levy paid by 
an employer to the scheme would constitute the 
provision of a fringe benefit and be subject to 
fringe benefits tax at a flat 46.5%. Section 59PA 
of the Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 
provides that a contribution by an employer to an 
‘approved worker entitlement fund’141 on behalf of 
its employees and in accordance with an industrial 
instrument will be an exempt benefit. Accordingly 
it could be argued that an exemption from fringe 
benefits tax should apply to the scheme on the 
same basis as the current exemption for approved 
worker entitlement funds. If an employer levy paid 
to a scheme is treated as an exempt benefit for FBT 
purposes then it would also be excluded from a 
liability to State payroll tax. 
The treatment of existing worker entitlement funds 
in relation to the Superannuation Guarantee Charge 
could also be applied to the proposed scheme. 
Interpretative decision ATO ID 2005/33 states that 
in the ATO’s view neither the worker entitlement 
Tax implications 
& advantages for 
employers of a 
nationally consistent 
PLSL scheme
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fund or the employer have an obligation to make 
superannuation contributions in accordance with 
the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) 
Act 1992 (‘SGAA”) on LSL payments made to an 
individual from the fund.
A number of worker entitlement funds have received 
class rulings from the ATO confirming that a 
payment of LSL from the worker entitlement fund 
to an employee will receive the same tax treatment 
as if it had been paid directly by the employer. In 
addition contributions by the employer to the worker 
entitlement fund are not assessable to the fund.142 
Along the lines of the current tax treatment of worker 
entitlement funds a nationally consistent PLSL 
scheme, if structured appropriately, would provide 
an upfront income tax deduction in respect of an 
employer’s liability to pay LSL as well as payroll tax 
and workers compensation payment savings.
Further tax incentives could be explored to 
neutralise any increased costs for small employers. 
These could include the following:
 company tax reductions linked with the cost of 
a levy; and/or 
 a refundable tax offset for a significant 
proportion of the levy payments an employer 
would be liable for, equivalent to a deduction 
of 120%. This mechanism would adopt 
the model used for the Research and 
Development tax incentive (offset).
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This report responds to a need recognised in the 
Fair Work Review for streamlining and consolidating 
a uniform and minimum LSL standard as part of 
the National Employment Standards. The report 
investigates the available means for achieving this 
end in a way that is equitable for all workers. It also 
identifies both the wider benefits for employers, 
government and the community, and ways of 
minimising the cost burdens on employers.
LSL is a well-established employee entitlement in 
Australia, with origins in the 19th century. Since 
then the entitlement has continuously evolved to 
extend benefits to a wider range of employees, 
reduce the qualifying and vesting periods, and 
increase the amount of leave granted. This has 
occurred through State legislation, the award 
system and some collective agreements. This 
report presents a case for the continued evolution 
and expansion of coverage as part of the National 
Employment Standards and through supportive 
legislation by government.
LSL has become well established in Australia 
because of a high degree of community consensus 
regarding its benefits. Traditionally one of the 
primary rationales for LSL is to enable employees 
partway through their working life to recover their 
energies and return to work renewed, refreshed and 
reinvigorated, which positively impacts on employee 
health and well-being and potentially improves 
effectiveness at work, and hence productivity.
This objective has become increasingly important 
in Australia because workers are spending longer 
proportions of their lifetimes in employment. 
A related trend is that growing numbers of workers 
are remaining in the workforce at older ages, and 
public policy has sought to encourage this trend in 
regard to superannuation, tax, and old age pension 
eligibility. 
This trend for longer lifetimes in employment 
means that it is becoming more important than 
ever before for employees to have a sustained 
period of recovery and renewal from work midway 
through their working life. However, this trend is on 
a collision course with another major trend in the 
labour force: mobility.
Australian workers are highly mobile between 
employers as a result of changing career patterns, 
rapidly shifting sectoral labour demand, and the 
demand for workplace flexibility that has resulted 
in a significant increase in casual and part-time 
employment. Almost one in five workers have been 
employed by their current employer for less than 
one year. 
Labour mobility has many positive effects. It allows 
labour to move between different sectors as 
structural economic shifts occur with corresponding 
changes in sectoral labour demand. It facilitates 
flexibility at the organisational level. Labour mobility 
is also associated with productivity in the economic 
concept of “creative destruction”, whereby 
innovation occurs through new firms displacing 
old.143 In addition, it also allows employees to 
develop varied careers. However, for workers, 
labour mobility is not always a matter of choice: 
37% of those who left their jobs between 2010 and 
2012 did so involuntarily.
Labour mobility has major implications for 
access to LSL because 10 years is the standard 
qualifying period for LSL. Three in four workers 
remain with their employer for less than 10 years, 
including many who have been in the workforce 
for much longer. The low prevalence of long-
term employment relationships limits access to 
LSL entitlements to a fraction of the Australian 
workforce. 
Conclusion & 
Recommendations
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This lack of accessibility is also highly gendered. 
Women are far more likely than men to be in 
casual or part-time employment, and therefore are 
less likely to be employed with one employer for 
10 years or more. Women are therefore less likely 
to be able to access LSL.
In response to this situation PLSL schemes have 
emerged for a limited number of occupations. 
These schemes are widely available to public 
sector workers in all Australian jurisdictions. In 
the private sector PLSL first became available 
through awards in the coal mining industry from 
1949. Other instances have occurred at a State or 
Territory level, in building and construction from the 
1970s, in contract cleaning from 1999, and, in the 
ACT, in the highly casualised community services 
and security industries.
The reviews of established PLSL schemes 
and stakeholder representatives of employers, 
employees, and administrators involved in their 
management generally present a positive view of 
these schemes. In particular, they generally see 
the advantages of PLSL as outweighing its costs. 
A number of interviewees (including employer 
representatives) said that PLSL allows workers 
to receive their LSL entitlements, and that the 
levy system is an effective way of collecting funds 
without imposing an administrative burden on 
employers. They also identified advantages in 
relation to employee attraction and retention, 
improved health and safety outcomes, greater 
mobility and flexibility, productivity, reduction of 
non-compliance problems because employers pay 
for entitlements as they accrue, reduction of free-
riding amongst employers because all are obliged 
to fund LSL entitlements, greater cost certainty, 
and tax benefits. However, some interviewees said 
that the obligation to make LSL payments into 
industry funds effectively imposes an additional 
cost burden on employers operating in industries 
where the profit margins are typically very small.
There are a number of extra benefits of PLSL 
schemes. A considerable body of research 
indicates the importance of leave generally for 
employee health, well-being and work/life balance. 
Long hours without significant leave periods has 
been associated with stress-related illness, which 
can also represent a cost for employers through 
higher levels of claims for workplace accidents, 
illness and mental health issues. Regular leave 
has also been associated with greater employee 
motivation and productivity.
Wider benefits still could be expected if PLSL was 
extended to employees as a whole. European 
experience suggests that the tourism and 
hospitality sectors may benefit from extended 
leave provisions. The Commonwealth government, 
and taxpayers, would save a substantial and 
growing financial outlay for the LSL component 
of the Fair Entitlements Guarantee in the case of 
business insolvencies. PLSL funds would also 
benefit the economy generally by contributing 
substantially to national saving and investment, 
in the same way that superannuation funds have 
contributed.
Building on the experience from existing PLSL 
schemes, and with the superannuation industry, 
we investigated how PLSL might be designed to 
cover all employees. There are three aspects to 
this task. 
First, the Constitutional power of the 
Commonwealth to establish PLSL funds with 
compulsory employer levies may be challenged by 
the States. Commonwealth powers in the sphere 
of leave and industrial relations generally have 
grown in recent times, particularly through the 
corporations power. An alternative approach would 
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be to develop cooperative arrangements with the 
States whilst the Commonwealth institutes model 
legislation; this approach was used for occupational 
health and safety.
Secondly, portability requires full vesting of each 
worker’s LSL entitlements to a pro rata benefit 
whenever they leave service, even after a short 
period of service. Over time, effectively the “vesting 
period” would be reduced to zero. Each employer 
would have a liability to pay a specified amount in 
respect of the LSL entitlements accruing for each 
worker during each worker’s period of employment.
Thirdly, it would be necessary to develop rules 
for the payment of LSL benefits and the transfer 
of leave entitlements. At present, pro rata LSL 
benefits are paid in cash when an employee leaves 
service; and the employee cannot transfer their 
leave entitlements to their next employer. However, 
under a PLSL scheme, a worker might not take 
cash payment when they leave their job. Instead, 
the money set aside to pay their accrued benefits 
would be held in reserve. Questions arise as to 
whether portability should allow the worker to 
choose either alternative, or whether there should 
be restrictions in the payment of cash pro rata 
benefits.
LSL entitlements are usually determined on a 
defined benefit basis. When an employee takes 
leave, they receive a benefit which is equal to the 
number of weeks of LSL taken multiplied by their 
weekly wages at the date the benefit is taken. 
Alternatively, employers might fund LSL payments 
on an accumulation basis. The employer would 
periodically pay contributions, equal to a fixed 
percentage of salary, into an employee’s LSL 
account. The contributions would accumulate 
with interest, less administration fees. When the 
employee takes leave, they would be entitled to 
withdraw money from their account. Under an 
accumulation arrangement, the contribution would 
need to be set at a level expected to provide an 
adequate LSL benefit.
We considered three approaches for designing a 
national uniform approach to PLSL to extend it to all 
workers, including casual and part-time. These are:
 Option A: The Approved Deposit 
Fund (ADF) model similar to those in the 
superannuation industry. These provide for 
employees to receive defined benefit-based 
lump sum entitlements from employers 
when they exit a job, and roll them over into 
an ADF where the money is invested in an 
accumulation-style account until the employee 
is eligible to receive LSL. Employees with a 
number of jobs would have all entitlements 
paid into the one account.
 Option B: The Industry-based Defined 
Benefit Fund Model involving the creation 
of a range of industry-based defined 
benefit funds. There are already more than 
a dozen established industry-based PLSL 
arrangements, however, each of these 
provides only limited portability. Workers only 
accrue LSL benefits while working within the 
industry, and may forfeit their entitlements 
if they cease working in the industry prior 
to completing the vesting period of service. 
Workers who complete the vesting period 
and then leave the industry are usually entitled 
to claim a cash payout. If these schemes 
are extended to provide full portability, then 
presumably the LSL benefit entitlements would 
be transferred to a different industry fund if 
a worker shifted employment to a different 
industry.
 Option C: The Accumulation Model 
would require employers to make regular 
contributions for all eligible employees into 
designated LSL accounts administered by 
superannuation funds and/or authorised 
financial institutions. (The minimum 
contribution would be determined by the 
National Employment Standards.) Account 
funds would be invested on behalf of the 
account holder and investment earnings 
would be credited. Administration fees would 
be deducted. The account-provider would 
be required to maintain records sufficient to 
determine the worker’s eligibility for LSL cash 
payments in the future. The employee would 
be entitled to choose their LSL account-
provider and to transfer their LSL account from 
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one provider to another. This would enable an 
employee to combine LSL payments from two 
or more employers into one account.
We used the following criteria for identifying 
the factors that would allow for the design of a 
nationally consistent PLSL scheme that would 
accommodate the needs of these stakeholders:
 Transitional arrangements;
 Simplicity;
 Adequacy of benefits;
 Compliance;
 Protection in the event of insolvency;
 Prudential management and solvency;
 Payment of benefits (unclaimed money/lost 
members);
 Administrative burden for employers;
 Administration costs;
 Stability of employer costs;
 Employer cross-subsidisation;
 Flexibility.
We found different mixes of advantages and 
disadvantages for each model. These vary between 
employers and employees to some extent. In a 
defined benefit system employers bear the risk 
of volatility in levy rates if a fund’s revenue base 
is cyclical or declining. In an accumulation fund, 
the workers will bear the investment risk. If there 
are poor investment returns, then the workers’ 
accounts may not provide enough money for a 
replacement income during periods of LSL.
Employers will naturally be concerned about the 
additional cost of LSL benefits, therefore we have 
provided cost calculations for typical LSL benefits. 
These illustrate the factors which are likely to affect 
the overall cost, including benefit accrual rates, 
investment returns, wage increases, benefit design, 
workforce mobility, leave taking patterns, and 
administrative arrangements.
It would be necessary to carefully consider the tax 
treatment of PLSL accounts. Established industry-
based PLSL schemes are not required to pay tax 
on levies received or on the investment income 
earned. However, LSL benefits are taxed in the 
hands of recipients when the benefits are ultimately 
paid. The tax treatment of these accounts will, of 
course, affect the costing of LSL benefits. If LSL 
accounts are taxed, then employers will have to pay 
a higher rate of contributions in order to fund the 
same level of benefits. If LSL accounts are given 
favourable tax treatment, the annual contributions 
should not exceed the amount needed to fund 
the accruing LSL entitlements (e.g. fixed as a 
percentage of wages or salary).
There are further tax implications of a positive 
nature for employers. Currently employers required 
to prepare accounts recognise a liability to pay 
LSL to employees over an employee’s period of 
service and then claim that liability as an expense 
in the accounts each reporting period. However, 
for income tax purposes no deduction is available 
until the LSL benefit is actually paid out or until 
the employer makes a leave transfer payment. As 
a result there is often a mismatch between the 
liability recognised by the employer in the accounts 
and the amount actually claimed as an income tax 
deduction in any particular reporting period.
A nationally consistent PLSL scheme would 
ensure that the amount provided for LSL in a 
particular year is tax deductible in that year. 
An income tax deduction for a levy paid to the 
scheme is supported by the ATO’s approach to 
worker entitlement funds as it is envisaged that the 
scheme would have similar characteristics. The 
Commonwealth Government could legislate to 
make the position clear in this respect. In addition, 
because the LSL is paid directly to the member of 
the scheme, employers would not have to include 
these payments in their workers compensation 
calculations.
Another tax issue relates to the question of whether 
a levy paid by an employer would constitute the 
provision of a fringe benefit and be subject to fringe 
benefits tax (FBT) at a flat rate of 46.5%. It could 
be argued that exemption from FBT should apply 
on the same basis as the current exemption for 
approved worker entitlement funds. If an employer 
levy paid to a scheme is treated as an exempt 
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benefit for FBT purposes then it would also be 
excluded from liability to State payroll tax. 
The treatment of existing worker entitlement 
funds in relation to the Superannuation Guarantee 
Charge could also be applied: that neither the 
worker entitlement fund nor the employer have an 
obligation to make superannuation contributions on 
LSL payments made to an individual from the fund.
ATO class rulings have confirmed that a payment of 
LSL from a worker entitlement fund to an employee 
will receive the same tax treatment as if it had 
been paid directly by the employer. In addition, 
contributions by the employer to the worker 
entitlement fund are not assessable as income to 
the fund. A nationally consistent PLSL scheme, if 
structured appropriately, would provide an upfront 
income tax deduction in respect of an employer’s 
liability to pay LSL as well as payroll tax and 
workers compensation payment savings.
Further tax incentives could be explored to minimise 
any increased costs for small employers. These 
could include company tax reductions linked with 
the cost of a levy. 
We conclude that a national uniform system 
of PLSL accessible to all workers would be of 
great benefit; not only to employees, but also for 
employers, government and the community and 
economy generally. This system could build on 
extensive experience from existing PLSL schemes 
and the superannuation system, which provide 
strong viable models. PLSL should be introduced 
as part of a collaborative process between 
stakeholders and all levels of government, with 
supportive tax measures to minimise cost to 
employers and ensure full value of entitlements to 
employees.
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 That the Commonwealth government legislate for a uniform minimum Long Service Leave 
standard as part of the National Employment Standards. 
 That the Commonwealth government find ways to extend coverage of Long Service Leave 
through a portable scheme to include the large proportions of the workforce who are mobile 
between employers as a result of changing career patterns, rapidly shifting sectoral labour 
demand, and the growth of workplace flexibility through casual and part-time employment.
 That the name for this employee benefit be changed to Accrued Employment Leave in 
recognition that it would no longer be tied to service with one employer.
 That the Commonwealth government initiate a consultative process involving State and 
Territory governments and employer and employee representative groups to determine the 
most effective mechanisms for implementing portable long service leave and to broaden the 
level of community support.
 That the Commonwealth government adopt a model for Accrued Leave Funds based on one, 
or a combination of, models successfully employed in the superannuation industry, namely 
Approved Deposit Funds, industry-based Defined Benefit Funds, or Accumulation Funds. 
 That the Commonwealth government consider the ways of minimising extra business costs, 
especially for small and medium sized enterprises, through favourable tax treatment of 
portable long service leave accounts in specified funds, tax offsets linked with the cost of a 
levy in the form of reduced company tax.
 That the stakeholders consider an agreement for a one-off wage offset for the first year of 
an employer levy, to the extent of 1-2% of anticipated wage increases, to assist with the 
transition.
 That existing portable long service leave arrangements in some sectors, whether established 
by State legislation or industrial instruments, be allowed to persist within the new system, at 
least for a transitional period.
Recommendations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
130
McKell Institute The case for a National Portable Long Service Leave Scheme in Australia
Appendices
1.  Examples of 
 Definitions Used in
 Construction Industry
 Schemes.
 
1.1  Victorian Scheme
Rules of the Construction Industry LSL Fund (as at 
7 April 2009)
s.  18 ‘ORDINARY PAY’
18.1 In this Part 6 of these Rules, ‘Ordinary Pay’ of 
a Worker in respect of whom any entitlement 
to Long Service Leave Benefit or pay in lieu of 
Long Service Leave Benefit accrues means the 
total amount of remuneration actually received 
by him during a week calculated as at the date 
of the taking of the leave by the Worker or as 
at the time of his death (as the case may be), 
but does not include:
(a)  any remuneration paid in respect of work 
performed by the Worker outside his 
normal weekly number of hours of work;
(b)  any allowance paid in respect of fares or 
travelling expenses; or
(c)  any loading paid in respect of 
remuneration paid during the taking of 
any annual leave;
18.2 For the purpose of the definition of ‘Ordinary 
Pay’ in rule 18.1:.....
(b)  where no normal weekly number of hours 
is fixed for a Worker under the terms of his 
employment the normal weekly number of 
hours of work shall be deemed to be the 
average weekly number of hours worked by 
him during that period of twelve months; .....
1.2  Queensland Scheme
 Building and Construction Industry (PLSL) Act 
1991
 s. 59 Amount of long service leave 
payment
(1)  In this section—
 LSLP (long service leave payment) 
means the amount of long service leave 
payment.
 P (pay), in relation to an application 
by a registered worker under section 
56, means the lesser of the following 
amounts—
(a)  the amount of ordinary pay for a normal 
working week that is, in the authority’s 
opinion, payable to the registered worker;
(b)  the amount fixed under section 59A(1).
 relevant award or agreement means 
the relevant building and construction 
industry award or agreement.....
s. 59A Maximum amount of ordinary pay for 
normal working week
(1)  For section 59(2), if P is an amount greater 
than $1400, P is fixed at—
(a)  for the period from commencement of this 
section until 30 June 2009—$1400; or
(b)  for any later financial year—the amount notified 
by the Minister by gazette notice.
(2)  As soon as practicable after 1 January in each 
year, the authority must review the cap and 
recommend the change to the cap that the 
authority considers appropriate.....
aPPendix 1. MeanIng of ‘ordInary Pay’ or 
‘reMuneratIon’ In Plsl statutes.
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1.3 ACT Scheme
Long Service Leave (Portable Schemes) Act 2009 
(Schedule 1)
Rate is—
(a)  if the registered worker is receiving 
compensation under the Workers Compensation 
Act 1951—the weekly average of the ordinary 
remuneration received by the worker during 
the 4 quarters before the injury to which the 
compensation relates happened; or
(b)  in any other case—the highest of the weekly 
averages of the ordinary remuneration received 
by the registered worker during each of the 
following periods that applies to the worker:
(i)  the most recent 2 quarters of service 
as a registered employee before the 
designated day;
(ii)  the most recent 4 quarters of service 
as a registered employee before the 
designated day.
1.4 South Australia Scheme.
Construction Industry LSL Regulations
s. 6—Ordinary weekly pay
Pursuant to section 4(3)(d) of the Act—
(a)  the following payments made to or for the 
benefit of a construction worker must be 
included for the purposes of a determination 
or calculation under section 4(3):
(i) any payment related to annual leave 
(other than a payment in the nature of an 
annual leave loading);
(ii) any payment related to sick leave;
(iii) any payment related to a day off work for 
a public holiday;
(iv) any payment related to a rostered day off 
work;
(v) any industry allowance or tool allowance;
(vi) any compensation by way of income 
maintenance paid in respect of a 
compensable disability under the Workers 
Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Act 1986 (but not if the period, or the 
aggregate of separate periods, for which 
the compensation has already been paid 
exceeds 2 years); and
(b) the following payments made to or for the 
benefit of a construction worker must be 
excluded for the purposes of a determination 
or calculation under section 4(3):
(i) any payment in the nature of an annual 
leave loading;
(ii) any payment in respect of overtime;
(iii) any payment in the nature of a bonus;
(iv) any site allowance;
(v) any payment made on the retirement or 
retrenchment of the worker, or in relation 
to any redundancy, other than for back-
pay;
(vi) any payment in respect of fares or in the 
nature of a travelling allowance;
(vii) any payment that is in the nature of 
a special rate paid to the worker on 
an irregular basis to compensate for 
occasional disabilities under which work 
is performed, other than where the rate is 
paid during a period of leave with pay.
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2.  Examples of  
Definitions Used in 
Contract Cleaning 
Schemes.
 
2.1  ACT Scheme
Long Service Leave (Portable Schemes) Act 2009 
(Schedule 2)
Rate is the highest of the weekly averages of the 
ordinary remuneration received by the registered 
worker during each of the following periods that 
applies to the worker:
(a)  the most recent 2 quarters of service as a 
registered worker before the designated day;
(b)  the most recent 4 quarters of service as a 
registered worker before the designated day;
(c) the most recent 20 quarters of service as a 
registered worker before the designated day;
(d)  the most recent 40 quarters of service as a 
registered worker before the designated day.
 
2.2  Queensland Scheme 
Contract Cleaning Industry (PLSL) Act 2005
s. 73 Amount of long service leave payment
(1)  R means the annual rate of pay that is payable 
for the classification level at the time the 
application under section 71 is made.
(4)  In this section—
 classification level means a classification 
level under an industrial instrument prescribed 
under a regulation.
 moderated wages, of a registered worker 
for a return period, means the ordinary wages 
earned by the registered worker during the 
return period divided by the annual rate of pay 
that is payable for the classification level at the 
end of the return period.
 
2.3  NSW Scheme 
Contract Cleaning Industry (PLSL Scheme) Act 
2010
s.66 R is the highest of the weekly averages of 
the ordinary remuneration received by the 
registered worker during each of the following 
periods that applies to the worker:
(a)  the most recent 2 quarters of service as a 
registered worker before the designated 
day,
(b)  the most recent 4 quarters of service as a 
registered worker before the designated 
day,
(c)  the most recent 20 quarters of service as 
a registered worker before the designated 
day,
(d)  if relevant—the most recent 40 quarters 
of service as a registered worker before 
the designated day
s.68 Deemed minimum and maximum rates of 
pay
(1)  Despite section 66, the regulations may make 
provision for the determination of minimum 
and maximum amounts for R for the purposes 
of the formula in that section.
(2) T he Minister is to consult with the Committee 
before recommending the making of a 
regulation under this section.
(3)  The Committee is to advise and make 
recommendations to the Minister on the 
operation of, and any amendment to or repeal 
of, any regulation made under this section.
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aPPendix 2. actuarIal estIMates of 
adMInIstratIon costs as a Percentage of 
worKer’s wages
Fund nuMbeR oF 
eMPloyeeS
eStiMated 
adMiniStRation 
coStS (% 
wageS)
SouRce
Coal Mining 44,880 0.10% 2011 Actuarial Report (notes 
that actual administration 
expenses have been within 
this budget)
ACT 
Community 
Services 
(Initial 
costing)
6,600 0.20%1 Updated Actuarial Assessment 
of the Costs of a PLSL 
Scheme for the Community 
Service Sector 2009
Victoria 
Construction
0.23% / 0.25% 2 2012 Actuarial Report
Victoria 
Community 
Sector 
(proposed)
0.10% 3 Actuarial feasibility study for 
proposed scheme 2008
Western 
Australia
0.10% 2012 Actuarial Report
Note: Other schemes’ actuarial estimates were not available.
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The Alsynite Employees' Entitlement Trust 1 April 2005
AMCA ACT Industry Development Training and Redundancy Trust 1 April 2005
Australian Construction Industry Redundancy Trust 1 April 2003
The Austral Refrigeration Employees' Entitlement Trust 1 April 2005
BERT Fund No.2 1 April 2003
Building Industry Redundancy Scheme Trust 1 April 2003
CFMEU Mining & Energy Employees' Entitlement Trust 9 October 2006
Contracting Industry Redundancy Trust (Queensland) 1 April 2003
Construction Industry Complying Portable Sick Leave Pay Scheme 1 April 2003
Electrical Industry Severance Scheme 1 April 2003
Ensham Production and Engineering Employees' Leave Entitlements Trust 1 April 2006
Fisher & Paykel Termination Funding Trust 28 April 2009
J&P Richardson Industries Group Employee Entitlement Trust 1 April 2003
John Holland Group Worker Entitlement Fund 24 May 2010
KBAus Employees' Entitlement Trust (Knorr-Bremse Australia Pty Ltd) 1 April 2006
Mechanical and Electrical Redundancy Trust 1 April 2003
Metal and Engineering Construction and Contracting Industries Complying 
Portable Sick Leave Pay Scheme
1 April 2003
National Entitlement Security Trust 1 April 2003
The Port Kembla Coal Terminal Employees' Entitlements Trust 1 April 2005
Professional Employees Entitlements Trust 9 October 2006
Redundancy and Employee Entitlements Fund 1 April 2006
Redundancy Payment Approved Worker Entitlement Fund 1 1 April 2003
Redundancy Payment Approved Worker Entitlement Fund 2 1 April 2003
Secure Employee Entitlements Trust 1 April 2003
Severance payment scheme - Electrical Contractors Association of 
Western Australia (Inc)
1 April 2003
Shaw's Darwin Transport Employees' Entitlement Trust 11 March 2009
Tronics Employee Entitlement Scheme Trust 1 June 2005
Trust Employees' Entitlement Service 1 April 2004
Victorian Contract Cleaning Industry Portable Long Service Leave Fund 1 April 2003
WA Construction Industry Redundancy (No. 2) Fund 1 April 2003
aPPendix 3. ato lIst of aPProved worKer 
entItleMent funds (Per ato websIte 4 March 2013)
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aPPendix 4. vestIng requIreMents under state 
legIslatIon for MInIMuM lsl entItleMents
State oR 
teRRitoRy MiniMuM PRo Rata entitleMentS on leaving SeRvice
Australian  
Capital  
Territory
Employees who have completed 5 years continuous service, but less than 7 years, are 
entitled to pro rata payments after five years service, if (a) the employee dies (b) the 
employee resigns due to illness or incapacity (b) the employee resigns due to domestic 
or other pressing necessity (c) the employee’s services have been terminated by the 
employer for any reason other than serious and wilful misconduct. An employee who 
has more than 7 years continuous service is entitled to a pro rata payment for any 
unused LSL, on leaving employment for any reason.
NSW Employees who have completed 5 years continuous service, but less than 10 years, 
are entitled to pro rata payments after five years service, if (a) the employee dies (b) the 
employee resigns due to illness or incapacity (b) the employee resigns due to domestic 
or other pressing necessity (c) the employee’s services have been terminated by the 
employer for any reason other than serious and wilful misconduct. An employee who 
has more than 10 years continuous service is entitled to a pro rata payment for any 
unused LSL, on leaving employment for any reason.
Northern 
Territory
Employees who have completed 7 years continuous service with one employer, but 
less than 10 years service, are entitled to pro rata long service leave payments only on 
(a) death (b) illness or incapacity (c) domestic or pressing necessity (d) the employee’s 
services have been terminated by the employer for any reason other than serious and 
wilful misconduct. An employee who has more than 10 years continuous service is 
entitled to a pro rata payment for any unused LSL, on leaving employment for any 
reason (with some restrictions if terminated due to serious misconduct)
Queensland Employees who have completed 7 years continuous service with one employer, but 
less than 10 years service, are entitled to pro rata long service leave payments only on 
(a) death (b) illness or incapacity (c) domestic or pressing necessity (d) dismissal for a 
reason other than the employee’s conduct, capacity or performance (e) unfair dismissal. 
An employee who has more than 10 years continuous service is entitled to a pro rata 
payment for any unused LSL, on leaving employment for any reason.
South 
Australia
Employees who have completed 7 years continuous service, but less than 10 years, is 
entitled to pro rata long service leave payments (unless dismissed for serious and wilful 
misconduct). An employee who has more than 10 years continuous service is entitled to 
a pro rata payment for any unused LSL, on leaving employment for any reason.
Victoria Employees who have completed at least 7 years service are entitled to a pro rata 
long service leave payment for any unused long service leave. This applies on death, 
resignation, or termination. 
Western 
Australia
Employees who have completed 7 years continuous service, but less than 10 years, is 
entitled to pro rata long service leave payments (unless dismissed for serious and wilful 
misconduct). An employee who has more than 10 years continuous service is entitled to 
a pro rata payment for any unused LSL, on leaving employment for any reason.
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